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ABSTRACT 
Four studies investigated the effects of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988) on the 
processing of health-risk information. Prior to being presented with health information, 
participants completed either a control or self-affirmation task focusing them on their 
values or strengths. Study 1 found self-affirmation promoted acceptance of the 
personal implications of health information targeting female students' alcohol 
consumption. Self-affirmed participants reported greater risk perceptions, negative 
affect and intentions to reduce alcohol intake. Differences were maintained up to one-
month later. Study 2 describes the development of a practical self-affirmation 
technique, rooted in contemporary thinking about values. Using this technique, Study 
3 found evidence that self-affirmation promoted orientation to threatening health 
information, and was associated with a reduction in an unhealthy behaviour. Self-
affirmation was not found to influence effort applied to message· processing. Study 4 
investigated participants' sensitivity to argument. strength. Rather than self-affirmation 
reducing biased processing, self-affirmation was associated with less inductive 
processing and sensitivity to message strength. Study 5 examined whether the effects. 
of self-affirmation were mediated by changes in processes identified by models from 
the fear appeal literature. Self-affirmation was found to increase intentions and 
behaviours aimed at adopting a healthy behaviour. Overall, three of the four studies 
provided evidence suggesting that affirming the self in a domain unrelated to health 
reduced biased processing of health information. This reduction in biased processing 
appeared to be associated with systematic rather than heuristic processing. The effects 
of self-affirmation were not mediated by a reduction in negative affect or increases in 
coping appraisals. Self-affirmation may have the potential as an applied technique, 
with evidence in the present thesis that it is associate'd with durable changes in 
- " 
persuasion, and effective for both those low and high in self-esteem. Further research 
is needed to establish possible moderators of the effects of self-affirmation. " 
, IX 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
. "J don't drink enough [alcohol] for it to affect my health. 1 won't drink. 
this much when I'm older anyway. Breast cancer happens to older 
people. 1 won't be one of the 2,000 deaths." 
''There might not be a definite link [between alcohol and breast cancer], 
it could be something else. They probably changed or used figures that 
suited them." 
"I drink too much alcohol, but other students do too. Other factors must 
have a more significant role in developing breast cancer anyway. I'm 
sure I'll drink less when I'm not a student." 
. "I know 1 should reduce my alcohol intake but it's easier said than 
done. 1 will probably just repress what I've read or something". 
"How can there be a link? It'll just be estimates. I'm sceptical, but 
maybe it's because 1 don't want to believe it. 1 don't want to see myself 
as putting myself at risk." 
Reactions of female students to information that their high level of alcohol 
consumption could be putting them at risk of breast cancer. 
'. 
These women's responses to negative, personally-relevant health information provide 
an illustration of people's attempt to ward off unwelcome health information. When 
faced with information that their drinking behaviour could be putting their health at 
. . 
risk these women denied or minimised the impact of the message. Denial and 
mini~sation of risk may have consequences for people's beh~viour and health, for 
example, preventing them from changing their unhealthy behaviou~ and reducing their 
risk. The present chapter will outline evidence that people respond differently to 
, 
negative, personally-relevant health information, before reviewing explanations that 
have been applied to understanding why people s~meti~es reject relev'ant health 
messages that could have potential benefits for health. The final section of this chapter 
will discuss self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) as an explanation for why people 
resist certain types of health information, and will discuss evidence for the theory. 
How do people process personally relevant health-risk information? 
People respond to health-risk information differently dependent upon whether 
this information is personally relevant to them (Berkowitz & Cottingham, 1960; 
1 
Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). For instance, Kassarjian and Cohen (1965) demonstrated 
that smokers, in comparison to non-smokers, were less persuaded by the Surgeon 
. . 
General's report outlining the health risks as~ociated with smoking. This effect has 
been replicated by a variety of other studies. Kunda (1987; Study 3) provided men and 
women with a health message about the increased risk of fibrocystic disease (FBD) 
and breast cancer as a result of caffeine consumption. Male participants, who are 
unlikely to experience FBD or breast cancer and thus for whom the message was less 
relevant, were equally convinced by the information regardless of their caffeine 
consumption. In contrast, women who consumed high levels of caffeine and for whom 
the message was relevant were less convinced by the message than women who drank 
low levels of caffeine. Conversely, when low caffeine consumers were told caffeine 
could help prevent the disease, this group were least persuaded by the information 
(Sherman & Kunda, 1989; cited in Kunda, 1990). Liberman and Chaiken (1992) 
investigated the effects of personally-relevant health information using a similar 
message outlining the evidence for and against the risks of caffeine associated with po 
FBD. Participants were presented with either a strong version of the message, 
indicating the majority of evidence was in favour of a link, or a weaker version, which 
~uggested there was more evidence contrary to the link. High caffeine drinkers, for 
whom the message was relevant, were less likely to believe in the link, ind~pendent of 
whether they received the strong or weaker version of the message. Low relevance 
participants also reported the information describing the link between FBD and 
caffeine as superior to the information against the link, whereas higher risk participants 
did not. Furthermore, while low relevance participants reported that the risk-
confirming and risk-disconfirming information did not differ in terms of number of 
t 
weaknesses, high-risk participants saw more weaknesses in the risk-confirming 
information. The pattern of results suggests that when a negative health message is 
personally-relevant, participants report being less persuaded by the information. 
Studies using feedback on medical tests have also provided evidence that 
people process information differently when it suggests they are at risk of a disease, 
compared with when it suggests they are not at risk (Croyle & Sande, 1988; Ditto, 
Jemm~tt, & Darley, 1988; Ditto & Lopez,'1992; Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986). 
Jemmott et al. (1986) asked participants to take a fictitious Thioamine Acetylase 
2 
(TAA) enzyme saliva test. Results ofthe test were supposedly indicative of the 
likelihood of experiencing a range of pancreatic disorders. Personal relevance of the 
test results was manipulated by varying whether participants' results indicated they did 
or did not have TAA enzyme deficiency. Those who received results suggestive of a 
deficiency rated the health threat as less serious, and rated the test as less accurate. 
Ditto and Lopez (1992) also demonstrated that when participants were told they had a 
deficiency they were more likely to question the validity of the test (see also Croyle, 
Sun, Louie, 1993), spent more time examining their enzyme test strips, and attempted 
more often to retest themselves, than those whose results indicated no deficiency was 
present. These differences on behavioural measures may indicate that at-risk 
participants were less trusting of their test results. A variety of other studies, either 
using the TAA paradigm (Croyle & Sande, 1988), feedback on blood pressure (Croyle, 
1990), or cholesterol tests (Croyle et aI., 1993), have also found that participants who-
receive feedback indicating that they are at greater risk of a health disorder tend to rate 
the disorder as less serious than those who are told they are not at risk. 
Participants who receive personally-relevant health risk information have also 
been shown to differ in their recall of this information. Croyle, Sun, and Hart (1997) 
examined errors in recall of cholesterol test results. They found that participants who 
received test results that suggested that they were at greatest risk were more likely to 
inaccurately recall their cholesterol to be more desirable than it actually was, both in 
terms of their actual cholesterol level and the risk that this level implied. 
This pattern of responses has also been found to be moderated by how severe 
the health risk presented is. For instance, Kunda (1987, Study 4) examined the impact 
of reducing the level of threat upon differential processing of relevant and non-relevant 
, . 
messages. Kunda reduced the severity of the FBD health risk by describing the 
disorder as a common condition that some doctors argued should not be considered a 
disease at all. When severity of the condition was lower. higher and lower risk women 
did not differ in how convincing they perceived the riskinformation to be. Janis and 
Feshbach (1953) also demonstrated that the severity of a health message influences 
i 
message evaluation and acceptance. When participants received a health message 
outlining the risks of tooth decay, participants who received the message portraying 
3 
the risks as more serious, and more personally relevant, were least persuaded to change 
their behaviour. 
Research examining evaluation of other forms of negative, personally-relevant 
l 
information provides a similar pattern to that of health information. For instance, 
studies examining what impact failure on an IQ or social sensitivity test has upon 
people's evaluation of the test indicate that people who score poorly rate the test as 
less valid, than those who receive favourable results (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Holt, 
1985; Wyer & Frey, 1983). These effects are not limited to how people evaluate 
information. For instance, being provided with negative, personally-relevant 
information about one's personal traits (e.g., informing an extrovert that extraversion 
is associated with poor academic success) can influence the way in which participants 
evaluate themselves on that trait (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989), or what memories they 
generate (e.g., more introvert or extrovert) (Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). People 
respond differently to negative, personally-relevant information, whether it be in 
relation to health or another aspect of the self, in comparison to non-personally 
relevant, or favourable information. 
The pattern of responses to negative, personally-relevant health information, 
including the reduction in belief in the message, questioning the validity of the 
information and minimising the severity of the threat, particularly for severe threats, is 
both concerning for those attempting to develop effective health interventions, and of 
theoretical interest. Why do people appear less persuaded by messages when they are 
personally relevant and could have the potential to improve their health? 
. Why do people respond differently to negative personally-relevant information? 
The evidence outlined above has been used to argue that people demonstrate a 
bias in the way in which they process negative, personally-relevant health information 
(Chaiken et aI., 1996; Giner-Sorolla et aI., 1997; Kunda, 1990). This bias in processing 
is characterised by negative, personally-relevant information being evaluated more 
harshly, and the implications of the information being minimised. Why people respond 
in such a way still remains a controversial topic, with some emphasising the role of 
motivational factors (e.g., people process information with a goal to maintain 
favourable evaluations of the self) and others cognitive factors (e.g., expectations, 
prior beliefs). The following sections outline these two accounts, before examining 
4 
models from the fear appeal literature and how these have been applied to 
understanding rejection of health information. 
Motivational accounts of biased processing of health messages 
Until the 1980s dual-processing models of persuasion, such as the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM, Chaiken, 1980, 1987) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), assumed that people processed information with the 
goal of forming objective and accurate beliefs and attitudes. Drawing on evidence of 
biased processing of information (Kunda, 1990) the authors of these models 
recognised that accuracy may not always serve as the primary goal when processing 
information. Chaiken and colleagues (e.g., Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996) 
subsequently developed a multiple motive framework for understanding processing of 
information, and alongside the desire to be accurate they included the motives of 
defence and impression management. Defence motivation has been used to account 
for biased processing of health information. Chaiken et al. (1996) defined defence 
motivation as ''The desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that are congruent with existing 
self-definitional a~titudes and beliefs." (Chaiken et aI., 1996, p. 557). Self-definitional 
beliefs and attitudes are those closely related to important aspects of the self, including 
values, social identities, attributes and interests (Chaiken et aI., 1996). Those 
motivated to respond defensively do not primarily seek to hold an accurate view of the 
_ world or self, but process information in such a way as to mliintain their prior beliefs _ 
and attitudes. Petty and Cacioppo's (1981) ELM also distinguishes relatively objective 
or biased processing. They describe someone engaged in biased processing as 
"motivated or able to generate a particular kind of thought, often in defence of an 
initial attitude" (petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 45) . 
. Chaiken and colleagues assume that negative, personally-relevant health 
information is processed in a biased manner because it is incongruent with people's 
beliefs about their own health. One's own health is argued to form an important self-
conception (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997). Croyle et al. (1997) argue that people 
view health not only as a goal (e.g., "I want to be healthy") but as a value (e.g., "being 
healthy is important and good").Consequently, Croyle et at, propose that people 
desire to see themselves as healthy, and information incongruent with this belief is 
defended against. Thus the motivated account of biased processing suggests that a 
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health message threatens beliefs about one's health and is processed in such a way as 
to maintain prior beliefs and reduce the perceived threat to self-conceptions. Thus, 
negative, personally-relevant messages are argued to be "threatening" (Liberman & 
Chaiken, 1992). By processing threatening health information to maintain self-
conception, for example by denying or distorting the information, the threat to self-
conceptions is reduced, even though the actual danger to health is not reduced (Hogan, 
1952; cited in Lazarus, 1966). 
Models such as the Heuristic-Systematic Model outline how defence 
motivation may influence information processing. The Heuristic-Systematic Model 
proposes that information processing occurs at two concurrent levels, a relatively 
effortless heuristic level and a more effortful systematic level. When information is 
processed heuristically, judgemental rules or "heuristics" are activated. For example, a 
person may make judgments about the reliability of information based on learnt rules, 
such as "experts can be trusted" or "message length implies strength of arguments". 
Heuristic processing provides a relatively low cognitively demanding means of 
processing information. 
Systematic processing involves more in-depth examination of the content of 
" 
, the information; this form of processing is more analytical, comprehensive and 
effortful (Chaiken et at, 1996). Whether people engage in systematic processing will 
, depend on both the motivational factors (e.g.~ personal involvement with message) and 
their capacity to process a message in detail (e.g., time or resources). 
Chaiken and colleagues (Chaiken et al., 1996, Chen and Chaiken, 1999) 
suggest that both heuristic and systematic processing can be governed by defence 
motivation. In the case of the heuristic mode, a defence motive may influence the 
selectivity of which heuristics are applied. For example, heuristics that favour the ' 
\ 
desired outcome will be applied over those that do not (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 
1997). Furthermore, participants may apply an heuristic that information that is . 
incongruent with personal beliefs, values or attitudes is invalid (Liberman, de la Hoz, 
& Chaiken, 1988). 
Participants have also been shown to demonstrate selectivity in the amount of 
processing they apply to a health message (Chaiken et al., 1996). Participants may 
I 
avoid processing a negative personally-relevant message in-depth and engage in 
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attentional avoidance. Both cognitive and behavioural distractions can be used to avoid 
comprehending a threatening message (Blumberg, 2000). This form of avoidance is 
characterised by both inattention to the message and reduced recall of the content 
(Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). 
Alternatively, defence-motivated participants are hypothesised to apply more 
effort to processing a threatening message (Chaiken et aI., 1996). Whet;l defence 
motivation and cognitive capacity are both high, participants may engage in biased 
systematic processing. Defence-motivated participants may. selectively process 
inforInation by applying greater scrutiny and engaging in more counter-arguing of 
information contrary to prior beliefs or values (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). A defence 
motivation is also argued to lead to avoidance of personal inferences, such that a 
person is able to accept a health risk is true, but stop short of accepting that the 
message has personal implications (Blumberg, 2000). Consistent with the literature on 
defensive processing, the coping literature also describes a variety of strategies, 
including denial and rationalisation that can be employed to minimise the impact of 
negative, personally-relevant infonnation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Pearlin & 
Schooler,1978).. 
i 
The motivated account of biased processing acknowledges that there are limits 
to the effects of defence motivation on information processing. Kunda (1990) suggests 
. that biased responses will be constrained by information and participants' prior beliefs 
and knowledge. For instance, a weak message will be easier to defend against than a 
message presenting very strong evidence that a participant is at risk (petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Das: de Wit, and Stroebe's (2003) Stage Model of processing health 
messages, drawing upon Chaiken (1980) and Petty & Cacioppo's (1986) dual 
prOCessing models, predicts that when health information threatens a participant's self-
, 
conceptions a defence motivation will be aroused, leading to biased systematic 
processing. They argue that health information will only be accepted if constraints of 
the infonnation and rules of inference make biased systematic processing 
unsuccessful. 
The motivated processing account suggests that when people encounter a 
negative, personally-relevant health message they may not proces~ the message with a 
goal of accuracy, but instead be motivated to defend important self-conceptions. This 
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motivated processing leads to biases in participants' response to the health message, 
and ultimately to l~ss persuasion and behaviour change (Janis & Feshbach, 1953; 
Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). 
Non-motivational accounts of biased processing of health messages 
Non-motivational accounts have also been applied to understanding why 
people process health information differently when it is negative and relevant. The 
quantity-of-processing (QOP; Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998) perspective of motivated processing suggests that 
biased processing m~y not be a result of people simply believing what they want to 
believe, but a result of the amount of attention applied to processing the message. Ditto 
and Lopez (1992) suggest that it is adaptive for organisms to direct more attention and 
effort to processing information that is negative or preference-inconsistent, than 
. 
information that is favourable, or preference-consistent. Thus more critical evaluations 
of preference-inconsistent information (e.g., "you are at risk"), rather than prefer:nce-
consistent information (e.g., "you are not at risk") results from more intense cognitive 
processing, \yhich in tum leads participants to be more sensitive to flaws in the health 
( 
message . 
. Renner's (2004) cue adaptive reasoning account (CARA), extends the QOP 
perspective and provides a non-motivational account of biased processing by 
suggesting that expectations about health information could account for biases in 
processing. Renner suggests that unexpected information, either negative or indeed 
; ~" .: 
positive, will receive greater scrutiny, which in tum leads to more critical evaluation. 
Indeed, Renner demonstrated that both unexpected positive or negative personally-
. ' 
relevant information undergoes greater cognitive processing and is viewed as less 
accurate. Non-motivational accounts of biases in processing of information suggest 
that negative, personally-relevant information contradicts participants' prior beliefs 
and expectations about their health. Consequently, the information receives greater 
, < ,~' 
attention, increasing the likelihood of flaws in the information being identified, and 
ultimately leading to reduced belief in the message and persuasion. 
According to non-motivational~ccounts of biased processing, personally-
relevant and negative health information tends to be rejected, not because it threatens 
deeply held self-conceptions, but as it is unexpected and receives greater attention. 
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Models of processing fear appeals as accounts of biased processing of health 
messages 
As well as motivational and non-motivational accounts of health information ' 
processing, the literature examining the processing of fear appeals has also highlighted 
affective and cognitive factors that may account for why people reject a relevant health 
message. 
More severe health threats have been found to be associated with greater fear 
and less persuasio~ (Janis & Feshbach, 1953). This finding has led some researchers to 
suggest that fear could motivate defensive responses to health messages (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Janis, 1967; McGuire, 1968, 1969). According to Hovland et 
al.'s (1953) Drive Reduction Model of persuasion, participants are motivated to reduce 
fear associated with a personally-relevant health message, and if processing of the 
recommendatio~s of the health message (e.g., what can be done to reduce the risk) fail 
to reduce fear then people may spontaneously engage in defensive cognitions to reduce 
the fear by another means. 
Though later models (Janis, 1967; McGuire, 1968, 1969) also suggest low 
levels of fear m~y have a positive impact for message persuasion, when a message 
arouses high levels of fear this is seen to interfere with message acceptance, leading to 
biased processing of the message. However, evidence for fear reduction models of 
persuasion is weak (Sutton, 1982; Witte, 1992), leading to alternative models placing 
less emphasis on fear as a motivational factor and more emphasis on cognitive 
antecedents of message acceptance. Leventhal's (1970) parallel process model 
provides one such account. This model describes two simultaneous processes,fear 
control and danger control. Danger control involves processes aiming to deal with the 
actual danger rather than participants' perceptions of the threat. Fear control does not 
resolve the actual danger, but involves actions and cognitions targeting the fear 
experienced, for example reappraisal of the threat. Unlike the early drive models the. 
parallel process model suggests adaptive responses to a threat need not be driven by 
fear, but have their basis in danger control. , \. 
Further research has elaborated on Leventhal's model, with expectancy-value 
theories, such as Sutton's application of the subjective expected utility theory (SEU; 
1982) and Roger's (1975, 1983) protection motivation theory (PMT). In comparison to 
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parallel process model, these theories place an even greater emphasis on the role of 
cognitions in acceptance of health messages. Assuming people are rational processors, 
Sutton argues that the decision to accept a health message or reject it is based on three 
factors: the utility of the threat (e.g., the value attached to the outcome, with an 
unfavourable outcome having negative utility), and the subjective probability of the 
negative outcome occurring if the person takes no action, or the likelihood if they 
follow the recommend.ed action. Put simply, the model predicts that for a person to be 
persuaded to take action by a health message they must first believe the outcome of 
taking no action is negative and that they will be less likely to experience this negative 
outcome if they take action. Motivational factors, such as fear, are not directly 
incorporated into the model. Thus, according to this approach message rejection is not 
a result of a desire to maintain positive self-conceptions, but is mediated by people's 
cognitions about the health risk and their behaviours to reduce the risk. 
Roger's (1975, 1983) PMT similarly provides a cognitive account of 
processing of health messages. In its original version PMT identified vulnerability to 
the negative outcome, severity of the outcome, and perceived efficacy of the person to 
carry out the recommended action as key cognitive variables mediating the impact of 
health threats. Self-efficacy was later bro~en down into self-efficacy, one's perceived 
ability to carry out the behaviour, and response efficacy, the effectiveness of the action 
to reduce the threat (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). These ~ognitive variables generated 
protection motivation, "an intervening variable that has the typical characteristics of a 
motive: it arouses, sustains, and directs activity" (Rogers, 1975, p. 98), operationalised 
. as intentions to adopt a health behaviour or reduce an unhealthy behaviour. High levels 
of each of the four components are proposed to lead to greater message acceptance. 
A revised version of PMT (Rogers, 1983) included the further cognitive 
mediating processes of perceived rewards of the maladaptive behaviour and costs of 
. adaptive behaviour, and distinguished between threat and coping appraisals. This . 
expanded version of the theory proposes that when threat appraisals (e.g., perceptions 
of severity and vulnerability) are high, but coping appraisals (self- and response-
efficacy) are low, such that a person perceives themselves at risk of a serious health 
threat but can do little about it, no intention to change will occur.' 
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Though PMT ac~owledges that fear can act both as a precursor and a 
consequence of threat perceptions, fear arousal is no longer seen as a motivational 
force in determining message rejection or acceptance. This emphasis on cognitive, 
rather than affective responses to threat, has been argued to be a limitation of models 
aiming to examine what moderates message acceptance, and may help to account for 
why such models have received only partial support (Witte, 1992). One model that has 
attempted to tackle this lack of acknowledgement of the role of affect is Witte and 
colleagues' (1992, 1994,2000) Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM). The EPPM 
is founded in Leventhal's parallel process model, using the concepts of danger and fear 
control. EPPM predicts that when a health threat is encountered people firstly appraise 
the threat and then their coping resources. When perceptions of threat (vulnerability 
and severity) are high, people experience fear and then are motivated to appraise their 
self- and response-efficacy. If both coping and threat appraisals are high danger 
control should be initiated, with people generating adaptive responses to directly 
reduce the danger. However, if threat appraisals are high, but coping appraisals are 
low, fear control should be initiated, with people generating defensive responses to 
reduce the threat without reducing the danger. Witte and Allen (2000) conducted a 
, , 
meta-analysis of fear appeals and found evidence in support of the EPPM. Consistent 
with the EPPM, stronger fear appeals elicited stronger fear control, as did weaker 
efficacy messages. High threat I high efficacy messages were also found to be the most 
effective for persuasion. However, the interaction of threat and efficacy was not 
significant. In fact, the findings were more consistent with Sutton's SEU model. Witte 
. and Allen conclude that currently the evidence does not support o~e model over 
another. 
Currently, models of fear appeals appear inadequate at predicting when biased 
processing and message rejection will occur. In a'review of fear appeals, Ruiter, 
Abraham, and Kok (200 i) suggest that the lack of clarity in the use of the te~s threat 
and fear may help to account for inconsistencies within the literatUre. Ruiter et al. 
, , 
argue that fear directly generates fear control processes, such as denial or . 
rationalisation in response to health risk information, independent of threat appraisals. 
. . , . . ' 
Furthermore, fear C~ln influence both threat appraisals and attention to efficacy 
information. Ruiter et al. suggest that affect comprises a primary and automatic 
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response to health messages. In their re-conceptualisation of the effects of fear appeals 
fear, independent of threat, is seen to mediate the effects of fear appeals on message .. 
acceptance. 
Das, de Wit, and Stroebe's (2003) stage model of fear-arousing 
communications is one account that has incorporated concepts from fear appeal 
research (coping appraisals and threat appraisals) with dual-process theories of attitude 
change (HSM, Chaiken, 1980, 1987; ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Das et al. 
suggest that defensive processing is a result of health messages forming threats to 
important self-conceptions, rather than a response to fear. Unlike the models discussed 
above, Das et al. also predict that threat appraisals will predict depth of processing 
(e.g., if a person feels vulnerable and the threat is severe they will engage in more 
systematic processing). The stage model will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, 
as it was published since the start of, the research programme in 2002. 
Research aiming to understand what predicts the effectiveness of fear appeal is 
currently inconclusive about the mediating roles of affective and cognitive vari~bles. 
For example, it is unclear whether threat appraisals and coping appraisals interact to 
predict message acceptance and what effect, if any, affect has on message acceptance. 
,-
Setting aside th'ese unresolved issues, these models of processing fear appeals 
complement the motivational and non-motivational accounts of biased processing, 
highlighting factors that may be important in mediating message acceptance. 
Self-affirmation theory 
Whether biases in the processing of personally-relevant health information are 
a result of non-motivated or motivated processes remains contentious. The aim of the 
. ~ ;:, 
present thesis was to test the implications of one specific motivational account of 
'. . 
biased processing of health information, that of self-affirmation theory. Self· 
affirmation theory predicts that people are motivated to defend against negative,. 
personally-relevant health messages as they form a threat to a person's self-integrity. 
Steele (1988) describes self-integrity as a sense of the self as "adaptively and morally 
adequate, that is, competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, 
capable of controlling important outcomes, and so on." (p. 262). Self-affirmation 
. . 
theory suggests that people are motivated to maintain this positive experience of the 
self. 
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Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) developed out of the dissommce 
literature (Festinger, 1957). Festinger's work identified the need for consistency 
between attitudes, behaviour and beliefs as a key motivator in persuasion and decision-
making. If a health message led to inconsistencies between participants' beliefs and 
behaviour, for example, choosing to smoke cigarettes even though there are clear and 
well-established health risks associated with the action, this inconsistency could lead 
to rationalisation, denial and in some cases changes in behaviour. Festinger argued that 
it was this need for consistency that could motivate defensive reactions. 
Steele argues that people are more resilient in dealing with threats to the self 
than Festinger originally assumed. Steele suggests that people are able to engage in 
strategies to reduce a threat without directly tackling the inconsistency itself. Steele 
proposed that it is not the inconsistency that triggers the use of defensive strategies, but 
the fact that inconsistencies are one form of threat to people's perceptions of 
themselves as good, competent and morally adequate. For'example smoking while 
. ' 
acknowledging the increased risk of disease, threatens the view of the self as 
competent, adequate and adapti~e. 
Steele argues that it is not the need to reduce the inconsistency per se, but the 
need to restore a positive experience of the self that drives processes such as denial, 
rationalisation or attitude change. These,processes in themselves act as self-
affirmations, re-e~tablishing perceived self-integrity or adequacy or'the self. For 
instance, by denying the potential risk to health, or minimising the personal 
implications of a health message, the threat to self-integrity is reduced and a positive 
. view of the self is maintained. 
Though self-affirmations in the form of defensive reactions can have a negative 
impact for acceptance of a relevant health message, the theory also suggests that self-
affirmation can promote self-objectivity. Steele proposes that affirming one's self in a 
domain unrelated to a thfeat provides an alternative route to restore perceived self-
integrity and to reduce the need to engage in other self-affirming strategies, such as 
denial or rationalisation of the threat itself. 
Self-affirmation can take many forms. Steele argues that affirming any 
, . 
important and valued self-concept (e.g., traits~ values, identities and so on, Markus and 
Wurf, 1987) will act to restore one's self-integrity. Affirming one's values, or'the 
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. moral principles and standards one considers to be desirable (Chambers English 
Dictionary, 1990), has provided a particularly popular technique of self-affirmation " 
. (Koole, Smets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 
2000; Spencer, Fein & Lomore., 2001; Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). 
The concept that affirming one's values may have consequences for the self is not 
new. Katz (1960) argued that attitudes can hold a value-expressive function, and the 
act of expressing core aspects of the self can affirm these self-conceptions. Rokeach 
(1980) suggests that valu~s function to maintain and enhance self-conceptions 
important for facilitating social relationships. Greenwald (1989) indicates that values 
may act as a means of enhancing self-regard, for example, when core values are met or 
exceeded, whereas failing to meet one's values can have a negative effect for one's 
self-concept (Julka & Marsh, 2000). Though value affirmations provide a popular 
means of self-affirming, more broadly any behaviour or cognition that acts to restore 
self-integrity can be affirming. For example, as described above, biased processing of 
a health thre~t could act as a self-affirmation (Steele, 1988, p. 290). Chapter 3 !ooks in 
more detail at what constitutes an effective affirmation. 
Evidence for self-affirmation theory 
The first tests of self-affirmation theory focused on the use of dissonance 
paradigms. Steele and Liu (1983) reasoned that if dissonance is a result of a threat to 
self-integrity, then providing participants with an opportunity to affirm an unrelated 
self-concept should reduce ·dissonance. If, however, dissonance is a result of a 
perceived inconsistency, affirming an unrelated aspect of the self that does not resolve 
this inconsistency should have no effect. Steele and Liu found evidence consistent with 
self-affirmation theory, demonstrating that when participants had been provided with 
an opportunity to focus on personally important values after writing a counter-
attitudinal essay, they were less likely to demonstrate attitude change. Steele and Liu 
(1981) found that the mere expectation of being able to affirm one's self after a 
dissonant act could also reduce dissonance. Tesser, Crepez, Collins, Cornell, and 
Beach (2000) also demonstrated that when dissonance is greatest, in a high choice 
condition, participants write more self-affirming essays about an important value. 
Further research using dissonance paradigms has clarified factors that moderate 
the effectiveness of self-affirmation to overcome dissonance. Blanton, Cooper, 
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Skumik, and Aronson, (1997) demonstrated that the relationship between the domain 
of the self-affirmation and of the self-threat influences its effectiveness at reducing 
dissonance. That is, self-affirmation in the same domain as a threat, for example 
affirming one's compassion while advocating funding cuts for students with 
disabilities, exacerbated dissonance. People have also been shown to prefer self-
affirmations that are not contradicted by a self-threat (1. Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 
1995). For example, when given a choice of self-concepts on which to self-affirm 
people will choose those that are unrelated to the threat. These findings suggests that 
affirmation can act both as a source of self-objectivity and also as a standard. If an 
affirmation is contradicted by a threat in the same domain the affirmation may remind 
participants of their failings and have negative consequences for their self-conceptions. 
Research has also examined whether people will actually engage in self-
affirmation in a separate domain following a threat. Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, and' 
Aronson (1997) threatened participants by reminding them of their own or other's 
excuses for unsafe sexual practices. When participants were personally threatened in 
this way they were more likely to self-affirm by donating money to a homeless project, 
than those who were not threatened, providing support for self-affirmation theory. 
However, when an option to directly reduce dissonance was presented (purchasing 
condoms) participants were more likely to choose the direct rather than the indirect 
strategy to overcome the threat. Steele (1988) proposes that people are likely to engage 
in whatever strategy is most accessible to restore self-integrity, whether that be by 
directly changing behaviour, or by elaborating defensive cognitions, or affirmation in 
separate domains. 
Self-affirmation has also been applied to persuasive communications. Cohen, 
Aronson, and Steele (2000) provided participants with counter-attitudinal information 
that was either for or against the death penalty. Iri comparison to non-affirmed 
participants, self-affirmed participants rated the attitude-disconfirming evidence more 
favorably and demonstrated attitude change towards the counter-attitudinal message. 
This finding is indicative of self-affirmation reducing biased processing of counter-
attitudinal information. In a further study, in which participants were provided with 
arguments both for and against abortion, Cohen et a1. (2000) found that self-
affirmation acted to reduce biases in processing of attitude-congruent information, 
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such that self-affirmed participants were less likely to unconditionally accept 
information congruent with their prior beliefs .. 
Self-affirmation has also been shown to influence people's choices of social 
comparisons. After receiving failure feedback, for example on a test of social 
accuracy, people tended to choose to compare themselves with others on a dimension 
that they were good as opposed to bad at, and choose to make comparison with 
, . 
another's weakness opposed to their strengths (Wood, Giodano-Beech, & Ducharme, 
1999). Self-affirmation has been shown to reduce this bias in selection of comparisons 
(Wood et aI., 1999). Spencer et al. (2001) also demonstrated that, after a self-threat, 
self-affirmation could eliminate the tendency to choose an inferior target for 
comparison, and lead to people choosing a superior target (Le., one that had performed 
well on a task; see also Tesser & Cornell, 1991). These findings suggest that, after a 
self-threat, people are motivated to engage in strategies to restore their self-integrity, 
for example through making downward social comparison, and this motivation can be 
reduced through self-affirming a valued aspect of the self. Indeed, Tesser, et al. .(2000) 
demonstrated that when participants were given an opportunity to write about an 
important value, those who had previously been threatened by writing about being out-
performed by a close other, wrote more self-affirming essays than did those who had 
written about out-performing a close other. 
As well as evidence that self-affirmation can influence choice of social 
comparison information, self-affirmation also appears to influence people's responses 
to stereotype information. Fein and Spencer (1997) found that non-affirmed 
participants evaluated an out-group target more negatively than did a control group, 
and that self-affirmation eliminated this derogation of a stereotyped minority. This 
finding was argued to demonstrate both the effectiveness of self-affirmation and to 
suggest prejudice may serve a self-protection function. Harvey and Oswald (2000) 
provide further support demonstrating that exposing white participants to a civil-rights 
video, whi~h aimed to increase co~lective guilt and shame, led to suppression of 
support for social programmes targeted at black people. Self-affirmed participants, 
however, were found to increase their support for the black programmes. 
Aronson and Damiani (1997) examined whether self-affirmation could reduce 
black participants' underperformance on evaluative tests, on the basis that test anxiety 
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and therefore underperformance are associated with stereotype threat. In this study, 
participants completed either a relevant affirmation (Le., verbal ability), irrelevant 
affirmation (Le., social skills or ethnic identity), or no affirmation prior to a verbal 
ability test. Results demonstrated that when the affirmation was relevant to the test, 
underperformance on the task was reduced, indicating that self-affirmation may have 
the ability to reduce stereotype threat. 
Self-affirmation has also been found to have on effect on attributions (Liu & 
Steele, 1986). Undergoing helplessness training has been shown to be associated with 
increases in attributional analysis (Pittman & 0' Agostino,1985; Pittman & Pittman, 
1980). Attributional analysis can be measured, for example, by asking participants to 
read an essay and make attributions about why the author may have written the essay. 
More extreme attributions are argued to reflect more attributional analysis. Liu and 
Steele (1986) suggest that helplessness training threatens a person's perceptions of 
being competent and in control (Le., their self-integrity). While engaging in more 
attributional analysis helps regain that sense of being efficacious. Liu and Steele 
(1986) found that affirming a central value eliminated the effects of helplessness 
training on attributions, thus supporting their claim that helplessness training acts as a 
threat to self-integrity and self-affirmation can reduce this threat. 
Research has also provided evidence that self-affirmation can buffer people 
against the negative effects of threats to one's sense of self-integrity in the form of job 
insecurity (Petzall, Parker & Stoeberl, 2000; Wiesenfeld, Brockner, PetzaIl, Wolf & 
Bailey, 2001). In addition, Keough, Garcia and Steele (1997) demonstrated the 
potential benefits of self-affirmation for participants' physical health. Participants who 
self-affirmed an important vallie regularly over a period of time, reported being 
physically healthier than those who thought about things that made them feel good or a 
friend. 
Self-affirmation theory has also been applied to a variety of other research 
, , 
areas, from understanding narcissism (Morl & Rhodewalt, 2001), motivations for 
matricide (Holcomb, 2000), desire to work in television (Ursell, 2000), motivations for 
smoking (Denscombe, 2001), to dealing with hypocrisy within organizations (Brown 
& Jones, 2000). The diversity of topics in which self-affirmation theory has been 
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tested not only provides a breadth of evidence in support of the theory but also 
highlights the wide ranging implications. 
Self-affirmation and self-esteem 
The general literature on self-affirmation has provided evidence supportive of 
. 
Steele's self-affirmation theory. Providing participants with an opportunity to focus on 
central and valued aspects of the self has been found to reduce defensive reactions to 
self-threats. Furthermore, people naturally engage in self-affirmation strategies in 
separate domains to threat when these are made salient (e.g., Tesser et al., 2(00). 
Further tests of self-affirmation theory have examined its prediction about the effects 
of dispositional self-esteem. Steele's theory proposes that those with high self-esteem 
have more resources with which to restore their self-integrity when they experience 
self-threats. Thus those with high self-esteem should be less likely to engage in 
rationalisation, for example, in response to a dissonant act. Self-affirmation theory's 
prediction about the effects of self-esteem, are contrary to those of E. Aronson's 
(1968) self-consistency theory. E. Aronson predicts that those. with high-self esteem 
will experience greater inconsistency after experiencing a threat to positive aspects of 
the self, and thus attempt to rationalise the inconsistency to a greater extent than those 
with low self-esteem. In a test of these two opposing theories Steele et al. (1993) used 
a standard dissonance procedure and found that, in support of self-affirmation theory, 
those with low self-esteem engaged in more rationalisation, than those with high self· 
esteem. This was particularly the case when self-esteem was made salient. Supporting 
this Holland, Meertens and Van Vugt (2002) also found greater levels of self· 
justification and psychological discomfort in those with low self-esteem compared to 
those with high self-esteem, after dissonance was aroused. 
Research examining the use of social comparison has demonstrated that when 
self-esteem resources are made salient, participants with low self-esteem are more 
likely to engage in downward social comparisons, than those with high self-esteem 
(Spencer, Fein, & Steele, 1992). Further studies comparing low self-esteem and high 
self-esteem participants on estimates of performance (Spencer & Steele, 1992; cited in 
Spencer, Josephs & Steele, 1993), risky decision making (Josephs, Larrick, Steele & 
.. Nisbett, 1992), and information seeking behaviour (Steele, Spencer & Josephs, 1992) 
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provide further support for the assumption that those with low self-esteem hold fewer 
resources with which to self-affirm, in comparison to those with high self-esteem. 
These studies provide evidence consistent with self-affirmation theory, rather 
than self-consistency theory, suggesting that those with high self-esteem may naturally 
have greater resources to deal with threat to self-integrity. 
Limitations to the effects of self-affirmation 
The research presented here provides support for self-affirmation theory. For 
example self-affirmation has been shown to reduce biased responding to information 
which is thought to pose a threat to self-integrity, and consistent with Steele's 
prediction those with high self-esteem rationalise threats to a lesser extent than those 
with low self-esteem. However, research has also uncovered limitations to the effects 
of self-affirmation. For example, as already discussed, a variety of other studies have 
suggested that relevant self-affirmations, those in the same domain as a threat, may act 
as a standard and are not able to reduce threats to self-integrity (J. Aronson et al., 
1995; J. Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; Blanton et al., 1997). In at least one study the 
reverse has also been shown to be true. J. Aronson and Damiani (1997) found relevant 
but not irrelevant self-affirmations were able to reduce stereotype threat. 
Galinsky, Stone and Cooper (2000) have also demonstrated that the effects of 
self-affirmation are eliminated when disconfirmatory evidence is presented. Galinsky 
et al. provided participants with an opportunity to affirm their central values, and then 
provided them with feedback that suggested they scored below average on these 
values. Using a forced-choice paradigm, they found that disconfirming a self-
affirmation led to dissonance being reinstated. These findings'suggest there are . 
limitations to the effectiveness of affirmations. 
A study by Greenberg et al. (1993) has provided another example of why self-
affirmation may fail to reduce biased responding to a self-threat. Greenberg et al. 
applied self-affirmation to Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 1991). TMT 
proposes that people's desire to maintain a positive experience of the self is ultimately 
driven by fears over mortality and vulnerability. Greenberg et al. (1993) explored 
whether affirming participants by providing them with positive personality 
assessments would reduce biases in self-judgements of traits associated with negative 
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consequences. Participants were provided with information that suggested either that 
emotional or unemotional people die young, while for hal~ the participants their 
mortality was also made salient. Participants were then asked to rate themselves on 
how emotional they were. Participants in the non-affirmation conditions, irrespective 
of whether mortality was made salient, showed a bias in their self-judgements of their 
own emotionality. For example, those who were told that being emotional led to early 
death reported themselves to be less emotional. Self-affirmation was able to reduce 
this bias, but only if mortality was not made salient. This finding may suggest that 
when a threat to the'self is too great, for example participants are presented with 
multiple threats to self-integrity, self-affirmation is unable to r~duce biased processing. 
Steele (1988) also acknowledges that self-affirmation will only be effective in 
reducing threats to the self-integrity when the domain being affirmed is as important 
and central as that threatened. For example, affirming some peripheral aspect of the 
self, for instance one's skill at table temnis, is unlikely to reduce a threat to a more 
valued and central self-concept, such as being told you are a bad father .. 
Self-affirmation appears to reduce defensive responding to self-threats. These 
findings, however, highlight some of the limitations to the effects of self-affirmation. 
Affirmations related to a self-threat appear to act as standards rather than a resource to 
reduce defensive responding, whereas self-affirmation targeting aspects of the self less 
central or valued as that threatened may also be ineffective. 
Alternative accounts for the effects of self-affirmation 
Though'the aim of this introductory chapter is not to provide a comprehensive 
review of self-esteem maintenance and self-regulation theories, which are numerous 
(Tesser, 2000), some alternative accounts of the effects of self-affirmation are worth 
noting, for example, dissonance theory and Tesser and colleagues' (2000) work on the 
confluence of self-processes. These accounts have specifically examined whether the 
effects of self-affirmation are mediated not by self-integrity but by other processes. 
Drawing on concepts from dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), Simon, 
Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) have argued that self-affirmation does not act to restore 
. . . , , 
self-integrity, but as a trivialisation manipulation. Trivialisation refers to a reduction of 
. ," , , 
the importance of a perceived threat. For instance, when faced with failure feedback on 
an intelligence test, focusing attention to some other important aspect of the self may 
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reduce the importance of that failure by putting it into context of other aspects of the 
self. Simon et a1. demonstrated that asking participants to focus on generally important 
issues, such as world poverty, could reduce attitude change in a dissonance paradigm, 
just like self-affirmation did. They argue that those who are self-affirmed respond less 
defensively to self-threats as these threats are perceived as less important to the self. 
To test this alternative explanation for self-affirmation findings, Koole et al. 
(1999) examined whether self-affirmation was associated with trivialisation of failure 
on an intelligence test. They found no differences between non-affirmed and self- . 
affirmed participants on reports of how important the IQ results were. Koole et a1. 
argue this provides evidence that self-affirmation does not result in trivialisation of 
threats to the self, and provides support for Steele's self-affirmation theory. 
E. Aronson (1992) also suggests that the effects of self-affirmation can more 
easily be explruned using dissonance theory. Self-affirmation may act to make 
dissonant acts harder to rationalise. For example, in the context of a health message, a 
self-affirmation task may remind people that they are a good person, and subsequently 
make it harder for them to rationalise an inconsistent behaviour (e.g., "good people 
don't put their health at risk"). Thibodeau and Aronson, (1992) have also argued that 
self-affirmation findings could be accommodated by the original dissonance theory, 
suggesting that affirming one's values may act to remind participants of aspects of the 
self that are consistent with their self-concept. Thus self-affirmation manipulations 
may act not to restore self-integrity, but as a reminder of consistency which reduces 
the perceptions of inconsistencies, ~hich Festinger argues drives processes such as 
rationalisation .. 
Tesser and colleagues (Tesser, 2000; Tesser & Cornell, 1991; Tesser, et aI., 
2000) have also provided an alternative theory to that of self-affirmation. Tesser· 
interprets evidence that self-affirmation can reduce attitude change in dissonance 
paradigms, or the tendency to make self-enhancing social comparison as evidence that 
self-affirmation is one of many self-esteem maintenance mechanisms. Tesser argues 
that these me~hanisms can be substituted for on~ another'as they share a common ' 
currency, that of affect. Thus, unlike Steele (1988), who proposes self-affirmation 
reduces defensive responses by restoring self-integrity, Tesser (2000) argues that 
changes in affect mediate the effects of self-affirmation. Tesser et a1. cite evidence 
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from the dissonance (Fazio & Cooper, 1983), social comparison (Tesser, Millar, & 
Moore, 1988) and self-affirmation literature (Koole et al., 1999) to suggest that all 
these strategies can reduce psychological discomfort and negative affect when a person 
is confronted with a threat to their self-esteem. 
Steele, Spencer and Lynch (1993) state that affect does not mediate the effects 
of self-affirmation, but rather that changes in self-integrity do. To test this alternative 
hypothesis Steele et al. (1993) provided participants with a positive mood 
manipulation prior to a free-choice dissonance task. The results suggested that positive 
mood did not influence self-justifying attitude change in the same manner a~ self-
affirmation, providing support for Steele (1988). 
Contrary to Steele (1988), these examples illustrate that the effects of self-
affirmation may not be mediated by changes in self-integrity. Instead the findings may 
reflect a motive for consistency, or a broader self-esteem maintenance mechanism. 
mediated by affect. Whether the desire for self-integrity does account for the effect of 
self-affirmation, and the usefulness of these alternative accounts, will be returned to in 
Chapter 7. 
Self-affirmation theory and health messages 
~ 
This chapter has outlined the effects of self-affirmation on responses to 
, negative or belief-incongruent information. The current thesis focuses on the effects of 
self-affirmation on the processing of health information. There is evidence that health c, 
messages are often processed in ways that appear biased or even defensive (Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998) and the study of whether self-affirmation reduces such biased 
processing has clear practical potential. Indeed, providing evidence that self-
affirmation may promote greater message acceptance not only has implications for 
applied research, but also for models of the effects of fear appeals, as well as self-
affirmation theory itself. 
A few studies have applied self-affirmation to the study of processing of health 
information (Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999; Klein, Blier, & Janze, 2001; 
, , 
Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000), with mixed findings. 
. , 
Based on the assumption that health threats pose a threat to one's self-integrity (Croyle 
" et aI., 1997; Giner-Sorolla et aI., 1997), Reed and Aspinwall (1998) tested whether 
self-affirmation was able to re~uce biased processing of a health message~ Prior to 
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receiving the health message participants were assigned to either a control task; 
completing an opinion survey, or to self-affirm by recalling times when they engaged·' 
in kind acts. Reed and Aspinwall argue that kindness is an important value to most 
people and therefore should provide a means of affirming valued self-concepts for 
I 
most participants. Women who reported low and high caffeine consumption were then 
presented with a health message outlining evidence both for and against the link 
between developing fibrocystic breast disease (FBD) and caffeine consumption. To 
assess biased processing and subsequent message acceptance, Reed and Aspinwall 
measured belief in the link bet,ween FBD and caffeine, ratings of argument strength, 
intentions to reduce caffeine consumption and, after one-week, participants' behaviour 
and rec~ll of information. Frequent caffeine drinkers who were self-affirmed were 
more convinced by the negative health information than those who were non-affirmed. 
This finding is consistent with self-affirmation reducing biased processing. However, 
self-affirmed participants also reported a reduction in intentions to cut down on their 
caffeine intake, and did not tliffer in their caffeine drinking after one week. 
Furthermore, non-affirmed participants spent more time reading the information, and 
recalled more of the message after one week. Clearly, these findings provide mixed 
evidence 'for the effectiveness of self-affirmation to reduce biased processing and 
promote message acceptance. 
Sherman et al. (2000) reported two studies showing more promising effects of 
self-affirmation. In study one, before reading a health message, participants were 
assigned to either an affirmation or control condition. Self-affirmed participants 
completed a values scale concerning their most important value, (adapted from 
Allport. 1960). whereas those who were non-affirmed completed a scale corresponding 
to their least important value. The health message presented was the same caffeine and 
FBD risk message used in Liberman and Chaiken (1992). Self-affirmed caffeine 
drinkers were more likely to accept the health message, than those who were non-
affirmed. Self-affirmed participants also reported greater intentions to reduce their 
caffeine intake. thus suggesting s~lf-affirmation reduced bias processing and promoted 
message acceptance. 
In Study 2. sexually-active men and women were recruited to take part in a 
study ostensibly evaluating AIDS education materials. Those assigned to the self-
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affirmation condition were asked to write a short statement about their most important 
value, while non-affirmed participants wrote about their least important value. 
Participants then watched an AIDS education video aimed at increasing perceptions of 
fisk and the need to adopt AIDS-preventive behaviours. Those who were self-affirmed 
reported greater risk perceptions for mv than non-affirmed participants. Furthermore, 
those who were self-affirmed engaged in more precaution-relevant behaviours, taking 
more leaflets about mv and purchasing more condoms. These findings suggest that 
self-affirmation reduced biased pro~essing of a relevant health message. 
However, other studies have found less encouraging evidence for the effects of 
self-affirmation. Klein, Blier, and Janze (2001) conducted a study investigating the 
impact of self-affirmation upon participants' risk perceptions for heart disease and 
alcohol poisoning. At Time 1, participants were asked to rate their risk factor standing 
on these two health risks, and their comparative risk of experiencing the conditions . 
• Two months later (Time 2) they returned and half of them were provided with an 
opportunity to self affirm by writing an essay about an event that made them feel 
proud. As a threat manipulation, orthogonal to the affirmation manipulation, half of the 
participants were provided with challenging comparative risk information regarding 
their risk of heart disease and alcohol poisoning. Self-affirmed participants who were 
presented with threatening comparative risk information appeared to make less 
inductive risk judgments, (Le., risk judgments not based on their risk factor standing). 
For example, compared to those who were non-affirmed, self-affirmed participants' 
~ risk factor standing for heart disease was less strongly associated with their risk 
judgments at Time 2. While risk factor standing for alcohol poisoning was no longer 
associated later risk judgments. Furthermore, for risk perceptions of heart disease, 
self-affirmed participants' self-esteem emerged as a significant predictor. Thus it 
appeared that those who were self-affirmed based their risk perceptions not on their 
risk behaviours but on how they felt about themselves. Klein et al. argue that there are 
times when self-affirmation appears to lead to less objective assessment of risk, and 
) . 
. self-judgments based on self-esteem rather than actual risk. 
·Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, and Gerrard (1999) tested the effects of self- . 
affirmation by offering participants an opportunity to self-affirm on a personality 
inventory after being presented with a health threat. Boney-McCoy et al.·were 
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interested in what effect engaging in compensatory self-affirmation (Le., focusing 
attention on positive self-conceptions following a threat) had on perceptions of a 
health risk. Sexually active participants were offered an opportunity to self-affirm on a 
personality inventory either after being threatened or not. Those in the threatened 
condition were asked to list behaviours or factors that might lead to them contracting a 
sexually transmitted disease (STDs). Threatened participants with high self-esteem 
engaged in greater compensatory self-affirmation by rating themselves more favorably' 
~n the personality inventory. However, those who appeared to have self-affirmed the 
inost (i.e., rated themselves most favourably) also reported lower risk judgments for 
STDs in comparison to high self-esteem participants who engaged in less 
> 
compensatory self-affirmation. This finding suggests that self-affirming on unrelated 
personality traits did not offer a resource for self-objectivity, but instead that self-
affirmed p~icipants were less likely to accept their personal risk. A possible 
, 
explanation is that self-affirmation not only reduces the motivation to respo~d 
" 
defensively, but also the motivation to accept the message and change one's 
behaviour. Steele's theory suggests that when encountering a self-threat, self-integrity 
can be restored both directly, for example by changing a risky health behaviour, or 
indirectly, by applying defensive cognitions or by affirming one's self in a separate 
domain. Consequently, self-affirmation in a separate domain could reduce the 
motivation to apply defensive cognitions, but also to accept the need to change 
behaviour as a route to restore self-integrity. This interpretation of Steele's theory 
, would suggest that, although self-affirmation may reduce biased processing of a health 
message, participants may also be less motivated to change their behaviour. 
, The impact of self-affirmation in the context of health threats has provided 
mixed findings~ Reed and Aspinwall (1998) and Sherman et al. (2000) provid~ 
evidence that self-affirmation may reduce the biased processing of health messages, 
with self-affirmation associated with increased acceptance of the message and greater 
perceptions of personal risk. However, the evidence for changes in intentions and 
.. ' 
behavior are mixed, with Sherman et al. finding evidence for changes in both, b'ut 
I"~ 
Reed and Aspinwall failing to find evidence for such changes in their study. Both 
Boney-~cCoy et al. (1999) and Klein et at (2001) suggest that self-affirmation can 
lead to people being more, rather than less, defensive when faced with health threats, 
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" 
with participants' positive self-views not acting as a resource but as information about 
the self. 
Terminology 
Self-affirmation theory suggests that people process negative, personally-
relevant health information in a biased manner because it poses a threat to their self-
integrity. Subsequently, negative, personally-relevant health messages have been 
described as "threatening" (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman, et al. 2000) and the 
. biased processing of this information as "defensive". The use of terms such as 
threatening and defensive processing are contentious, as they imply that biased 
responding to h~alth-risk information is a result of motivated processing. While 
recognising that this is not necessarily the case, with evidence to suggest that non-
motivational factors such as expectations also contribute to biased responding (Renner, 
2004), for ease of expression in the current thesis health messages that provide 
negative and personally-relevant information will be referred to as threatening and, 
terms such as "defensive processing" will be used to indicate a pattern of responses 
including attentional avoidance, denial of risk, minimisation of personal ,implications 
of threat, and counter-arguing. 
Research Questions 
The research reviewed in this chapter provides evidence that self-affirmation 
can reduce defensive reactions to threat in a variety of different domains. However, 
there still remain questions about self-affirmation 'as a technique to promote self-
\ . 
objectivity in response to health threats. Past research directly examining the effects of 
self-affinnation on the processing of health messages (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; 
Sherman et al., 2000) and reactions to information that threatens perceptions of health 
(Boney-McCoy et al., 1999; Klein et al., 2000) have been inconclusive in 
demonstrating whether self-affirmation has the potential to reduce defence motivation. 
While some studies have found evidence that affirming valued aspects of one's self 
can provide a resource to reduce biased processing of health threats, others have found 
mixed results, or evidence indicative of greater defensiveness after a self-affirmation . 
. ' There still remain questions about the effectiveness of self-affirmation to reduce 
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defensive processing of health threats. The present research aimed to investigate this 
issue. 
In Chapter 2 the ability of self-affirmation to promote acceptance of a ' 
personally-relevant health message is examined. Chapter 2 extends past research by 
including measures of both cognitive and affective responses to threat, while testing 
how durable and specific the effects of self-affirmation are. Chapter 3 describes the 
development of a self-affirmation technique. The self-affirmation task, which focuses 
participants' attention on their personal strengths, provides an additional technique to 
those available with the benefits of being practical to administer, using values 
expressed in ways that are appropriate and meaningful to contemporary samples, and 
possessing an equivalent control condition. Using this self-affirmation technique, 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of self-affirmation on orientation to threat, assessing 
whether self-affirmation can reduce attentional avoidance of health-risk information . 
. In addition, Chapter 4 also examines depth of processing, by measuring time spent 
processing information and the accuracy of recall. The study also looks for direct 
evidence that self-affirmation affects the accessibility of defensive cognitions 
following threat. Chapter 5 provides a further test of self-affirmation on depth of 
processing of health-risk information, examining participants' sensitivity to the 
strength of arguments presented. This study is an Internet-based study and extends the 
findings of Study 1 by using the same health message but a non-student sample'. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, self-affirmation is applied to an established health message. This 
study draws on models of processing of fear appeals and tests the effects of self-
affirmation on threat and coping appraisals, as well as measures of self-reported affect. 
Examining what 'effects self-affirmation has on the processing of health threat 
provides the potential to illuminate the underlying mechanisms by which self-
affirmation influences reactions to threats to the self in general. Therefore, 
. investigating self-affirmation within the health domain provides an opportunity for 
research of both theoretical and applied interest. 
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CHAPTER 2: SELF-AFFIRMATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF PERSONAL RISK 
As shown in Chapter 1, previous studies examining the effects of self-
affirmation on the processing of negative and personally-relevant health threats have 
~ 
provided mixed results. Self-affirmation has been found to reduce biased processing of' 
health messages (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al., 2000), but other evidence 
suggests that self-affirmation can be associated with less objectivity (Le., risk 
judgements based less on risk factor standing and more on self-esteem, Klein et al., 
2001), and a reduction in acceptance of personal relevance of threat (Boney-McCoy, et 
al., 2001). There is clearly a need for more t~sts of self-affirmation theory. The present 
study is intended to extend previous research by assessing the effects self-affirmation 
on general, personal and affective measures of message acceptance and to assess the' 
durability of any effects. 
Little is currently known about the durability of the effects of self-affirmation. 
Sherman et al. (2000) found effects of self-affinnation on intention and behaviour 
measured contemporaneously, but did not subsequently follow tip their participants. In 
comparison, Reed and Aspinwall (1998), who did include a follow-up after one week, 
failed to find changes in behaviour. They also, however, failed to find changes in 
intention immediately after self-affirmation, suggesting behaviour change may n?t 
have provided an adequate indicator of durability. Furthennore, Reed and Aspinwall 
did not include measures of message acceptance at follow-up. Therefore providing no 
. I . 
. evidence that increases in message acceptance were maintained. Looking:more 
generally at the self-affirmation literature (Le., that examining non health-related 
threats), studies have only assessed the effects of self-affinnation immediately after the 
manipulation: Measuring the durability of the effects of self-affirmation provides a 
" I . 
means of assessing both the applied potential of self-affirmation to promote message 
acceptance, as well as addressing theoretical questions. For example, can a single self-
affirmation intervention be effective at promoting sustained changes in belief? Self-
affirmation may promote message acceptance in the short-term, but if participants 
. . 
subsequently find it hard to change, denial of the threat may provide an easier route to 
restoring self-integrity. Thus, a single self-affirmation may not be sufficient to promote 
. sustained changes in behaviour or message acceptance. In addition, the durability ~f 
the effects of self-affirmation may be indicative of depth of processing. Durable 
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changes in beliefs would suggest self-affirmation is associated with thoughtful 
consideration of the message and systematic processing (Petty & Wegner, 1999). In 
contrast, if changes in belief are short-lived the self-affirmation may be associated with 
heuristic information processing. Consequently, in the present study, in addition to 
measuring participants' response to a threatening message immediately after reading it, 
participants' responses on key measures of cognition, affect and behavior were 
obtained one week and again one month after self-affirmation. 
The fear appeal literature suggests that receiving a relevant message about a 
health risk can be associated with negative emoti<:>Ds such as fear. Drive reduction 
models of persuasion (Hovland, 1953; McGuire, 1968, 1969), as well as the Extended 
Parallel Process Model (EPPM, Witte, 1992, 1994,2000) suggests that negative affect 
can interfere with message acceptance, such that the desire to reduce negative affect 
. 
can lead to maladaptive responses that reduce the experience of threat without 
changing beliefs or behaviour. Thus defensive responses to a health threat can be 
associated with attempts to minimise negative affect. In support of this, Croyle & 
Sande (1988) demonstrated that minimisation of negative affect could provide a means 
of defending oneself from the implications of a health threat. Thus if defensive . 
responses are associated with attempts to reduce negative affect, and self-affirmation 
reduces the motivation to respond defensively, self-affirmed participants should report 
greater worry and fear associated with a health message. Alternatively, self-affirmation 
could itself act to reduce negative affect, and thus according to fear reduction models, 
reduce the motivation to respond defensively. Including measures of negative affect in 
the present study provides a means of testing whether self-affirmed participants accept 
a health threat even though they experience negative affect, or whether the effects of 
self-affirmation are mediated by a reduction in negative affect. 
The present study was designed also to extend the way in which the effects of 
self-affirmation on message acceptance have been measured. In addition to measures 
used in previous studies, for example items measuring the key components of the 
theory of planned behaviour (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998), the present study included 
measures disting~ishing general message acceptance (Le., "I believe there is a threat") 
from personal message acceptance (Le., "I believe it could happen to me"). In 
understanding defensive responding to threats, Lazarus (1983) distinguishes these 
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processes as denial of fact (Le., denial of the health threat or illness) from denial of 
implications (Le., minimising implications of an illness). For e~ample, it is possible for' 
a smoker to accept that there is a link between smoking cigarettes and disease without 
accepting that this has implications for their own health (Lee, 1989). Models of 
defensive processing also suggest that engaging in avoidance of personal inferences 
and counter-arguing the content of a threat are two distinct levels at which defensive 
processing can occur (Blumberg, 2000). Indeed, moving from accepting the general 
claims of a message to accepting the personal relevance of the threat is argued to be a ./ 
, __ critical step in precaution adoption (Weinstein, 1988). 
Current research suggests that self-affirmation can increase general message 
acceptance, for example increasing belief in a threatening message, ratings of evidence 
strength and agreement that others should reduce risky behaviours. However, there are 
conflicting findings regarding the effects of self-affirmation on measures of more 
personal acceptance, for example whether participants accept the need to change their 
own behaviour. Reed and Aspinwall (1998) reported no increase in intentions, whereas 
Sherman et al. reported the ·opposite. Risk perceptions as a measure of personal 
acceptance has only been employed once (Sherman, 2000; Study 2). Furthermore, 
participants' reports of intentions may not provide the most accurate indicator of 
personal message acceptance. For example, a participant could recognise that their 
behaviour put their health at risk and consequently they needed to change their 
behaviour, but other factors may limit their ability to actually change (Ajzen, 1991). 
Ease of imagination could provide an additional measure of personal measure 
acceptance. The ease with which a person can imagine an event occurring is argued to 
provide a measure of how likely a person believes an event will be to occur 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Thus by asking participants how easily they can 
imagine developing, for example, FBD as a result of drinking caffeine, provides a 
measure of whether they have accepted the health-risk applies to them personally. 
Therefore, in the present study a measure of the ease with which participants could 
imagine themselves experiencing a health disorder was included as an additional 
measure of personal message acceptance. 
The present study also aimed to extend the way in which the effects of self· 
affirmation on risk perceptions has been measured. Sherman et al. (2000) included a 
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single measure of perceptions of personal risk. In the present study an additional 
measure of risk perceptions for the average other was also included, to permit tests of .. 
the effects of self-affirmation on optimistic bias in risk perceptions. Optimistic bias 
refers to the tendency for people to underestimate their own risk of experiencing 
negative events, in comparison to others' risk (Weinstein, 1982, 1989). For example, 
research has demonstrated that for health risks such as experiencing a heart attack 
(Weinstein, 1980) or developing diabetes (Weinstein, 1982), people tend to believe 
they are at less risk than other people. This phenomena has been explained by both 
cognitive and motivational accounts. For example, egocentrism (Le., people focusing 
attention on behaviours they perform to minimise their risk, and neglecting to consider 
the steps an average other might take), and the use of a representativeness heuristic 
(Le., perceiving the self as dissimilar to a typical victim) have been offered as 
cognitive accounts of unrealistic optimism (Higgins, St Amand & Poole, 1997; 
Weinstein 1980; Weinstein & Lachendor, 1982). Motivational accounts suggest that 
optimistic bias may serve a self-esteem protective function. For example, being told 
you are at risk of a disease, but believing others are at greater risk, may serve to reduce 
the threat to one's self-esteem (Alicke, Klotz, Breiten, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; 
Kunda, 1990; Regan, Synder, & Kassin, 1985). Alternatively, the desire to redu~e 
anxiety has also been argued to motivate optimistic biases (Higgins et aI., 1997). 
Optimistic bias has proved highly resilient to attempts to reduce it using informati~n 
.; . . ; .-
(Weinstein & Klein, 1995). Self-affirmation may provide a means of tackling this bias 
. . 
at a motivational level, such that if self-affirmation boosts perceptions of self-integrity 
. . .' . '-
and adequacy the motivation to engage in self-enhancing risk judgments may be 
. . 
reduced. Consequently, the extent to ~hich self-affirmation reduced optimistic bias 
was also measured. 
In the present study, risk perception measures were also extended by including 
risk perceptions for diseases not targeted by the message. This allowed an additional 
theoretical question, concerning the specificity of the effects of self-affirmation, to be 
. '. 
tested. If self-affirmati.on acts to specifically overcome defensive processing of the 
message then only changes in risk perceptions' directly targeted by the message should 
be expected. Alternatively, if self-affirmation affects risk perceptions for a range of 
, health threats not targeted by the message, this may indicate self-affirmation allows 
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participants to more generally reconsider their personal risk to a range of health 
threats. Self-affirmation may not specifically affect processing of a threatening 
message, but be associated with a greater openness to acceptance of self-threats, 
including perceiving the self to be at higher risk of a range of diseases. To test this 
possibility, the impact of self-affirming on risk perceptions for diseases not targeted in 
the message were also assessed. 
Finally, measures were also included of participants' recall. Research has 
demonstrated that defence motivation can influence people's recall of health 
information, leading to self-serving and less accurate recall of health information 
(Croyle, Sun & Hart, 1997). In the present study, participants' recall of statements 
found in a health message was measured to examine whether self-affirmation 
influenced accuracy of their recall of health information. If self-affirmation reduces 
defence motivation, and promotes accurate systematic processing, higher risk, self-
affirmed participants should display more accurate recall of risk information.· 
Health message 
Two topics, caffeine consumption and mY, have been the focus of much 
research on defensive processing of health information, with caffeine consumption in 
particular proving popular wi.th researchers (e.g., Ditto et aI., 1998; Kunda, 1987; 
Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998, 
Sherman et al., 2000). The present study extended this list of topics by examining the 
impact of self-affirmation on women's risk perceptions for developing breast cancer as 
a result of their alcohol consumption. T~is choice of topic has the benefit of targeting a 
behaviour prevalent in young people today, with evidence that alcohol consumption is 
a normative aspect of UK students' lives, with pressures on males and females both to 
drink and to drink to excess (Norman, Bennett, & Lewis, 1998). Consequently the 
level of alcohol consumption in young people and young women in particular is of 
great concern (Donaldson, 2001; Meikle, 2001). Extending the health topics on which 
the effects of self-affirmation are exainined, also has the benefit of helping to provide 
, 
greater external validity for the effects. That is whether the effects <:>f self-affirmation 
generalise to the processing of other health-risk information. While the use of breast 
cancer risk as a health threat answers Reed and Aspinwall (1998) call for tests of self-
affirmation using more severe kinds of threatening health information. Clearly, both 
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extending the health topics examined and varying the severity of the messages 
I 
presented, could help identify limitations of the effects of self-affirmation and it's 
potential effectiveness as an applied technique to promote acceptance of health 
messages. In addition, the present study provides' a test of whether the effects of self-
affirmation generalise to a non-US sample. 
'. . 
The present study took advantage of research published at the time of 
designing the study showing that alcohol consumption is associated with breast cancer 
. . 
risk (Collaborative Group On Hormonal Factors In Breast Cancer, 2002). In the 
present study, young women were provided with a health leaflet detailing the increased 
risk of developing breast cancer from excessive alcohol consumption. The message 
explained that drinking a single alcoholic drink a day could increase a women's risk of 
breast cancer by 6% and that women should not drink above that government 
recommended guidelines of 14 "units" of alcohol per week for women. (A UK unit is 
. . . 
'.. -' , ' .. ' . 
8 grams of alcohol, which is approximately half a pint of beer, one measure of spirit or 
a glass of wine.) Consequently, the information was relevant and potentially 
threatening to young women who consumed alcohol to excess and, for most 
participants, comprised a novel alcohol-related threat. 
Prior to receiving the leaflet, participants were randomly assigned to either 
self-affirm by writing about an important value or to a control condition, which 
involved writing about an unimportant value. If self-affirmation reduces the motivation 
to process information defensively, higher risk participants who have self-affirmed 
should show greater acceptance of the message, which in tum should be associated 
with increased risk perceptions, greater intentions to reduce alcohol intake, and 
increased negative affect. If self-affirmed participants are truly persuaded, ~eater 
message acceptance should be maintained over time. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Female undergraduates, mainly studying psychology, were recruited to the 
study (N = 82, age M,:: 18.8, SD = 1.3 years) in exchange for course credit or entry 
into a prize draw. Participants' reports of typical weekly alcohol consumption ranged 
from 0 to 66 units (M = 11.97, SD = 9.33). Of the participants, 36 reported drinking 
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above the government recommended level of 14 units per week (18 self-affirmed; 18 
non-affirmed). The experimenter was blind to level of alcohol consumption and 
affirmation condition. 
Materials 
Questionnaire 1. Pre-manipulation measures included age, sex, course of study, 
smoking behaviour, alcohol-related attitudes, and alcohol consumption. Participants 
. . 
.' 
responded to the items: "Do you smoke?", yes / no, and "if yes, how many cigarettes 
do you smoke a day on average?". These items were included to help camoufla.ge the 
aims of the study. Responses to the alcohol consumption questions (e.g., "How much 
alcohol have you consumed in t~e last 7 days?") were given in terms of pints of 
beer/lagerkider, shorts, glasses of wine, and bottles, with illustrative examples (for 
example a bottle was described as either a mixer [e.g., Barcardi Breezer] or beer [e.g., 
Budweiser]). (Italics indicate ~mphasis in the originaI)~ Participants' responses were 
later translated into units of alcohol by the experimenter. Reports of alcohol 
consumption in the past week and in a typical week were strongly correlated, r(80) = 
, , .... _. - ' 
~ 72, P < .001, and combined into a mean score for analyses. Participants completed. 
four items measuring their general attitudes towards drinking alcohol, all measured on 
7-point scales, "For me drinking alcohol is ... " bad / good, hannful / beneficial, . 
unenjoyable / enjoyable, foolish / wise. These items were combined into a single item 
measuring attitude, a = .76. Participants also completed three attitude items examining 
beliefs specifically about the health consequences of drinking alcohol, "I believe 
drinking alcohol could be linked to serious health consequences such as developing 
cancer", "My current level of alcohol consumption is good for my health", and "My 
current level of alcohol consumption is bad for my health", s~rongly agree / strongly 
disagree. The positively worded item was recoded, and the items were combined into a 
single measure of participants' attitudes towards the health consequences of drinking 
alcohol (a= .72). 
Self-affinnation manipulation. Participants were given an information sheet 
describing what was meant by a value and listing values they were told other 
. students had described as important to them (Appendix A). The illustrative 
examples of values were: spirituality/religion, creativity, spontaneity, kindness, 
conscientiousness, friendliness, compassion, intelligence, hedonism, generosity, and 
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trustworthiness. In the self-affirmation conditio~, participants were asked to choose 
- -
a value from the list or another value that was most important to them and asked to 
write "about why this principle or standard is important to you" and "how you use 
this value in your everyday life". They were asked to try to recall and write about 
"specific occasions on which this value determined what you did". In the control 
group, participants were told to choose the value least important to them and asked 
to write a short statement about why it "could be important to another student". 
They were specifically instructed to think only about why ~is value might be 
important to another person, and not why it was unimportant to them. 
Health message. The leaflet, based on a press release (Cancer Research UK, 
2002) and a newspaper article (Bosley, 2002), was designed to resemble closely the 
size and format commonly' encountered for this type of leaflet (Appendix B). It was 
printed in colour on high quality paper and presented as being a pilot health-promotion 
leaflet being evaluated by researchers in the department. All statements it contained 
were true. The leaflet was approximately 750 words in length. The leaflet presented 
the research as convincing, stating that the research provided "the most accurate 
estimates ever" of the risk of alcohol, and quoted co-authors of the study as stating that 
the research shows "there is a definite link between alcohol and breast cancer". The 
message highlighted the fact that it was important for young women to realise that 
"drinking too much is dangerous". The leaflet stated that "drinking a single alcoholic 
drink a day increases a woman's chance of developing breast cancer by around 6%", 
and closed with the recommendation that people did not exceed the UK government 
recommended levels of alcohol consumption, reiterated those levels for women and 
men, gave examples of what amount of beer, spirit and wine comprised a unit, and 
provided genuine contact numbers of advice and helplines for breast cancer and 
alcohol abuse. Participants in all conditions saw the leaflet as convincing (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Perceptions of How Convincing Leaflet was by Condition and Risk.-
Lower risk Higher risk 
-SA NA SA NA, F p 
(N = 22) (N =24) , (N= 18) (N =, 18) (1,81) 
Leaflet convincing 4.41 (.80) 4.79 (1.14) 4.83 (.71) 4.67 (.91) .28 .60 
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Note. Higher scores indicate participants perceived the article as more convincing. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. SA = self-affirmation; NA = non-affirmed 
(applies throughout this chapter). 
Questionnaire 2. Participants were instructed to work through the post-
manipulation questions in order, answering them honestly and accurately. The opening 
section included the items "Had you heard about the link between alcohol and breast 
cancer before reading the leaflet?" (yes/no/uncertain) and "Before today, how much 
thought had you given to the possibility that you might get breast cancer from drinking 
alcohol?", none at all (0) to a great deal (10). 
Then followed the risk items: "How likely do you think YOU will be to 
experience each of the following health problems at some stage in the future? ... 
Breast cancer as a result of your current alcohol consumption, breast cancer as a 
result of other causes, skin cancer, and cardiovascular problems, such as heart disease 
or a stroke." Next were the average student items, "How likely do you think the 
average Sheffield University student of your age and sex will be to experience each of 
the following health problems at some stage in the future?" (same four health problems 
as above). Responses were given on an ll-point scale, impossible (0) to extremely 
. , 
likely (10). 
There followed a mix of dependent measures (measured on 7-point scales, 
anchored at 0 and 6) and filler items. Filler items included: "How easy did you find it 
to understand the content of the leaflet", (very easy / very difficult) and "I feel 1 could 
explain the content of the leaflet to another person" (very easily / with difficulty). 
Dependent measures (in sequence) were: "How convincing did you find the content of 
the leaflet?" (unconvincing / convincing), current mood ("What is your current 
mood?", negative I positive), anxiety (''The article made me feel a bit anxious", not at 
all / extremely), fear ("I felt fearful while reading the leaflet", strongly disagree / 
. strongly agree), belief ("I believe that drinking alcohol increases a woman's chances 
of developing breast cancer", strongly disagree I strongly agree), persuasiveness of 
article ("In your view, how persuasive are the arguments that there is a link between 
alcohol consumption and breast cancer?", not at all persuasive Ivery persuasive). The 
personal reduction item also included the response option I don't drink alcohol.). 
Participants also responded to items measuring worry ("I feel my level of alcohol 
consumption is something I ... don't need to worry aboutl do need to worry about), 
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and evidence strength ("The evidence linking alcohol consumption and breast cancer is 
- ... very weak/very strong). 
On the final page was the imagination item, "How easy is it for you to imagine 
yourself developing breast cancer as a result of your current alcohol consumption", 
measured on a 6-point scale, not at all easy (0), slightly easy, quite easy, moderately 
easy, very easy, extremely easy (5). Th~ response option I don't drink alcohol was also 
included Lastly participants completed the three recall items, indicating whether the 
( . 
following statements were true: "Every time a woman drinks an alcoholic drink on a 
daily basis she increases her chance of breast cancer by 6%" (correct statement), "For 
young women the harmful effects of drinking on breast cancer outweigh the protective 
benefits of alcohol on heart disease" (correct statement), and "Smoking increases a 
woman's chance of breast cancer" (incorrect statement), strongly disagree / strongly 
agree. 
Questionnaire 3. The final questionnaire included items from the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1991). All items were measured on 7-point scales .. 
anchored at 0 and 6. Intentions to reduce alcohol consumption were measured on two 
items, "I intend to cut down on the amount of alcohol I drink in the next 7 days", 
strongly disagree / strongly agree, and (six questions later) "Do you intend to cut 
down on the amount of alcohol you drink in the next 7 days?", definitely do not intend 
! 
to I definitely intend to. These items correlated strongly, r(80) = .86,p < .001, and 
were combined into a mean score. Subjective norms were assessed by two items, 
"Most people who are important to me think I should/should not cut down on the 
amount of alcohol that I drink in the next 7 days," think I should notlthink I should, 
and "Most people who are important to me would approve I disapprove of me cutting 
down on the amount of alcohol I drink in the next 7 days," would approve I would 
disapprove (r(80) = .50, p < .001). Two items measured perceived behavioural control, 
"How much personal control do you feel you have over whether or not you cut down 
on the amount of alcohol you drink in the next 7 days?", no control I complete control, . 
and "I feel in complete control of whether or not I cut down on the amount of alcohol 
that I drink in the next 7 days," strongly disagree / strongly agree (r(80) = .82, p < 
.001). Attitude towards reducing alcohol consumption was measured using the same 
~ . 
semantic differentials as in Questionnaire 1 but in response to the item "For me cutting 
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down on the amount of alcohol I drink in the next 7 days would be". Participants also 
completed the same attitude measures relating to the health consequences of drinking "' 
alcohol as iri Questionnaire 1. Two further items were also included to assess self-
efficacy to reduce alcohol consumption, "If I wanted to, I could easily cut down on the 
amount of alcohol that I drink in the next 7 days," strongly disagree I strongly agree, 
and "For me cutting down on the amount of alcohol that I drink in the next 7 days 
would be ... ", very difficult Ivery easy (r(80) = .57,p < .001). 
( 
At the bottom of this questionnaire was Robins, Hendrin and Trzesniewski's 
(2001) single item self-esteem scale, "I have high self-esteem", measured on a 5-point 
scale, 1 = not very true o/me, 5 = very true o/me. Robins et al. (2001) report four 
studies demonstrating test-retest reliability over 4 years for this measure and predictive 
validity with respect to well-being. A subset of participants also completed the 
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale as part of a mass testing session at the beginning 
of the semester. In the present study, the Robins et al. measure correlated significantly 
with the Rosenberg (1965) scale, r(56) = .54,p < .001, both immediately after 
completing the study and a week later. 
One-week/ollow-up. After one week participants received the first follow-up 
questionnaire, by email. Included were the items measuring reported alcohol 
consumption over the previous 7 days (from Questionnaire 1), self and other risk items 
(all disease~), ease of imagining breast cancer from alcohol, worry, belief in the link, 
persuasiveness of article, evidence strength, recall statement items (from Questionnaire 
2), and the Robins et al. measure of self-esteem. 
One-monthfollow-up. One month later participants received the second follow-
up, also by email. Included were the following measures from the one-week follow-up: 
reported alcohol consumption over the previous 7 days, risk perceptions for breast 
cancer (self and other), and the worry, belief, and strength of evidence items. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Upon arriving at the laboratory they were 
told that, to make full use of their time, they would be taking part in two separate 
studies: a student values study, for the experimenter's supervisor, and the evaluation of 
health information study being conducted as part of the experimenter's research. 
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Participants were told that the experiment would therefore consist of a variety of 
disparate tasks relating to these studies . 
. After completing Questionnaire 1, participants were given information about 
the student values study. The experimenter explained (once again) that this was a 
separate study being carried out on behalf of her supervisor. It was emphasised that it 
was important that the participant understood what was meant by a value, and the 
experimenter asked them to briefly describe what was meant by the term. The 
• r 
experimenter stressed that it was important that they try to write as much as possible 
and instructed them to write at least one side. To ensure the experimenter was blind to 
condition, the student values instruction sheet was taken and placed face down in front 
of the participant, from a pile previously randomised by someone else. The 
experimenter explained that the instruction sheet described in more detail what the task 
would involve. In order to minimise the time between the manipulation and the 
reading of the threatening message, participants were told to move directly on to 
reading the health leaflet once they had completed the values task. The health leaflet 
was in a labelled envelope in front of them. Participants were told that some people . 
were being asked to comment on how easy they found the information to understand, 
but that they were being asked to think about how the health information was relevant 
to them and how it made them feel. They were instructed to complete Questionnaire 2, 
also in front of them in a separate labelled envelope, once they had read the leaflet. 
The experimenter ensured that they were clear about the instructions provided and the 
order in which they were expected to complete the tasks, then left the room. The 
participants' behaviour was monitored from outside the door, and the experimenter re-
entered when they were ready to complete Questionnaire 3. 
After completing the session, participants were reminded about the one-week 
follow-up that they would receive via email. The experimenter also asked them 
whether they would be willing to receive a possible second follow-up after one-month, 
to which all participants agreed. The emails were described as follow-ups to the "study 
looking at the communication of health information" that participants had completed, 
"'I'"" ", f -( 
. . '." , 
and instructions were provided for participants to return their responses by email. 
if· .• , 
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Manipulation Check 
Two independent judges rated the essays (using 7-point scales, anchored at not 
at all [0] and very [6]), on the following items: (a) "Setting aside your own opinions 
and values, how self-affirmed would you estimate the writer of this passage to have 
been (at the end)?", (b) ''To what extent have they stuck to the task asked of them?". 
and (c) "How important does the value they have selected appear to be to them?". The 
raters also assessed "How much have they written about the value?", using a 3-point . 
, ' 
scale, not a lot (1) to a lot (3). Ratings were significantly correlated (Table 2.2). Mean 
ratings on each variable were the!efore used in analyses. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Between-participantANOV As with condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) 
as the independent variable were conducted to test whether the self-affirmation 
manipulation successfully focused participants' attention on important and valued 
aspects of the self, and the non-affirmation task did not (Table 2.2). Analysis revealed 
that the judges rated the values chosen by participants in the self-affirmation condition 
as significantly more important than those in the non-affirmation condition. Judges 
estimated that those in the self-affirmation condition would have been significantly . 
more self-affirmed after writing after the statement, and that they wrote passages that 
were more positive about themselves. Participants were not judged to have differed in 
how well they stuck to the task. However, those in the self-affirmation condition wrote 
marginally more, F(1, 81) = 3.8,p = .054. Thus participants in both conditions 
performed the task that they were set, and those in the self-affirmation condition were 
judged to have been more self-affirrried afterwards. 
Table 2.2. Judges Ratings of Self-affirmation and Non-affirmation Essays. 
Rating '" r(82) 'SA NA F(81) p 
. Value important .98*** ' 5.79 (0.76) 0.18 (0.76) 1920.12 <.001 
How self-affirmed .96*** 5.40 (0.62) 0.44 (1.11) 613.60 <.001 
. Positive about self .97*** , 5.38 (0.67) 0.44 (1.22) 508.56 . <.001 
How well stuck to task .79*** 5.26 (1.03) 5.26 (1.11) .00 .99 
How much wrotea . .74*** 2.81 (0.36) 2.58 (0.59) 3.80 .054 
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Note. *** p < .001. aScored 1 to 3. 
The risk information was confirmed as being no~el for most participants, with 
only 16 (19.5%) reporting having heard previously of a link between alcohol and 
r 
breast cancer. These were equally distributed between affirmed (N = 9) and non- . 
affirmed conditions (N = 7). Consistent with this, participants reported having given 
little thought before the experiment to the possibility that alcohol could give them 
breast cancer (self-affirmed, M = 1.0, non-affirmed, M = 1.1), F (I, 78) < I, p = .57. 
Post-experimental interviews were conducted with the first 10 participants, none of 
. . ., 
whom reported suspecting that the studies were linked. When asked to think of ways in 
which they might be linked, no one mentioned anything resembling the real connection 
between them. 
Randomisation Check 
Data in Table 2.3 were analysed using one-way, between-participants' 
ANDV As, with condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) as an independent variable. 
Analysis was conducted separately for those at higher (>14 units per week) and lower 
(~ 14 units) risk. The analysis revealed no significant differences i~ alcohol 
consumption: higher, F(I, 34) < l,p = .56~ lower, F(I, 44) = 3.8,p = .07. Self-
affirmed and non-affirmed participants in the higher risk group did not differ in 
'. 
attitudes towards drinking, F(1, 34) = 1.15, p = .29, although self-affirmed participants 
in the lower risk group had significantly more positive attitudes than those who 'were 
not affirmed, F(I, 45) = 7.32, p = .010. There were no significant differences in mood: 
higher, F(I,34) = 1.9, p = .18; lower, F(l, 44) < I, p = .71. Analysis of a subset of 
participants (N = 58) who had completed the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale in a 
" 
mass session at the beginning of the semester revealed no significant differences in 
prior levels of self-esteem in either group: higher, F(l,. 21) < 1, p = .83; lower, F(1, 33) 
< 1, p = .96. Analysis of participants smoking behaviour revealed no significant· 
. differences in the number of participants smoking: higher, F(l, 35) = 1.10, P = .30; 
lower, F(l, 45) = 1.91,p = .17. 
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Table. 2.3. Mean Responses to Randomisation Check Measures Among Higher and 
Lower Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Higher risk Lower risk 
r 
Measures SA NA SA NA 
(N= 18) (N=18) (N= 22) (N=24) 
Alcohol consumptiona 19.15 (5.80) 20.82 (6.43) 8.00 (4.30) 5.72 (3.71) 
Attitudesb 3.50 (0.46) 3.72 (0.73) 3.53 (0.69) 2.94 (0.80) 
Moodb 2.94 (1.31) 3.50 (1.10) 3.27 (1.42) 3.13 (1.23) 
Rosenberg Self-esteem 22.20 (2.15) 22.71 (3.68) 22.47 (3.83) 22.55 (5.11) 
SmokingC 1 3 0 2 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels on each of the measures. aUnits of alcohol. 
bScored 0 to 6. cNumber participants reporting smoking. 
Message Acceptance 
The present study was primarily intended to test whether self-affirmation 
encouraged greater message acceptance at higher levels of risk (alcohol consumption), 
and therefore whether there was a significant interaction of condition and risk. A list of 
the measures of general and personal message acceptance are presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Principal Measures o/General and Personal Message Acceptance 
Personal message acceptance 
Breast cancer risk from alcohol 
Ease of Imagination 
Negative affect items 
Intention 
Behaviour 
General message acceptance 
Belief in link 
. Evidence strength 
Persuasiveness of article 
Data were analysed using two-step hierarchical regression analyses. The . 
independent variables were first mean centered in order to. minimise any problems of 
multi-collinearity and to aid the interpretation of the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991) . 
. The main effects of condition and alcohol consumption were entered at step 1, and the 
Condition X Risk interaction at step 2. Where the interaction was significant, simple -
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slopes analyses were conducted (Aiken & West, 1991) for the dependent variable at 
three levels of the moderator (alcohol consumption): low (one standard d~viation' , 
below the mean), moderate (the mean) and high (one standard deviation above the 
mean)!. For each analysis that included repeated measures (Le., time or target; self or 
other) ANOVA for mixed designs with between-participants' variables of condition 
(self-affirmed or non~affirmed) and risk as a two-level independent variable (highe~ 
>14 units or lower ~ 14 units per week) were first conducted to'examine whether 
( , ' , 
moderated regressions were carried out on combined ratings or within levels of the 
repeated measures variable. Where analysis revealed interactions between condition 
and time or target, the regression analyses were conducted within levels of the 
repeated measures, variable. To aid interpretation of the analyses, descriptive data are 
reported for higher (>14 units per week) and lower (~ 14 units) risk participants. 
Personal message acceptance 
Perceptions of risk targeted by the message. Perceptions of risk of contracting 
breast cancer from alcohol were analysed using four-way ANOVA for mixed designs, 
with between-participant variables of condition and risk, and within-participant ' 
variables of time (immediately after, 1 week, or 1 month) and target (self or other). 
The data are in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. Mean Responses to Risk Perceptions Measures Among Higher and Lower 
Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition. 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Measure SA NA SA NA SA NA 
Higher risk N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 N=15 N=16 
Self risk 4.67 3.28 4.33 3.17 4.53 3.19 
(1.57) (1.64) (1.33) (1.58) (1.85) (1.87) 
Average risk 5.67 4.22 5.17 3.83 5.27 3.50 
(1.78) , (1.70) (1.30) (1.98) (1.71) (1.97) 
Lower risk N=22 N=24 N=21 N=22 N= 18 N=19 
Self risk 2.82 2.75 3.43 3.46 3.00 3.21 
(1.50) (1.87) (1.72) (2.30) (1.57) (2.44) 
1 Moderated regressions throughout the thesis were conducted in the same manner 
(e.g., variables were mean centred, and where interactions were significant simple 
slopes analyses were conducted at three levels of the moderator). ' 
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Average risk 5.05 
(1.43) 
5.50 
(2.09) 
5.33 
(1.65) 
5.05 
(2.10) 
4.00 
(1.85) 
4.63 
(1.98) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher risk perceptions. Scored 0 to 10. Time 1 = 
immediately after manipulation; Time 2 = after 1 week; Time 3 = after 1 month 
(applies throughout this chapter). 
,The eff<icts of condition were notmoderated by time or target, alone or in 
combination with risk (Table 2.6). The main effect of target was significant, F(l, 63) = 
60.7, p < .001, indicating that regardless of condition, participants reported themselves 
to be at less risk than the average other (Le., optimistic bias). 
Table 2.6. Testing whether the Effects of Self-affirmation for Risk Perceptions were 
Moderated by Target, or Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source dt', MS F p 
Target 1 175.68 60.68 <.001 
Condition X Target 1 0.22 0.08 .79 
Condition X Risk X Target 1 ·4.03 1.39· .24 
Error ' 63 2.90 
Condition X Time 2 0.34 0.21 ~81 
Condition X Time X Target 2 0.86 1.85 .17 
Condition X Risk X Time 2 0.78 0.32 .73 
Error 126 2.29 
Condition X Risk X Time X Target 2 0.27 0.74 .48 
Error 126 0.50 
As the effects of condition were not moderated by time or target, the moderated 
regression analysis used breast cancer risk ratings collapsed over time and target as the 
dependent variable. Neither condition nor risk emerged as a significant predictor. The 
predicted Condition X Risk interaction was, however, significant, B = .29, p = .021 
(Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7. Moderated Regression Analysesfor Participants' Risk Perceptions. 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model JlR.2 M' 
Variable Entered ' F 
Breast cancer risk from alcohol 
1. Condition (C) , .16 
Risk (R) -.04 
2. CXR 
.13 
.04 .03 
.29* .11 
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0.82 
2.45 .08 5.60* 
Note. * p < .05 
Simple slopes analyses revealed self-affirmation did not significantly affect 
risk perceptions when consumption was low, 8 = -.16,p = .38, or moderate, 8 = .13, 
p = .28, but, as predicted, self-affirmation was associated with higher risk perceptions 
.I 
when consumption was high, 8 = .42, p = .012 (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. Interaction of condition and risk for ratings of breast cancer risk as a result 
of alcohol consumption: Simple slopes for condition at three levels of risk. 
The equivalent analysis was also conducted for the overall ratings of personal 
risk. This revealed the same effects: self-affirmation did not significantly predict risk 
perceptions at low, 8 = -.H,p= .53, or moderate consumption, B = .12,p = .33, but 
did when consumption was high, 8 = .34, p = .038. Among higher risk drinkers, risk 
perceptions for the targeted outcome were higher among those who had self-affirmed .. 
This effect was not moderated by time or target. 
. . 
Imagination. Ratings of ease of imagination were first analysed using three-
way ANOV A for mixed designs, with between-participant variables of condition and 
risk and within-participant variable of time (immediately after or after 1 week). The 
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data are in Table 2.8. The effects of condition were not moderated by time, alone or in 
combination with risk (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.8. Mean Responses to Ease of Imagination Measure Among Higher and Lower 
Risk Participants by Self-affinnation Condition. 
Time 1 Time 2 
Measure SA NA SA NA 
Higher risk 1.89 (1.37) 0.76 (0.90) 1.72 (0.90) 0.83 (0.86) 
Lower risk 0.95 (1.36) 1.30 (1.64) 0.95 (1.00) . 1.10 (1.26) 
Note. Higher scores indicate greater ease of imagining developing breast cancer. 
Table 2.9. Testing whether the Effects ofSelf-affinnationfor Ease of Imagination were 
Moderated by Time, either alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source df MS F p 
Condition X Time 1 0.02 0.29 .86 
Condition X Risk X Time 1 0.41 0.74 .39 
Error 71 0.55 
As the effects of self-affirmation were not moderated by time, moderated 
regressions were conducted using the overall ratings of ease of imagining as the 
dependent variable. Neither main effect was significant at either step. However, the 
predicted Condition X Risk interaction was significant, 8 = .26, p = .028 (Table 2.10). 
Table 2.10. Moderated Regression Analyses for Participants' Ease of Imagination. 
Beta 
Dependent Step..~ Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model M2 M' 
Varfable "-'.~ "'~' Entered F 
., 
Imagination 
1. Condition (C) .15 .12 
Risk'(R) '.15 .20 .05 1.80 
2. CXR .26* .11 2.95* .06 5.05* 
Note. * p <.05 
. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that self-affirmation did not significantly 
affect risk perceptions at low, 6 = -.14, p = .41~ o~ moderate consumption, 8 = .12, 
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p = .28, but did when consumption was high, B = .39, p = .014 (Figure 2.2). Among 
higher risk drinkers, self-affirmation predicted an increase in ease of imagining 
developing breast cancer as a result of alcohol consumption. This effect was not 
moderated by time. 
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. Figure 2.2. Interaction of condition and risk for ratings of imaging developing breast 
cancer as a result of alcohol consumption: Simple slopes for condition at three levels 
of risk. 
Negative affect. Moderated regression analyses were conducted on the mean 
ratings of negative affect (anxiety, fear, and worry combined, a = .68) as the 
dependent variable (data in Table 2.11). , . 
Table 2.11. Mean Responses to Negative Affect Measure Among Higher and Lower 
, ' 
Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition. 
Higher risk Lower risk . 
SA NA SA NA 
N= 18' N= 18 N=-22 N= 24 
Negative affect 3.61 (0.77) 2.94 (0.79) 2.32 (1.13) 2.74 (1.20) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher reports of negative affect. Scored 0 to 6. 
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The main effect of risk was significant at step one, but not at step two (Table 
2.12). Condition was not significant at either step. The predicted interaction was, 
however, significant, B = .25, P = .016. Tests of simple slopes revealed effects of self-
affirmation approaching significance at low, B = -.25, P =.087, and high, B = .25, P = 
.075, but not moderate, B = .007, P = .98, levels of drinking. The pattern of results is 
consistent with that presented in Figure 2.3. In comparison to non-affirmation, self-
. . 
affirmation was associated with reports of more negative affect at high levels of 
drinking, but less negative affect at low levels of drinking. 
Table 2.12. Moderated Regression Analyses for Participants' Ratings of Negative 
Affect 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable, Step 1 Step 2 R2 . Model F 6R? M 
Variable Entered 
Negative affect 
1. Condition (C) .01 .00 
Risk (R) .43*** .38*** .08 9.02*** 
2. . CXR .25* .14 8.42*** .06 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Intention and behaviour. Data for participants' intentions and drinking 
behaviour are in Table 2.13. 
6.08* 
Table 2.13. Mean Responses to Measures of Intentions and Behaviour Among Higher' 
and Lower Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Measure Time 1 
SA NA 
Higher risk N= 18 N= 18 
Intentions 3.44 1.64 
(1.17) . (0.98) 
Alcohol 
consumption 
Lower risk N=22 N=24 
Intentions 1.73 2.10 
(1.18) (1.99) 
Alcohol "" 
consumption 
Time 2 
. SA NA 
N=18 N=18 
19.97 
(9.57) 
20.61 
(8.19) 
Time 3 
SA NA 
N=15 N=16 
21.30 
(10.14) 
21.03 
(9.69) 
N = 21 N = 22 . N = 18 N = 19 
8.14 
(5.19) 
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6.68 
(5.60) 
7.42 
(6.55) 
6.18 
(7.04) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher intentions and alcohol consumption. Empty cells 
mean data not collected. 
Moderated regression analyses were conducted on participants' intentions to 
cut down on alcohol in the next 7 days (Table 2.14). Neither condition nor risk was 
significant at either step. The predicted interaction, however, was significant, B = .22, 
p = .042. Tests of simple slopes revealed that self-affirmation did not significantly 
affect intentions at low, B = -.05, p = .73, or moderate consumption, B = .18, P = .10, 
but did when consumption was high, B = .40, P = .01. The pattern of findings was 
similar to those in Figure 2.1. In comparison with non-affirmed participants, higher 
risk participants who had been self-affirmed reported stronger intentions to reduce 
their alcohol consumption. ' 
Table 2.14. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measure of Intentions 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model ~R? M' 
Variable Entered F 
Intention. 
1. Condition (C) .18 .18 
Risk (R) .20 .. 25 .08 3.26* 
2. CXR .22* .13 3.70* .05 4.30* 
To test whether these changes in intention were reflected in subsequent 
behaviour, three-way mixed ANOV A with variables of condition, risk and time (1 
week or 1 month) were first conducted. The analysis revealed the effects of condition 
. . 
were not moderated by time, alone or in combination with risk (Table 2.14). 
Table 2.15. Testing whether the Effects of Self-affirmation for Behaviour were 
Moderated by Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source 'df' MS F 
Condition X Time 1 7.74 ,0.13 
Condition X Risk X Time 
'" 
1 ',0.55 0.01 
Error 63 57.86 
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p 
' .72 
.92 
Moderated regression analyses on combined reports of alcohol consumption 
after one-week and one-month revealed a significant main effect of risk at both steps.·: 
However~ neither condition nor the interaction was significant (Table 2.16). 
Table 2.16. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measure of Behaviour 
Beta 
Dependent· Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 ModelF ilR? M' 
Variable Entered 
Behavior 
1. Condition (C).· -.02 -.02 
Risk (R) .72*** .72*** . 52 34.52*** . 
2. CXR .01 .52 22.67*** .00 0.02 
. Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p< .001. 
General message acceptance 
Data for items measuring general acceptance of the health message are in Table 
2.17. 
Table 2.17. Mean Responses to Measures of General Message Acceptance Among 
Higher and Lower Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Measure Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
SA NA SA NA SA NA 
Higher risk N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 N= 15 N= 16 
Belief 4.33 4.33 4.56 4.12 4.33 3.00 
(0.59) (0.97) (0.86) (1.41) (0.82) (1.59) 
Evidence 3.94 3.39 3.78 3.56 3.73 3.13 
strength (0.80) (1.15) (1.11) (1.20) (1.03) (1.63) 
Persuasi veness 4.17 3.72 3.50 3.00 
(0.70) . (1.18) (1.10) . (1.28) j 
Lower risk N=22 N=24 N=21 N=22 N= 18 N= 19 
Belief in link 3.91 4.13 3.95 3.76 3.18 3.84 
(1.11) , (1.42) (1.47) (1.92) (1.67) (1.46) 
Evidence . 3.18 3.50 3.30 3.10 3.00 3.95· 
strength (1.33) (1.38) (1.53) (1.67) . (1.68) (1.84) 
Persuasi veness 3.41 3.79 2.90 3.25 
(1.22) (1.38) • (1.09) (1.54) 
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Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels on each of the measures. Empty cells mean 
data not collected. 
Belie/ in the link. Ratings of belief that alcohol causes breast cancer were first 
analysed using three-way ANDV A for mixed designs, with between-participant· 
variables of condition and risk and within-participant variable of time (immediately, 1 
week, or 1 month). The results of the analysis are in Table 2.18. 
Table 2.18. Testing whether the Effects 0/ Self-affirmation/or Belie/in Link were 
Moderated by Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source d/ MS F p 
Condition X Time 2 1.52 2.27 .11 
Condition X Risk X Time 2 2.24 3.36 .04 
Error 120 0.67 
The three-way interaction emerged as significant. Consequently, moderated 
regression analyses were conducted on the responses separately at each time point 
(Table 2.19). The results of these analyses revealed no significant effects of risk or 
condition alone or in combination. Regardless of drinking behaviour, self-affirmed 
participants did not report any differences in their belief in the link between breast 
cancer and alcohol. 
Table 2.19. Moderated Regression Analyses/or Belie/in Link' 
Beta' 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model .M,2 aF 
Variable Entered F 
Belief: immediately after 
1. Condition (C) -.06 -.06 
Risk (R) .11 .12 .01 0.56 
2. CXR ·.07' .02 0.51 .01 0.40 
Belief: 1 week 
1. Condition (C) .10 .10 
Risk (R) .11 .11 .02 0.88 
2. CXR .01 .02 0.58 .00 .002 
Belief: 1 month 
" 
'1. Condition (C) .09 .08 
Risk (R) , 
.05 .09 .01 0.33 
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2. CXR .15 .03· 0.70 .02 1.44 
Evidence strength. Data were analysed as for belief ratings. The effects of 
condition were not moderated by time, alone or in combination with risk (Table 2.20). 
Table 2.20. Testing whether the Effects of Self-affirmation for Ratings of Evidence 
Strength were Moderated by Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source df MS F P 
Condition X Time . 1 0.02 0.03 .87 
Condition X Risk X Time . 1 1.39 1.72 .19 
Error 73 0.81 
Moderated regression analyses were therefore conducted on the ratings of 
evidence ·strength collapsed over time. These revealed no significant effects at either 
step, indicating that participants' ratings of the strength of evidence supporting the link 
were not significantly influenced by self-affirmation or risk, alone or in combination 
(Table 2.21) . 
. Table 2.21. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measures of Evidence Strength 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model M2 M' 
Variable Entered F 
Evidence strength 
1. Condition (C) .03 .02 
Risk (R) .004 .02 .001 0.02 
.2. CXR .06 .004 0.08 .003 0.21 
Leaflet Persuasiveness. Ratings of how persuasive the leaflet was in general 
were first analysed using three-way ANDV A for mixed designs, with between-
participant variables of condition and risk and within-participant variable of time· 
(immediately, 1 week). The effects of condition were not moderated by time, alone or 
in com~ination with risk (Table 2.22). 
Table 2.22. Testing whether.the Effects of Self-affirmation for Leaflet Persuasiveness 
were Moderated by Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
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Source . df MS F p 
Condition X Time 1 0.01. 0.02 .89 
Condition X Risk X Time 1. 0.03 0.01 .. 95 
Error 75 0.68 
Moderated regression analyses were therefore conducted on the ratings of 
general persuasion collapsed over time. These revealed no significant effects at either 
step, indicating that participants' ratings of how persuasive the arguments were linking 
alcohol and breast cancer were not significantly influenced by self-affiImation or risk, 
alone or in combination (Table 2.23). 
Table 2.23. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measures Leaflet Persuasiveness 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 . Model AR? AF 
Variable Entered F 
General persuasiveness 
1. Condition (C) .01 .01 
Risk (R) .06 .08 .003 0.13 
2. CXR .14 .021 0.55 .018 1.39 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Other outcome measures 
Theory of planned behaviour items. Data for mean response to TPB measures 
are in Table 2.24. 
Table 2.24. Mean Responses to Theory of Planned Behaviour Measures (Time 1 only) 
Among Higher and Lower Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Higher Risk Lower Risk 
Measure 
SA , NA SANA 
N= 18 .N= 18 N= 22 N= 24 
PBC 4.53 (1.44) 4.89 (0.98) 5.43 (0.89) 5.42 (0.89) 
Subjective norms 4.00 (1.33) '3.53 (1.09) 3.09 (0.91) 2.88 (1.26) 
Attitudes (costs) 4.41 (0.59) 4.13 (0.94) 3.12 (1.27) 3.15 (1.27) 
Attitudes (cutting down) '. 4.24 (0.93) 3.89 (0.71) 3.74 (0.84), 3.90 (1.02) . 
. ' Self-efficacy . 4.19 (1.36) 3.89 (1.29) 4.86 (1.07) 5.15 (1.21) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels on each of the measures. Scored 0 to 6. 
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Moderated regression analyses we~e conducted on participants' reports of 
perceived behavioural control (PBC). The main effect of risk was significant, B = -.46, 
p < .001, with higher levels of alcohol consumption being associated with slightly 
lower perceptions of PBC. However, condition neither alone or in combination with 
risk was significant (Table 2.25). 
Table 2.25. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measures from Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model l1R? M 
Variable Entered F 
PBC 
1. Condition (C) -.05 -.05 
Risk (R) ;'.46*** -.48*** .22 10.97*** 
2. CXR -.07 .22 7.44*** .00 .53 
Subjective norms 
1. Condition (C) .12 .12 
Risk (R) .27* .28* .09 ·3.89* 
2. CXR ' .08 .10 2.76* .01 .55 
Attitudes towards reducing alcohol 
1. Condition (C) .03 .03 
Risk (R) .. 12 .15 .02 0.61 
2. CXR .17 .04 1.19 .. .03 2.33 
Self-efficacy 
1. Condition (C) .01 .01 
Risk (R) -.46*** -.43*** .21 10.78*** 
2. CXR .19 .25 8.58*** .03 3.48 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Moderated regression analyses were conducted on the ratings of subjective 
norms. These revealed no significant effects at either step, indicating that participants' 
perception of subjective norms were not significantly influenced by self-affirmation or 
risk, alone or in combination. 
Moderated regressions of participants' attitude towards reducing their alcohol 
consumption revealed no significant effects involving condition, risk, either alone or in 
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.,. 
combination (Table 2.25). This indicates that self-affirmation did not influence 
participants' attitudes towards reducing their alcohol consumption. 
To test for changes in participants' attitudes towards the health consequences 
of drinking alcohol before and after reading the leaflet, a three-way ANDV A for 
mixed designs, with between-participant variables of condition and risk, and within-
participant variables of time (immediately before leaflet, immediately after) was 
conducted. Analysis revealed no significant effects of condition, either alone or in 
combination with risk. There was a main effect of time, F(l, 78) = 12.25, p = .001, 
with participants regardless of condition reportirig alcohol consumption to be 
associated with greater costs after reading the leaflet. There was also a main effect of 
risk, F(1, 78) = 21.60,p < .001, such that those drinking higher levels of alcohol 
. reported alcohol to be associated with more costs (Table 2.26). 
Table 2.26. Testing whether the Effects of Self-affirmation on Attitudes about the 
Health Consequences Associated with Alcohol were Moderated by Time, either Alone 
or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source df MS F p 
Condition 1 1.52 0.73 .40 
Risk 1 45.59 21.60 <.001 
Condition X Risk 1 1.53 1.53 .40 
Error 78 2.11 
Time 1 5.15 12.25 .001 
Condition X Time 1 0.20. 0.48 .49 
Risk X Time 1 0.19 0.45 .50 
Condition X Risk X Time 1 0.06 0.15 .70 
Error 78 0.42 
Moderated regressions for participants' reports of self-efficacy to reduce their 
alcohol consumption revealed a main effect of risk, B = -.46, P < .001, with 
. 
participants drinking higher levels of alcohol reporting lower perceptions of self-
efficacy. Condition was not signific,ant at either step. However, the interaction did 
approach significance, B = .19, p = .066. Tests of simple slopes revealed that the 
effects of self-affirmation did not reach significance at low, moderate or high level of 
consumption. 
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Recall of information. Participants' recall of facts presented in the leaflet were 
first analysed using three-way ANOV A for mixed designs, with between-participant 
variables of condition and risk and within-participant variables of time (immediately 
after, 1 week). Data are in Table 2.27. . 
Table 2.27. Mean Responses to Recall Measures Among Higher and Lower Risk 
Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Time 1 Time 2 
. Measure SA NA SA NA 
Higher risk N= 18 N= 18 N=18 N= 18 
Recall 3.17 3.74 3.64 3.29 
(central facts) (1.65) (1.50) (1.36) (1.61) 
Recall (non- 2.00 1.24 3.56 2.24 
central facts) (1.88) (1.60) (1.76) (2.14) 
-. 
Lower risk N=22. N=24 N=21 N=22 
Recall 3.23 3.35 3.43 3.48 
(central facts) (1.26) (1.58) (0.89) (1.94) 
Recall (non- 2.36 2.52 3.05 2.95 
central facts) (1.76) (1.97) (1.57) (1.99) 
The effects of condition were not moderated by time, alone or in combination 
with risk for any of the recall items (Table 2.28). 
Table 2.28. Testing whether the Effects 0/ Self-affirmation/or Recall were Moderated 
by Time, either Alone or in Conjunction with Risk. 
Source df MS F p 
Recall of central facts 
Condition X Time 1 1.81 0.97 .33 
Condition X Risk X Time 1 2.23 1.82 .18 
Error 71 1.22 
Recall of non-central fact. 
Condition X Time . 1 2.65 1.62 .21 
Condition X Risk X Time 1 0.64 0.39 .54 
Error 69 1.64 
Moderated regression analyses were therefore conducted on the recall items 
collapsed over time. Analysis for the facts central to the message revealed no 
significant effects at either step. indicating that participants' recall was not 
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significantly influenced by self-affirmation or risk, alone or in combination. However, 
for participants' recall of the peripheral fact, suggesting smoking could cause breast 
cancer, the interaction of Condition X Risk approached significance, B = .22, P = .061 
(Table 2.29). 
Table 2.29. Moderated Regression Analyses for Measures of Recall 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable 
Entered 
Step 1 Step 2 R2 
Variable 
Recall (central facts) 
1. Condition (C) -.05 
Risk (R) -.07 
2. CXR 
Recall (non -central fact) 
1. Condition (C) .12 
Risk -.06 
2. CXR 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
-.05 
-.07 
-.01 
.11 
-.03 
.22 
.01 
.01 
.02 
.07 
0.28 
0.19 
0.66 
1.66 
.00 0.01 
.05 3.61 
Simple slopes analyses revealed self-affirmation did not significantly affect 
recall when consumption was low, B =-.12,p = .49, or moderate, B =.l1,p = .36. 
However, self-affirmation was associated with greater levels of incorrect recall when 
, " 
consumption was high, B = .33, p = .041 (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3. Recall of facts peripheral to the message as a function of condition and 
risk: Simple slopes at three levels of risk. 
Risk/or Diseases Not Targeted by the Message. Mean ratings of self and other 
risk for these diseases were combined and analysed initially using four-way ANDV A 
for mixed designs, with between-participant variables of condition and risk and within-
participant variables of time (immediately after, 1 week, 1 month) and target. The data 
, . 
for this analysis are presented in Table 2.30. 
The effects of condition were not moderated by time or target, alone or in 
combination with risk. (Table 2.31). There was a significant main effect of target, F(I, 
62) = 7.6, p = .008, indicating the presen,ce of optimistic bias regardless of condition. 
Table 2.30. Mean Responses to Risk Perception Measures, not Targeted by Message, 
Among Higher and UJwer Risk Participants by Self-affirmation Condition 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Measure SA NA SA NA SA NA 
Higher risk. N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 N= 18 . N= 15 . N= 16 
Self risk 4.89 4.26 4.69 4.53 5.27 4.63 
other diseases (1.30) (1.80) (1.34) (1.51) (2.19) (1.86) 
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A verage risk 5.33' 4.65 5.20 4.54 5.40 4.63 
. other diseases (1.34) (1.65) (1.03) (1.54) (1.80) (1.63) 
Lower risk N=22 N=24 N=21 N=22 N= 18 N=19 
Self risk 4.30 4.94 ·4.57 5.29 4.56 5.58 
other diseases (1.52) (1.74) (1.58) (1.48) (1.85) (1.64) 
Average risk 4.89 5.50 5.19 5.38 4.72 5.53 
other diseases (1.37) (1.74) (1.31) (1.37) (1.32) (1.43) 
Table 2.31. Testing whether the Effects of Self-affirmation for Risk Perceptionsfor 
, 
Other Diseases were Moderated by Target, or Time. either Alone or in Conjunction 
with Risk. 
Source df MS F P 
Condition X Target' 1 1.00 0.75 .39 
Condition X Risk X Target 1 0.09 0.07 .79 
Error 62 1.33 
Condition X Time 2 0.22 0.13 ' .88 
Condition X Time X Target 2 0.38 0.99 .38 
Condition X Risk X Time 2. 0040 0.24 .79, 
Error 124 1.66 
Condition X Risk X Time X Target 2 0.01 0.00 .96 
Error 124. 0.38 
The overall risk ratings (ex = .88) were averaged and combined into a single 
item for analysis. Moderated regression revealed a significant main effect of risk in the 
final model but not of condition at either s~ep. However, the interaction was 
significant, B = .27, P = .033 (Table 2.32). 
Table 2.32. Moderated Regression Analyses for Participants' Risk Perceptions for 
Disease Not Targeted by the Message ' . 
Beta 
Dependent Step Variable Step 1 Step 2 R2 Model AR2 AF 
Variable Entered F 
Risk of other diseases 
1. Condition (C) -.10 -.13 
Risk (R) -.21 -.14 .06 1.98 
2., . CXR .27* . 
.13 2.99* .07 4.77* 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. . , .' 
59 
Tests.of simple slopes revealed no significant effects of condition at high. B = 
.14. P = .40, or moderate levels of drinking, B = -.13, P = .30, but a significant 
reduction in risk perceptions at low levels of drinking. B = -.39, P = .031 (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4. Interaction of condition and risk for ratings of risk of disease not targeted' 
by message: Simple slopes for condition at three levels of risk. 
Predicting Intentions to change 
To test whether differences in risk perception mediated the impact of self-
affirmation on intentions in those drinking at a higher level, mediation analyses 
following Baron and Kenny (1986) were performed. Conditi'on predicted the potential 
mediator, ris,k perception,s for breast cancer from alcohol, R2 = .18, B = .42, t(34) = 2.7, 
, - . . - . . 
p = .01, and also intentions, R2 = .42, B = .65, t(34) = 5.0, p < .001. However, whe~ 
. . 
intentions were regressed simultaneously on risk perceptions and condition, risk. 
perceptions were not significant, B = -.11, t(33) = -.73, p = .47, indicating that risk 
perception did not mediate the effect of self-affirmation on intentions. 
Risk Perception, Self-esteem and Risk Factor Standing 
In comparison to Klein et al. (2001), analysis of the present data provided no 
evidence that for higher risk self-affirmed participants risk factorstanding (units of 
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. alcohol calculated from reported alcohol consumption) was less well associated with 
self-risk judgment for breast cancer (Table 2.33). Nor were self-affirmed participants' 
risk perception associated with their self-esteem. 
Table 2.33. Strength of Association Between Self-esteem, Risk Factor Standing and 
Risk Perceptions for Breast Cancer. 
Risk factor standing Self-esteem 
r 
r p r p 
Higher risk 
Self-affirmed (N = 18) .42 .055 -.07 .70 
Non-affirmed (N = 18) -.01 , .971 -.07 .78 
Lower risk 
Self-affirmed (N = 22) .68 .001 .07 .77 
Non-affirmed (N = 24) .59 .003 -.22 .39 
Self-esteem as. a moderator 
Moderated regressions were conducted to test whether self-esteem moderated 
the effects of self-affirmation on participants' acceptance of the message: The single 
Robins et aI. (2001) self-esteem item taken at the first session and a week later were 
highly correlated, r(75) = .90, p <.001, and combined into a single item. Self-esteem 
was not found to moderate the effects of self-affirmation for participants' risk 
. , 
perceptions, ease of imagination, belief in the me~sage, ratings of evidence strength, 
leaflet persuasiveness, negative affect, or behaviour (Table 2.34). The interaction of 
Self-esteem X Condition for participants' intentions to reduce their alcohol 
consumption did however approach significance, B = .22, p = .058. Simple slopes 
analysis revealed that self-affirmation had little effect at moderate, B = .14, p = ~22, 
and low self-esteem, B = -.17, p = .32. However, at high self-esteem, self-affirmation 
increased intentions to reduce alcohol consumption, regardless of risk, B = .41, 
p = .010 (Figure 2.5). 
t', 
Table 2.34. Moderated Regression for Self-esteem for Outcome Measures 
Condition X Self-esteem 
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Condition X Risk X 
Self-esteem. 
B p 
Breast cancer risk from -.04 .83 
alcohol 
Ease imagination .19 .39 
Negative affect -.06 .67 
Intentions .66 .06 
Behaviour -.68 .72 
Belief in link -.23 .' .15. 
Evidence strength .03 .86 
Persuasive .31 .23 
PBC .13 .;.. .59 
SN .14 .60 
Attitude .22 .29 
Self-efficacy .24 .40 
, 
--+- Low self-esteem 
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-0- High self-esteem 
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-.01 .85 
-.01 .84 
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.01 .83 
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.03 .94 
.03 .36 
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Figure 2.5. Interaction of condition and self-esteem on intentions to reduce alcohol 
(. , 
consumption: Simple slopes for condition at three levels of self-esteem 
;1 Eighteen-month Follow-up 
The current'study suggests that self-affirmation can l~ad to durable changes in 
participants' acceptance of risk. Eighteen months after the original study. participants 
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were sent a further follow-up email to assess whether these changes had been 
,maintained over a longer period of time. Unfortunately, only 29 (35% of original 
sample) responded to the final follow-up, of whom only nine had previously reported 
drinking above the government recommended level (self-affirmed: 5; non-affirmed: 4). 
This sample was too small to analyse further owing to loss of statistical power. 
Discussion 
r 
The findings strongly support the hypothesis that self-affirmation can reduce 
defensive processing of a threatening message. On a number of key variables, women 
at greater risk of contracting breast cancer from their alcohol consumption showed 
evidence of less biased processing and greater personal acceptance of the message 
contained in the leaflet if they had self-affirmed. Thus, compared to women at higher 
risk who had not affirmed, self-affirmed wo~en had higher 'risk perceptions for 
. , . . I, 
,developing breast cancer from their drinking, found it easier to imagine developing the 
disease, reported greater intention to reduce their alcohol consumption, and reporte? 
higher levels of negative affect. 
On the measures of personal acceptance of the message, the effects of self-
. ' 
affirmation were maintained over time, indicating that self-affirmation resulted in 
changes that were durable as well as consequential. Moreover, the effects were 
specific to the outcome targeted. Thus, there were no effects of self-affirming on other 
, , 
diseases, including an outcome as close to the targeted outcome as breast cancer from \ 
. , 
other causes. 
. , 
That the effects were so specific suggests that self-affirming works by reducing 
-- biased responses to threatening messages rather than by a mechanism that heightens 
the sense of vulnerability more generally. That the message was perceived as being 
equally persuasive by both theself-affirmed and non-affirmed higher risk groups, who 
did not differ in their belief that there was a link between alcohol and breast can~er or 
ratings of the, leaflet strength or persuasiveness, suggests that self-affirming 
" < '" 
specifically reduced denial of personal inferences of the message, rather than biased 
'evaluation of strength or validity of the message. This appeared to be the case at least 
when, as in the present study, the arguments are strong. 
~
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Self-affirmation may have the potential to reduce defence motivation at other 
levels of processing. For example, if a health message allows participants to more 
easily counter-argue the contents, non-affirmed participants may be more likely to 
denigrate the message and the effects of self-affirmation may be seen on measures of 
general persuasion. Alternatively, if participants are offered an opportunity not to 
attend to the message, self-affirmation may reduce attentional avoidance. Study 4 tests 
this latter prediction .. 
r The findings of increases in personal risk and intention among those at higher 
risk who had been self-affirmed are consistent with those of Sherman et al. (2000). 
However, self-affirmed participants also increased their perceptions of average risk, 
thus maintaining an optimistic bias in their risk judgments. This finding highlights a 
possible limitation to the effects of self-affirmation. One account of optimistic bias is 
,> 
that it results from a desire to maintain positive evaluations of the self (Regan et al., 
1995). When faced with a health threat, making positive comparisons with an average 
other may help to maintain a sense of invulnerability, control (Higgins et al., 1997) and 
positive self-evaluation (Regan et aI., 1995). The fact that self-affirmation was unable 
to reduce this bias could suggest a number of things. For example, from a motivational 
perspective, self-affirmation may not have adequately restored positive self-
I, conceptions needed to reduce the motivation to make self-enhancing comparative risk 
judgments. The fact that self-affirmation reduced bias responding on other measures 
suggests that the manipulation was successful. Why then was optimistic bias so 
resilient? Perhaps the resource of self-affirmation can be depleted, and though self- ' 
affirmation increased participants' acceptance of personal risk, the effects were not 
. powerful enough to allow them to also recognise their increased comparative risk. 
Alternatively, the finding could reflect the fact that optimistic bias results from non-
motivational causes. Optimistic bias has been argued to result from cognitive factors, 
such as the use of a representa~iveness heuristic or egocentrism (Higgins et aI., 1997). 
Perhaps self-affirmation was unable to influence these cognitive processes. Studies 3 
and 5 provide further tests of the effects of self-affirmation on optimistic bias. 
Self-affirmation did not appear to reduce negative affect that can interfere with 
message acceptance (Witte, 1992), but rather was associated with reports of greater 
negative affect. This finding is consistent with self-affirmation providing participants 
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( 
with a resource to face up to the negative affective consequences of a health message, 
without negative affect interfering with message acceptance. The finding could suggest 
that while non-affirmed participants attempted to minimise the affective consequences 
of the message self-affirmed participants did not. Alternatively, self-affirmed 
participants may have reported higher levels of negative affect as a result of perceiving 
the health-risk as more relevant. In either case, the effects of self-affirmation were not 
mediated by a reduction in negative affect associated with the message. 
r In the present study, self-affirmed participants reported increased intentions to' . 
reduce their alcohol consumption. This is a promising finding for self-affirmation as an 
applied technique, such that participants not only recognised their increased health-risk 
but intended to do something about it. This increase in intentions to reduce alcohol 
consumption was however not translated into changes in subsequent drinking 
behaviour. Perhaps this finding is not that surprising, for though self-affirmation may 
reduce biased processing of health messages and help participants to form intentions to 
change, whether this intention is transformed into behaviour is likely to depend on 
factors other than message acceptance. Factors such as strong social norms among 
students to drink, and the impact of peer pressure and habit, may have hindered 
participants making changes to their drinking behaviour. That said, the fact that self-
e affirmed women who were at higher risk reported maintained changes in their risk 
perceptions and reports of ease of imagination suggests that even though they did not 
reduce their alcohol consumption they did not subsequently defensively reappraise the 
risk to fit their maintained drinking behaviour. Thus though self-affirmation was not 
associated with immediate behaviour change, the effects on personal message 
" acceptance were durable, and may have eventually been transformed into a reduction 
in drinking. Unfortunately, in order to maximise the number of participants responding 
to the follow-up, the number of variables included at one week and one month were 
limited. Thus it is not possible to say whether participants also maiptained their 
intentions to reduce alcohol consumption as these were omitted from the follow-up 
questionnaires. 
,Contrary to Reed and Aspinwall (1998), the present study found no evidence 
that self-affirmation increased participants' PBC. Nor were there changes on the 
measures of subjective norms or attitudes, the variables along with PBC, seen as 
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precursors in the fonnation of intentions in the Theory of Planned Behaviour. There 
was also no evidence that the impact of self-affinnation on intentions was mediated by 
increases in self-efficacy or risk perceptions. The findings of the current study were 
not able to establish what factors might mediate the impact of self-affinnation on 
intentions to change. 
For the most part, trait self-esteem did not moderate the effects of self-
affinnation. Regardless of trait self-esteem, self-affinnation promoted higher risk 
perceptions, greater negative affect, and ease of imagination. Self-esteem did however 
moderate the effects of self-affinnation on intentions to change. When self-esteem was 
high, self-affinned participants reported greater intentions to change their alcohol 
consumption, irrespective of their risk. This finding could reflect the fact that self-
. 
affinnation was most effective at increasing personal message acceptance in those who 
reported high self-esteem. However, this appears unlikely, as self-esteem did not 
moderate the effects of self-affinnation on the other measures of personal acceptance. 
Instead, those with high self-esteem may have felt more capable of changing their 
drinking behaviour, regardless of message acceptance. This is supported by the fact 
that self-esteem moderated self-affinnation regardless of risk. Overall, the findings 
suggest that self-affinnation was ,as effective at increasing acceptance of a health 
message for those with low and high self-esteem. 
The results of the present study indicate that self-affinned and non-affinned 
women at higher risk of breast cancer as a result of their drinking did not differ in their 
recall of infonnation central to the leaflet's claims about alcohol and breast cancer. 
However, on the item measuring recall of infonnation peripheral to the message, 
. regarding the risks of smoking cigarettes, self-affinned participants incorrectly agreed 
more that smoking increased the risk of breast cancer. The article itself described past 
research suggesting there was a link, but that new research suggested that smoking did 
not increase the risk of breast cancer. The fact that self-affinned participants were less 
accurate in their recall could be accounted for by a number of different explanations. 
For example, self-affinned participants may have evaluated the infonnation more 
openly l and interpreted the conflicting past evidence to suggest smoking may be linked 
to breast cancer, even though this was not supported by the new research. 
Alternatively, non-affirmed and self-affinned participants may have differed in the 
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beliefs about the link between smoking and breast cancer prior to reading the message, 
a variable that was not measured. Another explanation is that self-affirmed participants 
may have paid less attention to aspects of the leaflet not specifically personally 
relevant to them. As self-affirmed participants accepted the message about alcohol and 
breast cancer, their attention may have been focused on central aspects of the message 
more than those who were non-affirmed. Those who were non-affirmed may have 
focused on information irrelevant to the personal threat, and thus recalled it more 
accurately, as a distraction. Finally, the findings may be indicative of self-affirmed 
participants paying less attention to the message as a whole, and less in-depth 
processing. If self-affirmed participants did engage in less in-depth processing then 
changes in message acceptance were likely to be short-lived. Contrary to this self-
affirmation produced durable changes on measures of personal acceptance. 
Exanuning the responses of those at lower risk, the present study revealed self-
at'firmed participants reported 'reduced negative affect associated with the message, 
and perceived themselves to be less likely to experience a range of health disorders not 
targeted by the message. Thus for lower risk participants self-affirmation appeared to 
make them feel less vulnerable, both to other disease and in terms of worry about their 
risks from alcohol. In the present study women drinking low levels of alcohol, were in 
some respects provided with a mixed message, both suggesting that even a single drink 
a day could increase their risk, but also that women should avoid drinking more than 
14 units a week. Thus though the message may have caused women drinking low 
-
levels of alcohol to be concerned, they were likely to perceive the message as less 
negative and personally relevant as those drinking more excessively. The results of the 
_ present study might suggest that self-affirmation prior to a message that causes little 
. ' ~ . 
threat to a participant's self-integrity could lead to feelings of invulnerability.· 
Alternatively, however, the reduction of negative affect associated with the message in 
those drinking within safe limits, might not indicate a lack of concern over health 
threats but be an accurate reflection of their risk. Further research is needed to 
determine the effects of self-affirnlation on those not presented with ~ threat. From an 
applied perspectIVe, however, those at higher risk provide a more interesting group to 
study the effects of self-affirmation, firstly because this group is in the greatest need of 
change, and secondly because this is where biased processing is most likely to 'occur: 
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Thus the present thesis focuses on higher risk participants to investigate the effects of 
self-affirmation. 
Limitations 
The present study found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that self-
affirmation could reduce biased processing of negative, personally-relevant 
information. From the present findings it is not clear, however, how self-affirmation 
affects participants' processing of a health message. For example, Ruiter, Abraham 
and Kok (2000) argue that research examining the effects of self':affirmation on the ~, 
processing of health messages is unclear about whether participants systematically 
process the information or engage in more heuristic processing. This criticism is also 
true of the present study. Indeed self-affirmation may have acted to promote an 
"agreeableness" mindset. That is, participants may have appeared to accept the 
message to greater extent, but in fact not done so through thoughtful consideration of 
the message but heuristic processing. If this were the case it would contradict Steele's· 
arguments that self-affirmation provides a source of self-objectivity, allowing the 
consideration of threatening information that would otherwise be defensively 
processed. ~he present study does provide some evidence consistent with self-affirmed 
participants processing the information systematically. For instance, the effects on 
message acceptance were durable, in line with systematic processing (petty & Wegner, 
1999). Furthermore, the effects of self-affirmation on risk perceptions were specific to 
those targeted by the message, suggesting self-affirmed participants were not agreeing 
that they were at risk of disease when no risk information was presented. To answer 
Ruiter et al.'s (2001) call for further tests of self-affirmation on depth of processing, 
Studies 4 and 5 will include measures of self-reports of message scrutiny, and 
sensitivity to message strength argued by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) to be indicative 
of depth of processing. 
Study 4 also provides an improved measure of recall of information than that 
used in the current study. In the present study the items may not have accurately 
reflected participants' recall of facts in the message as the items used agree / disagree 
, . \ 
scales. This may have resulted in participants reporting their opinions as opposed to 
their recall of the information. To improve on this measure of recall, Study 4 includes 
a free-recall task after a one-week delay. This also provides another measure of depth 
68 . 
processing (petty & Cacioppo, 1986), while also allowing a further test for possible 
biases in participants' recall. 
Another limitation of the current study is that the negative affect measu.res used 
did not distinguish fear experienced while reading the message'and negative affect as 
conseque~ce of accepting the message. It is possible that non-affirmed and self- ' 
affirmed participants did not differ in terms of fear experienced while reading the 
information, but thatthose who were non-affirm~d subsequently engaged inprocesses 
-' 
to reduce fear and worry associated with the message. Study 6 distinguishes these two .... 
processes and extends th~measures by which negative affect is measured. 
69 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl,uk 
PAGE NUMBERING AS 
ORIGINAL 
Summary 
The findings of this study clearly support the idea that self-affirmation can 
encourage people to be less, rather than more, defensive when faced with threats to the 
self. The relative permanency of the effects obtained here suggest self-affirmation may 
have potential as an applied intervention. Likewise, the fact that the effects were 
specific to the outcome targeted and those for whom the message was most relevant.-
.. 
Self-affirmation appeared to promote personal message acceptance rather than general 
. message acceptance. 
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. CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPING A METHOD OF SELF-AFFIRMATION 
The results of Study 1 suggest that a task focusing participants' attention on 
their central values can reduce biased processing of personally-relevant health 
information. The values essay technique of self-affirmation employed in Study 1 was 
clearly successful. However, it also has some practical drawbacks. For instances it is 
time consuming for participants to comp~ete, making this method impractical fo~_ 
settings that require a relatively quick and straightforward technique of self-
affirmation. The practical constrai~ts of this method led to a search for an additional 
self-affirmation technique for use in the current thesis. A variety of ways of inducing 
self-affirmation have been adopted by researchers: these include the completion of 
value scales (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000; Koole, Smets, van Knippenberg, & 
Dijksterhuis, 1999; Sherman et aI., 2000; Spencer et aI., 2001; Steele & Liu, 1983; 
Tesser & Cornell, 1991), writing statements corresponding to a central value or an 
action taken pride in (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Jones, Pelham, & Mirenberg, 2002; 
Klein, Blier, & Janze, 2001; Sherman et aI., 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & 
Beach, 2000), and the use of positive personality feedback on traits (Blanton, Cooper, 
Skumik, & Aronson, 1~97; Cohen et aI., 2000; Greenberg, 1993; Steele, Spencer & 
Lynch, 1993). The variety of methods is indicative of the various ways in which it is 
assumed people can engage in self-affirmation- (Steele, 1988). However, these different 
methods are not also without their drawbacks and practical constraints. Therefore, 
three studies were conducted to test a method of self-affi~ation that was developed to 
overcome some of the problems inherent in the existing methods, and provide a 
practical self-affirmation technique for use in the current thesis. 
Techniques of self-affirmation 
According to Steele (1988) value affirmations pr~vid~ an effective means of . 
. .'
affirming one's self-concept. Many studies have based their self-affirmation 
. " .. 
manipulations on the Allport-Vemon-LindzeY,values scale (A VLS; Allport, Vernon, & 
Lindzey, 1960). Allport et al. identify six values: theoretical,economic, aesthehc, 
social, political and religious. Typically, self-affirmation techniques based on this 
, , 
approach require participants first to rank or complete an inventory to indicate their 
central values. This information is then used either to pre-select participants (e.g., 
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Steele & Liu, 1983) or assign them to a condition in which they complete a subscale 
corresponding to their selected value (e.g., Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Those completing "' 
a control task typically complete a subscale corresponding to a value that they rated as 
unimportant. Other methods drawing on Allport's work require participants to write 
statements or essays about an important value (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Sherman, 
. Nelson, & Steele, 2000). ' 
The A VLS h~s proved to be an effective means of self-affirmation in a number 
of different experimental settings (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000; Koole, Smets, 
van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Sherman et aI., 2000; Spencer et aI., 2001; 
. + 
r Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser & Cornell, 1991). However, it is not without problems. 
Practically, using the A VLS requires establishing participants' core values and 
assigning each participant a particular A VL subscale. There are, however, some 
settings in which such an approach is not feasible, such as when running large numbers 
of participants simultaneously. Time constraints may also limit the feasibility of the 
essay-based methods. More prosaically, the language used in items on the A VLS can 
feel antiquated and the way in which the values are measured dated. For example, 
items such as, "Are you more interested in reading accounts of the lives and works of . 
men such as: (a) Alexander, Julius Caeser, and Charlemange; (b) Aristotle, Socrates, 
,; ~ and Kant?" may not provide the most appropriate means of affirming modem day 
young adult's values, who often comprise the samples in the present thesis. 
Developing a method that does not require pre-testing or assignment to different value 
. scales, and that uses more contemporary language and measurement of values, would 
provide a useful addition to the available methods of self-affirmation, especially if it 
proved suitable for use in large-scale and more applied settings. 
One alternative approach, used by Reed and Aspinwall (1998), is the ~'Personal 
Attribute Inventory", in which all participants are given the opportunity to self-affirm 
the value of kindness, by recalling and describing incidences in which they completed 
kind acts. Reed and Aspinwall argue that this single value is important and desirable to 
most people, and it therefore provides an effective means of self-affirmation (1998, p. 
107). In not requiring questions to be tailored to individuals, this method clearly has 
many practical advantages over the use of the A VLS. However, there are clearly 
problems in assuming that one value is central and important to all participants. In data 
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from Study 1 and pilot work, of 50 participants who were asked to select their most 
important value, only 4 chose kindness as their most central value. Other values such 
as trustworthiness (N = 13) and friendliness (N = 13) were selected more frequently. 
Thus a single value may not provide an adequate source of affirmation for all 
participants. Moreover, the use of a single value creates the problem of finding a 
suitable control task, an issue that also affects many other methods of self-affirmation. 
Reed and Aspinwall (1998) used as their control task a personal opinion survey 
in which participants indicated their agreement with trivial opinion statements, such as, 
"I think that fruit makes the best desert", Where participants agreed with an opinion 
r they were asked to write a short statement to explain why. However, clearly there are 
some differences between the control and self-affirmation tasks, any of which might be 
responsible for the effects found (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). For example, unlike their 
experimental condition the control task did not incorporate a recall element (something 
that Reed & Aspinwall themselves acknowledge, 1998, p. 125). This lack of 
equivalent controls is not unique to their method. For example, Cohen et al. (2000; 
study 2) provided affirmed participants with positive personality feedback, followed 
by an interview highlighting their particularly high score. In comparison, non-affirmed 
participants received neither feedback nor interview. Essay techniques may also. 
I 
.' include controls that vary on more than one dimension from the experimental 
condition. Some techniques vary both the importance of the value and the task target, 
such that participants either describe how a value is important to them, or how an 
unimportant value c(:mld be significant to another person (Fein & Spencer, 1997). 
Other essay techniques use a neutral control task, such as recall of food and drink 
consumption (Cohen et al., 2000; study 1), or provide no control task at all (Klein et 
aI., 2001). Use of these non-equivalent control conditions reduces the ability to 
determine which aspects of the self-affirmation manipulation are responsible for its 
effects. For example, rather than the effects of the manipulation being a result of 
affirming personal values or strengths, simply recalling positive ev~nts or providing 
participants with a distraction from the threat could account for the findings. 
The search is on for a method of self-affirmation that combines some of the 
strengths of Reed and Aspinwall's method - universal applicability:- with those of 
other approaches in terms of values - sufficiency of values - while having a directly 
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equivalent control task, yet not requiring individual tailoring for every participant. For 
the purpose of the present thesis, developing such a technique, which has practical 
benefits, is up to date in its measurement of values, and thus relevant to the samples 
used, has some advantages over more traditional techniques. This is particularly the 
case for studies that required a method that is quick and easy to apply on a large scale, 
such as in Study 4 (an Internet based study). Thus in this chapter I describe the 
. : 
development of a self-affirmation technique with the following properties: a) the 
,( 
ability to make salient central and positive aspects of the self-concept while being, b) 
. . ' 
easy and practical to administer, c) using values expressed in ways appropriate and 
meaningful to modem samples, and d) possessing an equivalent control condition. 
Bearingthese criteria in mind, materials were developed based on the Values in Action 
(VIA) Strengths scale (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; see also Seligman, 2002), in which . 
participants focus upon their personal strengths. An equivalent control was designed to 
be as similar to the experimental manipulation as possible, with participants 
completing the same VIA scale but focusing on a celebrity's strengths as opposed to 
their own .. 
The Values in Action (VIA) Strengths scale consists of 250 items, measuring 
24 key strengths;that fall under the following headings: Wisdom and Knowledge, 
Courage, Humanity, Justice, Temperance, and Transcendence. The scale was 
developed from philosophy, eastern and western religions, as well as contemporary 
views of virtues and character strengths. Not only does the scale cover an extensive 
range of values, but it also has the benefit of using up-to-date language. 
The values identified in the character strength questionnaire have obvious 
parallels with those of the A VLS. For example, the A VLS' s "theoretical value", 
encompassing the pursuit of truth and a critical and rational perspective (Allport et al., 
. . 
1960), resembles VIA scale's wisdom and knowledge (e.g., "I love to learn new 
things", "I value my ability to think critically"). Allport's "aesthetic man", who views' 
. . . . 
beauty to be equivalent to or to exceed the importance of truth, may hold strengths in 
transcendence (e.g., "I experience deep emotions when 1 see beautiful things."). The 
' .. 
"social man", whose "highest value ... is the love of people" (Allport et al.. 1960, p. 5) •. 
could be seen to possess interpersonal strengths under the category of humanity (e.g., 
"I am never too busy to help a friend", "I can express love to someone else"). Finally, 
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, "religious" values are reflected in Peterson and Seligman'S concept of spirituality 
(e.g., "I am a spiritual person"). In comparison to the A VLS, the VIA classification of 
strengths offers a more up-to-date methodology for use as a self-affirmation technique. 
By using an adapted VIA classification of strengths questionnaire it was hoped central 
values would be made salient, offering participants an opportunity to consider their 
personally important, self-defining values. Steele (1988) argues that reflection on such 
values can be self-affirming, and therefore this technique should provide an effective 
means of inducing self-affirmation .. 
Measuring the effectiveness of self-affirmation manipulations 
In testing this method, firstly the changes that would be expected, if a 
technique successfully induces self-affirmation, have to be addressed. In fact, few 
studies include manipulation checks that specifically test what effect self-affirmation 
has on self-perceptions. Steele (1988) argues that providing opportunities to confirm, 
endorse and bolster important aspects of the self, such as values, should provide a 
means of self-affirmation and impact upon self-integrity. In one study that has 
addressed the effects of self-affirmation, Steele & Liu (1983) showed that after 
completing a values salience manipulation, in which participants focused on their, 
central value, participants made more positive ratings of their self-concepts, in 
comparison to a control task. Other studies have included measures of positive self-
.. " ' "~. 
feeling (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000) and self-regard (Cohen et aI., 2000), and 
found increases, albeit marginal (Cohen et al., 2000) on these measures. Based on 
" ". 
manipulation checks in existing studies and the arguments of Steele (1988) the . 
following measures were included as a test of the effectiveness of the self-affirmation 
task being developed: the salience of positive, central, and valued aspects. of the self-
concept, and the positivity of participants' self-regard. 
Participants' mood and state self-esteem were also measured, with the aim of 
providing further insight into the possible mechanism of self-affirmation. In general, . 
there is currently a lack of research investigating the underlying mechanisms of self-
affirmation (Koole et aI., 1999). Some studies have included measures of mood, to test 
claims that self-affirmation may be mediated not by self-worth but by other processes 
, '\' .' -. ~ 
such as affect (Koole et al., 1999; Tesser et al., 2000). Results from a variety of studies 
, . . ~, 
have consistently demonstrated that completion of a self-affirmation manipulation 
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either independently (Steele & Liu, 1983) or in conjunction with a self-threat, has no 
impact on explicit mood ratings (Cohen et al., 2000, Fein and Spencer, 1997; Klein et 
al., 2001; Sherman et al., 2000). However, these studies typically use single item mood 
measures that may not have the sensitivity to examine changes in affect associated 
with self-affirmation. More convincing evidence is provided by Steele et a1. (1993), 
who manipulated mood, and 'found that increasing positive affect did not reduce 
rationalisation in the same way as self-affirmation techniques. This finding supports 
their argument that self-affirmation does not simply act as a boost to current mood. 
However, Raghunathan & Trope, (2002) investigated the impact of boosting positive 
mood upon processing of negative health information. Their findings suggest that 
when negative health information has long-term benefits, positive mood can act as 
resource to overcome defensive reactions to self-threats. Thus changes in affect may 
provide a plausible mediator of the effects of self-affirmation. The presenf study 
includes a measure of explicit affect to test this possibility .. 
Past research has also provided conflicting findings regarding the impact of 
self-affirmation on state self-esteem. Unlike trait self-esteem, an enduring form of self-
esteem or affection for one's self (Brown, 1993,1998; Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001), 
state self-esteem refers to "the aspect of a person's feeling of self-worth that is more 
subject to change" (Chang & MacKenzie, 1998, p. 2325). Measuring state self-esteem 
provides one measure of the effects of self-affirmation on participants' feeling of self-
worth. Steele (1988) predicts that self-affirmation should restore participants' self-
integrity or positive experience of the self. However, it is unclear whether this 
necessarily indicates that self-affirmation should increase in self-worth. For example, 
self-affirmation may not bolster feelings of self-worth prior to a threat, but may act as 
a restorative process activated by a self-threat. Indeed, using positive personality 
feedback as a self-affirmation manipulation, Fein and Spencer (1997) found increases 
in state self-esteem (see also Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Greenberg et a1., 1992). 
However, the use of a value salience task has been found to have no impact upon state 
self-esteem, either in conjunction with a self-threat (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000), 
or independently (Spencer & Steele, 1990; cited in Fein & Spencer, 1997). These 
findings may represent subtle differences between self-affirmation techniques. Value 
salience tasks, may provide a means of restoring participants' self-integrity, without 
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necessarily boosting perceptions of self-worth. Including a measure of state self-
esteem in the present study will provide an additional test of whether self-affirmation 
affects state self-esteem, and help inform our current understanding of whether self-
affirmation is necessarily mediated by changes in state self-esteem . 
. Theoretical questions also remain regarding the effect of dispositional self-
esteem upon the effectiveness of self-affirmation techniques (Cohen et aI., 2000). 
Steele et aI. (1993) proposed that those with high self-esteem are more resilient when 
faced with self-threats. According to them, by possessing a more favourable self-
concept, affirming the self is made easier, with those with high self-esteem having 
more positive aspects available a.s resources to combat threats to the self. Stone and 
Cooper (2003) found that priming positive self-attributes reduced attitude change in a 
dissonance task, but only for those with high self-esteem. Stone and Cooper argue that 
the primes may have been less self-descriptive for those with low self-esteem, 
rendering them less likely to be employed as a resource when faced with ~ dissonant 
act. The same could also be true for other self-affirmation techniques. For example, 
those with low self-esteem may find positive feedback on a personality test less 
believable and consequently less effective. Thus, those with low self-esteem may face 
difficulties in self-affirming both naturally, due to fewer resources with which to self-
affirm, and after a self-affirmation manipulation, with techniques providing less 
relevant and credible sources for affirming ones self. 
On the other hand it is at least arguable that low self-esteem individuals might 
benefit more from self-affirmation manipulations. People with low self-esteem tend 
not to engage naturally in processes to accentuate their personal strengths (Baumeister, 
Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Beauregard & Dunning, 2001), even when faced with a self-
threat (Boney-McCoy et al., 1999; Sommer & Baumeister, 2002), unlike those with 
high self-esteem who naturally engage in these affirming processes (Boney-McCoy et 
aI., 1999; Brown & Dutton, 1995; Dodgson & Wood, 1998). Consequently,low self-
esteem individuals may benefit more' from the additional prompting provided by a self-
, 
affirmation manipulation that focuses attention on personal strengths, in comparison to 
high self-esteem individuals. Indeed, Spencer et al. (2001) suggested that those with 
low self-esteem may have difficulty spontaneously engaging in self-affirm'ation 
following a self-threat, but may adequately engage in these processes following a' 
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. values salience task. Furthennore, research examining consideration of personal 
strengths suggests that those with low self-este~m find tasks that involve selecting 
from among, rather than generating a list of, their strengths less intimidating, and 
respond as positively as those with high-self-esteem (Tower of Strength Activity; Sia 
& Czuchry, 1997; Sia, Czuchry, & Dansereau, 1999). 
Clearly, there remain questions over the role of dispositional self-esteem on the 
effectiveness of self-affinnation manipulations. However, because completion of self-
esteem measures has been found to be self-affirming in those with high self-esteem . 
(Steele et aI., 1993), measuring dispositional self-esteem as a possible moderator is 
rarely done. By measuring the effects of the self-affinnation technique independent of 
a threat manipulation this problem was overcome. The current study included the 
Robins, Hendrin and Trzesniewski (2001) measure of trait self-esteem. Study 1 
demonstrated that this measure is significantly correlated with the Rosenberg Self-
esteem scale, and was include to test whether the self-affinnation technique developed 
in the present chapter moderated the impact of self-affinnation upon salience of 
positive aspects of the self, as well as possible mediators, such as mood, state self-
esteem and self-regard. The inclusion of this measure allowed the assessment of the 
. effectiveness of the manipulation at different levels of self-esteem. 
Current Studies 
This chapter outlines three studies testing the effectiveness of the VIA 
character strength questionnaire as a self-affinnation manipulation. Study 2a set out to 
test whether the self-affinnation and the control task differed in their ability to make 
salient important and valued self-conceptions. Study 2b was conducted to confinn ~at 
the control condition did not lead to social comparisons that had negative effects for 
participants' self-views. To do this the celebrity control was compared to a more 
.. traclltional neutral control (recall of food). Finally, Study 2c provided a stronger test of 
the new self-affinnation task and control, using different items to measure the effects 
of the tasks, and a more elaborate cover story. Study 2c also tested the effects of the 
celebrity control against a traditional value essay control technique. The effects of the 
manipulation on affect, state self-esteem and self-regard were measured, and whether 
the effects of s~lf-affinnatio~ on these variables were moderated by di~positional self-
esteem, was also tested. 
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Study 2a 
Method 
The self-affirmation and control tasks 
For use as a practical self-affinnation manipulation in an experimental setting, 
the VIA scale was shortened and adapted (e.g., Americanisms changed) to 30 items. 
The items were selected to be representative of the original 24 character strengths. For 
example, to measure the strength of creativity, which is defined as "thinking of novel 
and productive ways to do things" (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), the item "Being able 
to come up with new and different ideas and ways of doing things is one of my strong 
points" was selected to be most representative. By covering a range of attributes it was 
hoped that the adapted Character Strength Questionnaire would provide all participants 
, 
an opportunity to focus on personally important strengths and values. Examples of 
items from each of.the main categories of values are in Table 3.1 and an exhaustive list 
of the 24 character strengths and their corresponding items are presented in Appendix 
C. 
Table 3.1. Examples of Items Selected to Measure each of the Character Strengths 
Value Item· 
Wisdom and Knowledge "Being able to come up with new and different ideas and 
ways of doing things is one of my strong points." "I value 
my ability to think critically." 
Courage "I must stand up for what I believe in even in the face of 
strong opposition:' "I always admit when I am wrong." 
Humanity "I am never too busy to help a friend." "I go out of my . 
way to cheer up people who appear down." 
Justice "I treat all people equally regardless of who they might 
be:' "I really enjoy being part of a group." 
,Temperance . "I never seek vengeance:' "I do not act as though I am a 
special person:' 
Transcendence "I experience deep emotions when I see beautiful things." 
"Despite challenges, I always remain hopeful about the 
future." 
Note. Adapted from Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification. 
Pet~!son, C, and Seligman, M. E. P., (2004). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Copyright 2004 by Values in Action Institute. Reprinted with permission of Values in 
Action Institute. 
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An equivalent control questionnaire was also developed. Past attempts to . 
develop self-affirmation techniques not based on the A VLS have struggled to provide 
equivalent controls. The present studies sought to address this issue by designing a 
control task as similar as possible to the self-affirmation manipulation, with only the 
central element of focusing on personal values removed. 
Two control conditions were initially piloted. Participants, instead of 
themselves, were asked to rate a well-known celebrity or someone of the same sex as 
themselves who they would like to get to know better, on the same 30 attributes taken 
from the VIA scale. As the majority of studies conducted in this thesis use female 
participants, to reduce the similarity between participants and the celebrity target a 
male celebrity was chosen. The acquaintance controlled some participants to focus on 
things they valued about themselves, and things that were personally important to 
them, while the celebrity control did not. On the basis of these preliminary data, the 
acquaintance control condition was dropped in favour of the celebrity control. 
< As well as testing the adequacy of the self-affirmation task, the present studies 
set out to test the sufficiency of the celebrity control task. For the putpose of this thesis 
the footballer David Beckham was used as the celebrity figure. (However, this 
questionnaire could easily be adapted to any celebrity figure familiar to a sample and 
about whom they would be happy to make personal strengths judgements). 
Participants in both conditions were presented with 30 strength statements and, 
as with the original VIA scale, were asked to respond to each statement on a 5-point 
response scale. In the self-affirmation condition participants rated how well each 
statement described them personally (very much like me / like me / neutral/unlike me / 
very much unlike me), whereas in the non-affirmed condition, participants rated how 
well each statement described David Beckham (very much like him / like him! neutral / 
unlike him/very much unlike him). 
Participants 
Participants were 242 high school and university students recruited to the study 
either from classroom and laboratory settings, or by opportunity sampling on the 
university campus. In some settings there was a time limit of 5 to 10 minutes for 
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completion of the questionnaire, which was beyond the experimenter's control. 
However, participants were not aware of this and were told simply to complete the 
questionnaire at their own pace. Those participants (N = 45) who did not finish the 
character strength questionnaire were excluded from the data. The final sample (N = 
197) consisted of 62 undergraduates (mean age 19.9 years; 37 females, 25 males) and 
135 high school students (mean age 17.4 years; 86 females, 49 males). 
Character Strength Questionnaire (Appendix D) 
Written instructions invited participants to complete a questionnaire designed 
to measure judgements about personal strengths, and participants were presented with 
the 30 strength statements. Participants were instructed "Please choose one option in 
response to each st~tement. If you are not sure choose the response that most closely 
reflects your thoughts". Participants were informed that all of the questions reflected 
statements that many people would find desirable, but they were to answer only in 
terms of whether the statement described what they (David Beckham) were like, and to 
be as honest and accurate as possible. After completing the strengths questionnaire, 
participants in the non-affirmed condition were asked: "What is your overall opinion 
of David Beckham?". Responses were given on a 7-point scale, Extremely negative (0) 
to Extremely positive (6). This rating was not found to be significantly associated with 
any of the outcome variables. The correlations that most closely approached 
significance were ratings of whether participants had focused on things that were 
personally important, r(86)= .20, p = .07, and whether the task made t~em think about 
things they value~, r(84)= .18,p = .11. 
Outcome Measures 
The opening items on the outcome measure questionnaire assessed to what 
extent the questionnaires had focused participants' attention on positive and valued 
aspects of themselves and were completed in the following sequence: ''The ' 
. questionnaire made me think about positive aspects of myself', "The questionnaire 
focused my attention on who lam", ''The questionnaire made me aware of things I 
value about myself', "The questionnaire made me think about things that are 
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personally important to me". ''The questionnaire made me think about my values (the 
principles and standards by which 1 try to live my life)". Participants responded on a 5-
point response scale (Strongly disagree / Disagree / Neutral/Agree / Strongly agree). 
These items comprised a measure of salience of positive and central aspects of the 
self-concept after completing the self-affirmation or control tasks. Next came a single 
item measuring participant self-regard (from Sherman et al.. 2000), "How do you feel 
about yourself?", measured on a 7 point scale. 0 = poorly, 6 = extremely positive. Each 
participant then completed either items measuring current mood or a state self-esteem 
scale. 
Mood. Participants (N = 70) completed an adjective checklist adapted by 
Raghunathan and Trope (2002) from the Mood Adjective Checklist (MACL; Nowlis. 
1965). Participants were presented with 8 adjectives, two measuring positive mood 
(happy I elated), two items negative mood (sad I depressed). and four filler items 
(tense I tired I calm I energetic). Participants were instructed to indicate to what extent 
each adjective described how they cur:rently felt, using a four point scale anchored at 
, 
Definitely does not apply to my feeling at this moment (0) I definitely does apply to my 
feeling at the moment (3). 
State Self-esteem. Participants (N = 72) completed the Current Thought Scale 
(He atherton & Polivy, 1991) measure of state self-esteem. The scale consists of 20 
items, which measure three aspects of self-esteem: performance (e.g., "I feel confident 
in my abilities"), appearance (e.g., "I feel dissatisfied with my weight"), and social 
(e.g., "I feel others respect and admire me"). Participants indicated on a 5-point scale 
whether each statement applied to them at the current time (Not at all / A little bit / 
Somewhat / Very much / Extremely). 
Dispositional self-esteem. The final item, completed by all participants, was the 
one-item Robins et al. (2001) trait self-esteem measure, described in Chapter 2. Study 
1 (Chapter 2) found that the single item measure was significantly correlated, r(56) = 
.57, p <.001, with Rosenberg's (1965) trait self-esteem scale. 
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Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a psychology project examining personal 
strengths. They were randomly assigned to condition, and completed either questions 
measuring mood or state self-esteem. Where participants completed the experiment in 
groups they were asked to do so in silence .. 
Results 
Study 2a was primarily intended to test what effect the character strength and 
o 
control questionnaire had on the salience of positive and valued aspect of the self, 
mood, state self-esteem, and self-regard. and whether the effects were moderated by 
trait self-esteem. 
Effects of self-affirmation manipulation 
The data were analysed using one way ANOV As, with questionnaire condition 
(self-affinned or non-affinned) as the between-participants variable. The data are in . 
Table 3.2. Analysis revealed no significant differences between self-affinned and non-
affirmed participants' positive, F(1, 69) < l,p =.60, or negative mood, F(1, 68) = < 1, 
p = .90, after completing the character strength questionnaire. Neither were there 
significant effects of self-affirmation condition on state self-esteem, F(1, 71) < 1, p = 
.48. or self-regard, F(1, 181) < 1, P = .63. 
Table 3.2. Effect of Self-affirmation Condition on Mood, Self-regard and Self-esteem. 
Outcome measure SA NA 
Positive affect 1.58 (0.64) 1.55 (0.60) 
Negative affect 0.36 (0.47) 0.33 (0.59) 
State self-esteem 66.79 (11.06) 65.56 (14.35) 
Self-regard 3.54 (0.82) 3.47 (1.02) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. SA = self-affirmed; NA = non-affirmed 
(applies throughout this chapter) 
Mean responses of the two groups to the measures of the salience of positi ve 
and valued aspect of the self are in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1. One-way ANOV As, with 
questionnaire condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) as the between-participants 
variable, confirmed that the two questionnaires significantly differed in their impact on 
the salience of central and positive aspects of the self-concept. (The degrees of 
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freedom for the different analyses vary slightly as some participants did not answer all 
. the questions.) Self-affirmed participal)ts reported that completing the questionnaire 
made them think more about positive aspects of themselves, F(l, 195) = 77.23, 
P < .001, focus more attention on who they were, F(1, 195) = 117.96,p < .001, made 
them more aware of things they value about themselves, F(l, 191) = 33.34,p < .001, 
made them think about things personally important to them, F(l, 189) = 31.72, 
p < .001, and made them think more about their personal values, F(1, 110) = 11.70, 
p = .001, than those in the non-affirmed condition. 
Table 3.3. Mean Responses of Self-Concept Salience as a Function of Self-affirmation. 
Outcome measures 
The questionnaire made me: 
SA 
(N = 100) 
Think about positive aspects of self 0.71 (0.77) ···a 
Focus my attention on who I am 0.61 (0.72) ••• 
Aware of what I value about myself 0.42 (0.78) ••• 
Think about things perso~ally important to me 0.54 (0.75) ••• 
Think about my values 0.04 (0.81) 
NA 
(N = 94) 
-1.68 (0.89) ... 
-1.40 (0.85) ••• 
. -1.68 (1.03)·· 
-1.82 (1.04) 
-1.26 (1.03) ••• 
Note. Disagreement with the self-concept salience questions was scored negatively (-2, 
-1), neutral responses were scored as 0, and agreement received a positive score (+1, 
+2).aOne sample t-test against midpoint. • p < .05 . •• p < .01. ••• p < .001. 
, 
One-sample t-tests were employed to test in which direction non-affirmed and 
self-affirmed participants differed. Analysis revealed that both the non-affirmed and 
self-affirmed groups differed significantly from the neutral mid point (0) on all but one 
of the items (see Figure 3.1). Whereas the self-affirmed group's responses to each of 
the salience of self-concept statements were above neutral, indicating agreement, the 
" non-affirmed participants' responses all fell below neutral, indicating disagreement. 
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Figure 3.1. Self-concept salience as a function of self-affirmation condition. 
In comparison to the control questionnaire, the self-affirmation task focused 
participants on central and valued aspects of the self. The self-affirmation technique 
was not found to influence mood, state self-esteem, or self-regard. 
Dispositional self-esteem as a moderator 
Moderated regression (Baron & Kenny, 1986) was used to examine whether 
dispositional self-esteem interacted with self-affirmation manipulation. Data were 
analysed using two-step hierarchical regression analyses, followed by tests of simple 
slopes (Aiken & West, 1991). At step one, the main effects of condition (dummy 
'coded 1,2) and self-esteem were entered, and the Condition X Self-esteem interaction 
at step two. 
, Salience o/positive and valued aspects o/the self. The first four items 
measuring the impact of questionnaire completion upon salience of central aspects of 
self-concept were combined into a single item measuring self-concept salience 
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(Cronbach's alpha = .85). The fifth item measuring salience of central values was not 
included in this analysis, as this item was added later to the questionnaire and was 
completed by fewer participants, reducing the power of the analysis. 
Regression analysis revealed that both self-affirmation condition, p = .62, p < 
.001, and dispositional self-esteem, p = .14, P = .032, predicted salience of positive and 
central aspects of participants' self-concept, such that both those who self-affirmed 
and also those who had higher self-esteem reported having thought more about 
positive and important aspects of themselves. The interaction of condition and 
dispositional self-esteem was not significant, p = -.17,p = .21, indicating there were no 
differential effects of dispositional self-esteem on self-affirmation's effect on self-
concept salience. 
Positive mood. Further moderated regressions were carried out to examine 
whether dispositional self-esteem moderated the effects of self-affirmation on mood, 
self-regard, or state self-esteem. The first analysis, predicting positive mood, revealed 
dispositional self-esteem as a significant predictor, ~ = .31, p = .012. The interaction of 
dispositional self-esteem and condition also approached significance, ~ = -.23, 
p = .059, but condition alone did not, ~ = .10, p = .42. The nature of the interaction 
between condition and dispositional self-esteem was explored using simple slope 
analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). Regression lines were examined at three levels of the 
hypothesized moderator (the mean level and one standard deviation above and below 
the mean). Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between self-affirmation arid positive 
mood as a function of dispositional self-esteem, indicating that for those with low self-
esteem self-affirmation as a predictor of positive mood approached significance, '. 
p = .34, p = .054, while ·self-affirmation had little effect on ·the mood of those with 
moderate, ~ = .12, p = .33 or high self-esteem, ~ = -.10, p = .51. 
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Figure 3.2. Interaction between self-affirmation condition and dispositional self-
esteem on positive mood: Simple slopes for condition at three levels of self-esteem. 
Negative mood. A second analysis for negative mood yielded similar results, 
with dispositional self-esteem both alone, f3 = -.31,p:: .013, and in interaction with 
self-affirmation condition, f3= .28, p= .019, but not self-affirmation condition itself, f3 
= -.033,p = .79, significantly predicted negative mood. Figure 3.3 shows the 
... 
relationship between self-affirmation and negative mood as a function of dispositional 
, -' 
self-esteem, indicating that the decrease in .negative mood following self-affirmation 
for those with low self-esteem approached significance, f3 = -.35, p = .054. Self-
affirmation had little impact on the negative mood of those with moderate, f3 = -.06, p 
= .60, and high self-esteem, f3 = .21,p = .18. 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction between self-affirmation condition and dispositional self-
. . 
esteem on negative mood: Simple slopes for condition at three levels of self-esteem. 
State self-esteem. The analysis of state-self esteem revealed that dispositional 
self-esteem, (3 = .77,p < .001, but neither self-affirmation condition, (3 = .07,p = 040, 
" nor the interaction, (3 = -.13, p = .40, predicted state self-esteem. Higher levels of 
, dispositional self-esteem were associated with greater state self-esteem. 
Self-regard. A final analysis, examining the self-regard item, revealed that both 
self-affirmation condition ~ = .24, p = .047, and dispositional self-esteem, ~ = .77, p < 
.001, were significant predictors, while the interaction was not, (3 = -.14,p = .17. Self-
regard was found to be at its highest both in those who were self affirmed and in those 
with high disp6sitional self-esteem. ' ' 
Discussion 
In comparison to those in the control task, self-affirmed participants were more 
likely to report having thought about positive, valued and central aspects of their self. 
There was no evidence that self-affirming resulted in more positive mood, less 
negative mood, or higher state self-esteem. Thus the effects of self-affirmation were 
not mediated by changes in these variables. 
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Study 2a provides initial evidence that the VIA character strength 
questionnaires provided adequate self-affirmation and control conditions. The 
experimental condition appeared to make salient positive aspects of the self, on which 
participants could self-affirm when faced with a self-threat. In contrast the control task 
did not. The current self-affirmation technique has the benefit of drawing on the 
contemporary literature on personal values and strengths, is easy to employ, and 
provides an equivalent control. 
Though initial analysis did not provide evidence that the self-affirmation 
technique increased self-regard, a further moderated regression did reveal the predicted 
increase in self-regard associated with self-affirmation that has previously been 
reported by Cohen et a1. (2000) and Sherman et al. (2000). Self-affirmed participants 
, reported an increase in the positivity of their self-feeling on the single item self-regard 
measure, but not on the state self-esteem scale. This finding may reflect the specificity 
of the measures. The single item may assess a more general sense of positive self-
feeling, as opposed to changes in specific aspects of self-esteem (e.g., performance, 
appearance or social self-esteem) and, as the self-affirmation task did not specifically 
affirm, for example, participants' appearance or social skills, changes were not seen on 
the state self-esteem measure. 
The present study also revealed that dispositional self-esteem influenced the 
s~lience of positive and central aspects of the self-concept, such that in both t~e non-
affirmed and self-affirmed groups those with higher self-esteem reported thinking 
about more positive and central aspects of themselves, than did those with lower self-
esteem. However, following self-affirmation, an increase in salience of positive and 
central self-characteristics was seen regardless of level of self-esteem. Past research 
has suggested that those with low self-esteem may benefit less from self-affirmation 
techniques (Stone & Cooper, 2003). However, the present study suggested that 
participants with low self-esteem could benefit from the present self-affirmation 
manipulation. 
The findings also provide insights into how dispositional self-esteem interacts 
.\. . 
with the effects of self-affirmation, particularly in relation to mood. In the non-
affirmed group, lower self-esteem was associated with higher levels of negative affect 
and lower positive affect; with the reverse true for those with higher levels of self-
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esteem, a finding consistent with research into the association between low self-esteem 
and affect (for example, Watson, Suls, Haig, 2002; Wood, HeimpeI;Michela, 2003). 
In the present study, self-affirmation was found to have differential effects on those 
with high and low self-e~teem, boosting the mood of those with low self-esteem and 
having no impact on positive or negative mood of those with moderate and high self-
esteem. 
Initial tests suggest that the character strength questionnaire could provide a 
successful means of making salient positive and central aspects of the self. 
Study 2b 
Although Study 2a suggested that the character strength self-affirmation 
technique can provide an effective self-affirmation technique, an alternative 
explanation for the findings is that the control condition focused participants' attention 
onto negative aspects of themself. The results for mood could, for example, be 
reinterpreted to suggest that those with low self-esteem were in a more negative and 
less positive mood after focusing on the strengths of a celebrity. By focusing on a 
successful celebrity, participants may have engaged in implicit social comparisons 
which lead to negative consequences for the self (Stapel & Suls, 2004). For instance, 
considering the traits of Einstein can lead to participants evaluating themselves 
negatively on the dimension of intelligence. Thus focusing on David Beckham's 
strengths may have negative effects for participants' self-evaluations. However, this 
account of the findings of Study 2a is unlikely for two reason. Firstly, when 
participants feel dissimilar to a target, social comparisons have little evaluative 
implications for the self (pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). Participants in the current 
study, and throughout the thesis, are women (and mainly young women), who are 
unlikely to feel similar to David Beckham. Secondly, Lockwood and Kunda (1997) 
investigated the impact of social comparisons with superstars. Superstars were only 
found to influence self-evaluations when they were perceived as relevant to the 
participants' area of expertise. For example,'a superstar football player may have a 
negative impact on self-evaluations for an aspiring footballer, but not for an aspiring 
accountant. 
This evidence examining the effects of social comparisons suggests that the 
control condition was unlikely to affect self-evaluation. Nevertheless, Study 2b was 
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undertaken to test this alternative hypothesis. The results of the celebrity control 
condition from Study 2a were compared to a second, unrelated control task, recall of 
food consumption. The food recall control task was chosen because it has been argued 
to provide a neutral task and has previously been used as a self-affirmation control task 
(Cohen et al., 2000; Study 1). Though it does not provide a directly equivalent control 
it does allow the comparison on the celebrity control against a neutral task. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 142 high school and university students recruited to the study 
. either in a lecture or a classroom setting. The majority of the sample were female (110 
females, 32 males) and were aged between 17 and 40 years of age (mean age 18.6 
years). 
Recall task 
Participants were asked to record in as much detail as possible a list of 
everything they had eaten in the last 48 hours. They were asked to recall the 
information as accurately and as in as much detail as they possibly could, for example, 
~_ including portion sizes and brand names where appropriate. Participants were given 
three minutes to complete this task. 
Outcome Measures 
Participants completed the same outcome measures as in Study 2a. In total, 90 
. participants completed the measure of current mood (Raghunathan and Trope, 2002), 
and a further 47 participants completed the Current Thought Scale (He atherton & 
Polivy, 1991) measure of state self-esteem. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a psychology project examining personal 
recall, and were ra~domly assigned to complete either questions measuring mood or 
state self-esteem. 
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Results 
The data were analysed using one-way ANOV As, with questionnaire condition 
(celebrity or food recall) as the between-participants variable. Analysis of participants' 
positive mood after the task revealed that those in the food control reported being in a 
, 
significantly less positive mood, F(I, 127) = 10.36, p = .002, after completing the 
, ' 
control task compared to those in the celebrity control condition (Table 3.4). There 
were no significant differences in participants' reports of negative mood, F(I, 128) = 
2.53, p = .12. The difference in state self-esteem between control conditions 
approached significance, F(1, 89) = 3.32, p = .07, with those in the food condition 
r~porting slightly higher state self-esteem. However, there was no significant 
difference in participants' reported level of self-regard, F(1, 220) < 1. 
Table 3.4. Mean Responses to Mood, Siate self-esteem and Self-regard measures by . 
Control Condition. 
Outcome measure 
Positive affect 
Negative affect 
State self-esteem 
Self-regard 
Celebrity 
(N =94) 
1.55 (0.60) 
0.33 (0.59) 
65.56 (14.35) 
3.47 (1.02) 
Food 
(N = 152) 
1.17 (0.68) 
0.54 (0.73) 
71.04 (8.84) 
3.42 (0.95) 
Note. The data for the celebrity condition duplicates that presented in Table 3.2. 
The mean resp~nses on the principal outcome measures are in Table 3.5. One-
way ANOVAs, with questionnaire condition (celebrity control or food control) as the 
between-partic~pants variable, tested whether the two control tasks significantly 
differed in their impact on salience of central and positive aspects of the self-concept. 
Those completing the celebrity control disagreed more that the task focused their 
attention on positive aspects of themselves, F(I,195) = 4.83, p = ..029, and who they 
. . 
.are~ F(I,195) = 10.00,p = .002. However, the two tasks did not differ significantly in 
how much they made participants aware of things they value about themselves, F(I, 
186) < I, made them think about things that were personally important to'them, F(1, 
185) < I, or made them think about their personal values, F(1, 182) < 1. 
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Table 3.5. Mean Responses of Self-Concept Salience by Control Condition. 
, . 
Outcome measures 
Celebrity Food 
(N = 94) (N = 152) 
The questionnaire made me: 
Think about positive aspects of self -0.33 (0.89) ***a 0.06 (0.85) 
Focus my attention on who I am, 
-0.60 (0.84) *** -0.21 (0.88)* 
Aware of what I value about myself 
-0.33 (1.03) ** -0.36 (0.81)*** 
Think about things personally 
-0.20 (1.04) . '-0.27 (0.92)** 
important to me 
Think about my values . *** 
-0.74 (1.03) -0.73 (1.17>*** 
Note. Disagreement with the self-concept salience questions was scored negatively (-2, 
-1), neutral responses were scored as 0, and agreement received a positive score (+1, 
+2). The data for the celebrity condition duplicates that presented in Table 3.3. aOne 
sample t-test against midpoint. • p < .05 . •• p < .01. ••• p < .001. 
One-sample t-tests revealed that those in the food condition differed 
significantly from the neutral mid point (0) on all the outcome measures except that ' 
measuring whether the task had focused participants on positive aspect of themselves. 
For the responses that did differ from neutral, they all fell below neutral, indicating 
, . 
participants reported the recall task did not focus their a~tention on important and 
valued aspects of the self. 
Discussion 
Comparison of the food control and celebrity control revealed little difference 
in their impact on the salience of values and important aspects of the self. Participants 
in the celebrity control condition did disagree more strongly that the task made salient 
positive aspects of the self, and the self (who I am): In this respect the findings could 
be argued to suggest that the celebrity condition provides a better control, with people 
focusing less on positive aspects of the self. On the other hand, it could suggest that 
the celebrity control was having a negative effect on how participants saw themselves, 
possibly due to making comparisons with a successful other. 
The food control reduced participants' reports of positive affect. One 
explanation could be that recalling diet was a less interesting task, or even meant 
facing up to unhealthy dietary choices that led to a less positive mood. Interestingly, 
those in the food recall task also reported marginally higher state self-esteem. This 
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finding could indicate that the celebrity control task did have a negative effect on 
participants' self-esteem, possibility due to participants making unfavourable 
comparison with a successful target. However, Study 2a revealed no differences 
between the self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants in terms of their state self-
esteem, suggesting this explanation is unlikely. 
Study 2c 
Study 2b provides some evidence that the celebrity control task does not affect 
participants adversely in comparison to a neutral control task. However, both Study 2a 
and 2b use unipolar scales to assess the impact of the self-affirmation and control 
tasks. The use of unipolar scale may suggest to participants the way in which they are 
expected to respond. In comparison, semantically opposed bipolar scales may provide 
a more neutral means of measuring the effects of the questionnaires, and reduce any 
acquiescence bias in participants' responses. 
By adapting the way in which the key outcomes were measured, Study 2c was 
designed to provide a further test of the adequacy of the manipulation and control. 
Furthermore, in Study 2c the cover story for the tasks was further developed, which 
allowed the inclusion of more filler items to reduce participants' awareness of what the 
study was measuring and the likelihood of demand characteristics in participants' 
responses. 
, Study 2c also included a more traditional values essay con~rol condition as a 
comparison for the celebrity control. This task involved participants writing about how 
their least important value could be important ~o another person. This allowed the 
celebrity control to be compared to a traditional values control on the outcome 
measures. Measures were included to test whether the manipulations influenced how 
participants felt about themselves. This was included to further test whether focusing 
attention on a celebrity made participants feel more negatively towards the self,' 
compared to a traditional control task,'and whether self-affirmed participants felt more 
positively towards themselves. Participants were also asked to report whether they 
made comparisons with the targets, and how similar they felt to the targets used, to 
assess whether those in the celebrity control condition reported making comparisons 
that could have negative implications for the self. 
93 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 143 high school and university students recruited to the study 
either in a classroom or laboratory setting. The majority of the sample were female (N 
= 102) and were aged between 16 and 26 years of age (mean age 17.6 years of age). 
Participants were randomly assigned to complete either the personal strengths (N = 47) 
. 
or celebrity strengths (N = 70) task. A further 26 participants completed the values 
essay task. 
Self-affirmation task or celebrity control 
. The instructions for the self-affirmation task were the same as those in Study 
/ 
2a, however, the task was described as a social perception task. Those completing the 
celebrity control ta~k were told that the study was investigating people's perceptions of 
themselves, people they know and well-known celebrities. Participants were told that 
they could be asked questions relating to any of these groups of people. They were 
informed that some people were going to be asked about other groups of people but. 
they were to think about the qualities of David Beckham. The rest of the instructions 
were the same as in Study 2a. Two further items were added to the character strength 
self-affirmation and non-affirmation manipulations, with participants rating 
themselves or the celebrity on perceptions of trustworthiness, ("My friends can trust 
me" and "I always try to keep my word" and the equivalent in the celebrity condition). 
The value of trustworthiness was not explicitly covered in the original character 
strength questionnaire. However,as pilot work and results of Study 1 suggests that it is 
one of the most common values to be rated as important, items allowing particip~nts to 
affirm this value were included. 
After completing the celebrity control task, participants were asked their 
opinion o~ David Beckham. This rating was found to be weakly correlated with one of 
the measures, ''The questionnaire made me think about things I am good at I bad at", 
r(69) = .25, p = .036. None of the other outcome variables were significantly 
associated with the opinion rating (rs ranged from .19 to -.15). 
For those completing the values essay control task, the instructions were same 
as for Study 1 (Chapter,2) with the following exceptions: the ~tudy was described as a 
social perceptions study investigating participants' perceptions of their own values, as 
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well as the values of people they know and well-known celebrities. They were told that 
they could be asked questions relating to any of these groups. 
Outcome Measures 
The outcome measures were intermixed with a variety of filler items. For 
example, "How easy was it for you to ... make judgements about your own strengths I 
David Beckham's strengths I describe the type of person you wrote about in your 
statement?" and "I like to read about the lives of other people in magazines and 
newspapers". All responses were given on 7-point scales (anchored at 0 and 6) unless 
otherwise stated. 
The key measures used to assess the impact of the tasks on positive aspects of 
the self included the following question and semantic labels: ''The questionnaire I 
writing the statement made me think about ... " negative aspects of myself /positive 
aspects of myself, things that are not important to me / things that are important to me, 
things I don't like about myself/things I like about myself, things I am bad at / things I 
am good at, things I don't value about myself/things I value about myself, my failings 
/ my successes, my weaknesses / my strengths. The mid-point was labelled not at all. 
, . 
In the self-affirmation condition participants also completed the following measure, 
"Completing the questionnaire made me feel ... " foolish / clever, inadequate / 
adequate, bad / good, unimportant / important, inferior / superior, unattractive / 
attractive. Those in the celebrity control and essay values condition also completed the 
equivalent items (''Thinking about David Beckham made me feeL." and ''Thinking 
about how my least important value could be important to other people made me 
feel ... "). The mid-point was labelled not at all. 
Two further items were also included to measure the impact of the task, ''The 
questionnaire I writing the statement made me aware of who I am" and "The 
questionnaire I writing the statement made me aware of my values {principles and 
standards by which I try and live my life)." Responses were measured on 5-point 
. . 
- . .., - . . -
scales (strongly disagree [0] / disagree / neutral/agree / strongly agree [4]). ' 
To investigate whether participants made comparisons with others while 
completing the tasks they responded to the statement "David Beckham has ... fewer 
personal strengths than me /more personal strengths than me". in the celebrity 
condition, " The average other has ... fewer personal strengths than me / more 
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personal strengths than me" in the self-affirmation condition, and "People who hold 
my least important value have ... fewer personal strengths than me / more personal 
strengths than me" in the essay values condition. As a more direct measure of whether 
I 
participants made comparisons while completing the tasks, they also completed the 
following question with appropriate response label: "While completing the 
questionnaire (statement) I compared myself ... unfavourably to David Beckham / 
favourably to David Beckham, unfavourably to others / favourably to others, 
unfavourably to someone who holds my least important value / favourably someone 
who holds my least important value. The neutr~ mid-point was labelle~ not at all. 
In the final section participants also completed the single item measuring . 
participants' self-regard, "How do you feel about yourself?", the Current Thought 
Scale (He atherton & Polivy, 1991) measure of state self-esteem, the measure of 
current mood (Raghunathan and Trope, 2002), and the Robin et al. (2001) measure of 
trait self-esteem. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to take part in a psychology project examining social 
perceptions. Participants completed the character strength questionnaires either 
individually or in groups of between 5 and 10. Participants were told to work through 
the questions in order and at their own pace, and those in groups were told to do so in 
silence. Those in the essay values condition all completed the task individually. 
Participants were given ten minutes to write the statement and then were provided with 
the outcome measures. 
Results 
Comparison of control tasks 
The data were analysed using one-way ANOV As, with control condition . 
(celebrity or values essay) as the between-participants variable. Analysis of, 
participants' mood after the tasks revealed no significant differences either in negative 
, . <..
mood F(1, 84) < 1, or positive mood, F(1, 84) < 1. There was also no significant ' 
differences in state self-esteem, F(1, 88) < 1, or self-regard, F(I, 87) < I, between the 
two control conditions. The mean re~ponses of both control groups to the outcome 
measures are in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Mean Responses to Mood, State self-esteem and Self-regard Measures by 
Control Condition. 
Outcome measure 
Positive affect 
Negative affect 
State self-esteem 
Self-regard 
. 
Celebrity 
(N = 69) 
1.60 (0.87) 
0.62 (0.84) 
69.18 (9.47) ; 
3.25 (0.77) 
Value Essay 
(N = 26) 
1.41 (0.68) 
0.57 (0.66) 
69.05 (11.31) 
3.14 (0.99) 
One-way ANOV As, with questionnaire condition (celebrity control or values 
, , 
essay control) as the between-participants variable, tested whether the two control 
tasks significantly differed in their impact on salience of central and positive aspects of 
the self-concept. The difference in how much the tasks had made participants think 
about their failings approached significance, F(I, 93) = 3.55, p = .063. Those in the 
celebrity condition' reported thinking slightly more about their failings. However, those 
in the celebrity condition thought less about "~ho I am" , F(I, 81) = 17.67,p < .001, 
and about their values, F(l, 80) = 5.08, p = .027, than those in the value essay 
condition. The two control conditions did not differ significantly on the rest of the 
outcome measures (Table 3.7) . 
. One-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether participants' responses 
• -i 
differed from neutral. Analysis revealed that responses of those in the essay value, 
condition only differed from the neutral mid-point on the items measuring whether the 
task made them aware of "who I am" and their values. On these two items those 
completing the value essay task slightly agreed that they had been made aware of these 
aspects of themselves. Analysis of those completing the celebrity task revealed 
, significant differences from the neutral mid-pOint for response on the items measuring 
how much the questionnaire made them think about negative aspects of the self, things 
that were important to them, things they value about themselves, their weaknesses, and 
feeling inadequate and bad. However, all these differences were in a positive direction 
(i.e., above neutral), suggesting the task had not made them feel worse about 
themselves. Participants also reported that the celebrity control task had made them 
slightly aware of their values, contrary to Study 2a. 
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Table 3.7. Mean Responses of Self-Concept Salience as a Function of Self-affinnation. 
Outcome measures 
Celebrity Value Essay 
(N = 69) (N =26) 
The task made me think about: 
Negative / positive aspect of myself 0.26 (1.01)* a -0.04 (1.04) 
Things that unimportant / important to me 0.35 (1.27)* 0.46 (1.73) 
Things I do not / do like about myself 0.13 (0.98) 0.12 (1.14) 
Things I am bad / good at -0.03 (1.02) 0.04 (1.00) 
Things I do not / do value about myself 0.40 (0.87)*** 0.38 (1.24) 
My failings / successes -0.04 (0.74) 0.31 (0.97) 
My weaknesses I strengths 0.32 (0.94)** 0.19 (1.23) 
The task made me feel: 
Foolish / Clever 0.08 (0.94) -0.04 (0.87) 
Inadequate / Adequate 0.36 (0.90)** 0.27 (1.19) 
Bad/Good 0.30 (0.81)** 0.31 (1.01) 
Unimportant / Important -0.02 (0.65) 0.04 (0.52) 
Inferior I Superior -0.03 (0.76) -0.23 (0.86) 
Unattractive / Attractive 0.02 (0.68) -0.08 (0.56) 
The task made me aware of: 
Who I am 0.05 (0.92) 0.88 (0.59)"* 
My values (principles / standards) 0.45 (1.00)** 0.96 (0.82)*** 
Note. Disagreement with the self-concept salience questions was scored negatively (-2, 
-1), neutral responses were scored as 0, and agreement received a positive score (+1, 
+2). aqne sample t-test against midpoint. * p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Participants' reports of how similar they felt to the target of the task (celebrity 
or someone holding least important value), revealed a significant effect of control 
condition, F(1, 74) = 29.04, p < .OO~, with participants indicating they felt less similar 
to the celebrity target (Table 3.8). Analysis using one-sample t-tests revealed a -, 
marginally non-significant effect for those in the essay condition, such that they 
reported having more strengths than their target, t(25) = 1.77, p = .09, while those in 
the celebrity strengths control did not differ from the mid-point, t(47) .16, p = .87. 
However, the two groups did not significantly differ in the number of strengths they 
reported having in comparison to their target, F(l, 73) = 1.44, p = .23. On the direct 
measure of whether participants had compared themselves with the target during the 
task, the responses of those in the values essay condition indicated that they did not 
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compare themselves. In the celebrity strengths condition, the difference from the mid-
point approached significance, indicating that they had compared themselves slightly 
favourably to the target, t(68) 1.72, p = .09. However, overall there was no difference 
between the two control conditions in terms of whether they had reported comparing 
themselves with the target, F(1, 94) < 1. 
Table 3.8. Mean Responses to Similarity and Comparison Measures by Control 
Condition. 
Outcome measure 
Celebrity Value Essay 
(N = 69) (N = 26) 
Similar to target 1.02 (1.09) 2.50 (1.21) 
More strengths than target ·3.02 (0.89) 3.27 (0.78) 
Made favourable comparisons 3.17 (0.84) 3.27 (1.25) 
Note. Higher scores indicate participants felt more similar to target, perceived 
themselves to have more strengths than the target and made more favourable 
comparisons. 
Comparison of self-affirmation and celebrity control task. 
The data were analysed using one-way ANOV As, with condition (self-
affirmation or celebrity control) as the between-participants variable. As with Study 
2a, analysis revealed no significant difference between self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants' positive, F(I, 67) = 1.09, p = .30, or negative mood, F(I, 68) = < 1, after 
completing the character strength questionnaire (Table 3.9). Neither were there 
significant effects of self-affirmation .condition on state self-esteem, F(I, 66) < 1, or 
sel~-regard, F(1, 98) = 1.78, p = .19. 
Table 3.9. Mean Responses to Mood, State self-esteem and Self-regard Measures by 
Control Condition. 
Outcome measure 
Self-affirmation Celebrity 
(N =47) (N= 69) 
Positive affect 1.38 (0.87) 1.60 (0.87) 
Negative affect 0.71 (0.75) 0.62 (0.84) 
State self-esteem 70.12 (11.52) 69.18 (9.47) 
Self-regard 3.55 (0.96) 3.25 (0.77) 
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.. 
Comparison of the celebrity control and self-affirmation task using one-way 
ANOV As, with condition (self-affirmation or celebrity) as the between-participants 
variable, confirmed that the self-affirmation task made participants think about more 
positive aspects of themselves, F{1 ,115) = 8.07, P = .005, things that were important to 
them, F{I, 115) = 5.83,p = .017, and things that they were good at, F(1,114) = 4.87, 
p = .029, compared to those who were non-affirmed (Table 3.10 & Figure 3.4). 
Table 3.10. Mean Responses to .Measures of Self-Concept Salience as a Function of 
Self-affirmation. ' 
Outcome measures Self-affirmation 
Celebrity 
(N = 47) (N= 69) 
The task made me think about: 
1. Negative I positive aspect of myself 0.94 (1.55)*** a 0.26 (1.01)* 
2. Things that unimportant I important to me 0.94 (1.31)**: 0.35 (1.27)* 
3. Things I do not I do like about myself 0.49 (1.28)* 0.13 (0.98) 
4. Things I am bad I good at 0.47 (1.40)* -0.03 (1.02) 
5. Things I do not I do value about myself 0.62 (1.19)** 0.40 (0.87)*** 
6. My failings I successes 0.21 (1.43) -0.04 (0.74) 
7. My weaknesses I strengths 0.47 (1.47)* 0.32 (0.94)** 
Note. Disagreement with the self-concept salience questions was scored negatively (-2, 
-1), neutral responses were scored as 0, and agreement received a positive score (+1, 
+2). aOne sample t-test against midpoint. * p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
The self-affirmation task also made participants feel more important, F(1, 105) 
= 10.56,p = .002, superior, F(1,105) = 4.78, p = .031, attractive, F(1,104) = 4.60, 
p = .034, and made them more aware of their self ("who I am"), F(1,101) = 21.10, P < 
.001. The effect of self-affirmation on how much participants thought about things 
they liked about themselves approached significance, F(1, 115) = 2.90, p = .09. Self-
affirmed participants reported thinking about slightly more things they liked about. 
themselves while competing the task. Self-affirmation did not have a significant effect 
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on thoughts about the things participants valued about themselves, their failing and 
successes, their weaknesses and strengths, and feeling foolish, inadequate, bad, or 
awareness of th~ir values or principles (Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11. Mean Responses to Measures of Self-Evaluation and Self-Concept 
Salience as a Function of Self-affi'!"lation. 
Outcome measures . Self-affirmation 
Celebrity 
(N =47) (N= 69) 
The task made me feel: 
8. Foolish I Clever 0.35 (0.79)** I O.OS (0.94) 
9. Inadequate I Adequate 0.57 (1.03)** 0.36 (0.90)** 
10. Bad I Good 0.50 (1.01)** 0.30 (O.S1)** 
11. Unimportant I Important 0.43 (O.7S)*** -0.02 (0.65) 
12. Inferior I Superior 0.30 (O.SI)* -0.03 (0.76) 
13. Unattractive I Attractive 0.35 (0.90)* 0.02 (0.6S) 
The task made me aware of: 
Who I am 0.S3 (0.74)*** 0.05 (0.92) 
My values (principles I standards) 0.59 (l.00)*** 0.45 (1.00)** 
. Note. Disagreement with the self-concept salience questions was scored negatively (-2, 
-1), neutral responses were scored as 0, and agreement received a positive score (+1, 
+2). lOne sample t-test against midpoint. * p < .05.**p < .01. ***p < .001. . 
The data from the self-affirmed group were analysed using one-sample t-tests 
(Table 3.11 and FIgure 3.4). The responses of self-affirmed participants differed from 
the neutral mid-point on all items, except that measuring whether the task made them 
think about their failings or successes. The rest of the responses were above neutral, 
indicating that as with Study 2a, the task had focused their attention on positive and 
important aspects of themselves. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean responses on measures of salience of positive and central aspects of 
the self as a function of self-affirmation condition. For item descriptions see Table 
3.10 and Table 3.11. 
Dispositional self-esteem as a moderator 
In an attempt to replicate the findings of Study 2a, moderated regressions were 
\ . 
conducted to test whether the effects of self-affirmation on the outcome measures were 
moderated by dispositional self-esteem. Data were analysed using two-step 
, , 
hierarchical regression analyses. At step one, the main effects of condition (dummy 
coded 1,2) and self-esteem were entered, and the Condition X Self-esteem interaction 
at step two. 
, - . " 
Salience of positive and valued self-concepts. The items measuring the impact 
. . . 
of questionnaire completion upon salience of central and positive aspects of self-
concept were combined into a single item (Cro~bach's alpha = .74), as 'were the items 
measuring the impact of the questionnaire on how participants felt about themselves 
(Cronbach's alpha = .78). 
Regression analysis revealed that both self-affirmation condition, 13 = .24, P = 
.007, and dispositional self-esteem, 13 = :28, p = .002, predicted salience of positive and 
central self-concepts. Those who were self-affirmed and also those who had higher 
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self-esteem reported having thought about more about positive and important aspects 
of themselves. However, the interaction of self-affirmation condition and dispositional 
self-esteem was not significant, ~ = .04, P = .64, indicating that effects of self-
affirmation on self-concept salie.nce, were not moderated by dispositional self-esteem. 
Similarly, the analysis of the impact of the tasks on how participants felt about 
themselves revealed both self-affirmation condition, ~ = .23, p = .014, and 
dispositional self-esteem, ~ = .31, p = .001, as significant predictors, while the 
interactio~ was not, f3 = .01, p = .91. These findings are consistent with those of Study 
2a in demonstrating that self-affirmation did not have differential effects at different 
levels of dispositional self-esteem. 
Positive mood. Moderated regressions were also carried out to examine . 
whether dispositional self-esteem moderated the effects of self-affirmation on mood, 
self-regard, or state self-esteem. The first analysis, predicting positive mood, revealed 
only dispositional self-esteem, f3 = .42, p = .001, and not self-affirmation condition 
itself, f3 = -.14,p = .24, or the interaction, f3 = .03,p = .80, significantly predicted 
positive mood. Higher levels of dispositional self-esteem were associated with higher 
levels of positive mood. 
Negative mood. A second analysis for negative mood yielded similar results, . 
with dispositional self-esteem significantly predicting negativ~mood, ~ = '-.30, p = 
, ~ . , 
.0 16, while self-affirmation condition, f3 = .05, p = .65, and the interaction, ~ = .11, p = 
.39, were not significant predictors. Higher levels of dispositional self-esteem were 
associated with lower levels of negative mood. Unlike Study 2a, the interaction of 
Condition x Self-esteem didnot emerge as a significant predictor for either positive or 
negative mood. 
State self-esteem. The analysis of state-self esteem revealed that, as with Study 
2a, dispositional self-esteem, ~ = .56, p < .001, but neither self-affirmation condition, 
~ = .07,p = .52, nor the interaction, f3 = .05,p = .62, predicted state self-esteem. 
Higher levels of dispositional self-esteem were associated with greater state self-
, . 
esteem. 
Self-regard. ~ final analysis revealed dispositional self-esteem significantly 
predicted self-regard, ~ = .60, p < .001, self-affirmation condition approached 
significance, f3 = .14, p = .055, while the interaction waS not a significant predictor, ~ 
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= .10, p = .20. As with'Study 2a, self-regard was found to be at its highest in those who 
were self affirmed and also those with high dispositional self-esteem. 
Discussion 
The self-affirmation task was found to focus participants' attention on positive 
and central aspects of their self-concept, and was associated with more positive ratings 
of how participants felt about themselves, in comparison to the celebrity control task. 
Self-affirmati~n did not result in more positive mood, less negative mood, or higher 
state self-esteem. Moderated regression did suggest self-affirmation led to a marginal 
increase in self-regard. 
Dispositional self-esteem predicted the salience of positive and central aspects 
of the self-concept and positive ratings of the self. However, self-affirmation led to an 
increase in these variables regardless of level of self-esteem. Dispositional self-esteem 
was not found to moderate any of the effects of self-affirmation. 
General Discussion 
The self-affirmation task was found to focus participants' attention on positive, 
valued, and central aspects of their self-concept, in comparison to the equivalent 
control questionnaire, which did not. This process of making salient valued and 
important aspects of the self-concept is said to be self-affirming (Steele, 1988). The 
method thus adds to those available a technique that is relatively straightforward to 
use, and is rooted in contemporary thinking about values (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
There was no evidence from either Study 2a or 2c that self-affirming resulted 
; , 
in more positive mood, less negative mood, or higher state self-esteem. Thus the 
effects of self-affirmation were not mediated by changes in these variables. The 
findings in regard to mood are largely consistent with past research that has 
demonstrated that self-affirmation does not impact upon explicit mood (Cohen et al., 
2000; Lui & Steele, 1986; Sherman et al., 2000), and supports Steele's (1993) model 
of self-affirmation, which suggests that self-affirmation does not simply bolster 
positive affect. Past research has also demonstrated that completing a values 
manipulation, as opposed to positive feedback techniques of self-affirmation, has no 
impact on state self-esteem (Galinsky et al., 1999; Spencer & Steele, 1990; cited in 
Fein & Spencer, 1997). This finding was replicated in the current studies. Though 
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analysis using one-way ANOV As in both studies 2a and 2c did not p~ovide evidence 
that the self-affirmation technique increased self-,regard, further moderated regressions 
did reveal the predicted increase in self-regard associated with self-affirmation that has 
previously been reported by Cohen et al. (2000) and Sherman et al. (2000). As with 
Cohen et al. (2000), the current findings also suggest that the impact of self-
affirmation on self-regard is marginal. 
Evidence from the studies reported here suggests that the character strength 
questionnaire developed can provide a successful method of self-affirmation. 
However, the current study set out not only to develop an effective self-affirmation 
technique but also an equivalent control condition. The results of Study 2a indicated 
that the celebrity condition did not focus participants' attention on valued aspects of 
their self-concept, and provided an adequate control task. Studies 2b and 2c further 
supported the adequacy of the technique, demonstrating that the celebrity control is 
largely comparable to traditional control conditions. In comparison to those 
completing the essay control, those in the celebrity control condition reported thinking 
marginally more about their failings; however, their mean response did not 
significantly differ from neutral. In fact those in the celebrity control reported that the . 
task made them less aware of their own values and who they were, than those in the 
value essay condition .. 
Given research demonstrating that people can engage in implicit social 
comparisons when asked to consider the traits of others (Stapel & Suls, 2004), Study 
2b and 2c examined whether the celebrity control had a detrimental effect on 
participants compared to the more traditional methods. There was no evidence to . 
suggest that the celebrity task caused participants to feel more negatively about 
themselves. There were no differences on the measure of self-regard between the 
celebrity control and other controls, and no differences between the celebrity and essay 
control on the measure of state self-esteem. Furthermore, those in the celebrity control 
condition reported having the same number of strengths as the celebrity, and even 
compared themselves marginally favourably with the target. Indeed, in comparison to 
the traditional value essay control, there was no difference in their reports of making 
comparisons with the target or the favourability of these comparisons. Finally, the 
celebrity control condition did not have a negative effect on how participants felt about 
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themselves. Indeed, participants reported feelings of adequacy and goodness 
marginally above the neutral mid-point, after completing the control task. 
The successful target in the celebrity condition may not have had a negative 
effect for participants' self-concept because the target was dissimilar and irrelevant to 
the sample. Participants reported feeling very dissimilar to the celebrity target. 
Comparison with the value essay technique revealed that participants felt more 
dissimilar to the celebrity target than a person holding their least important value. As 
the samples comprised mainly young women, a male sportsman may have been an 
irrelevant target and any comparisons would have had little impact on the self-concept. 
Though this technique does appear to provide an adequate self-affirmation and control 
task within the sample being investigated, caution should be applied when considering 
using this technique with other groups. For example, for young men aspiring to be 
successful footballers, another target such as a well-known female celebrity might 
- provide a more suitable target. 
Since dispositional self-esteem has been argued to moderate self-affirmation . 
(Steele et aI., 1993), with those low in self-esteem being seen as possessing fewer 
resources on which to self-affirm, the current study set out to investigate dispositional 
. . 
self-esteem as a possible moderator. Dispositional self-esteem was found to influence 
the salience of positive and central aspects of the self-concept in both Studies 2a and 
2c, such that in both the non-affirmed and self-affirmed conditions those with higher 
self-esteem reported thinking about more positive and central aspects of themselves, 
than those with lower self-est~em. However, following self-affirmation, an increase in 
\ 
salience of positive and valued self-characteristics (Study 2a and 2c) and feeling 
. positive about the self (Study 2c) were seen regardless of level of self-esteem. 
The findings of Study 2a suggest self-affirmation had differential effects on 
those with high and low self-esteem, boosting the mood of those with low self-esteem 
and having no impact on the mood of those with moderate and high self-esteem. This 
finding was not replicated in Study 2c. This could suggest that the self-affirmation 
manipulation does not affect participants' mood regardless of self-esteem. 
Alternatively, differences between the findings of Study 2a and 2c could have resulted 
from differences in the order in which the items were completed. Unlike Study 2a, in 
which participants only completed the state self-esteem or the current mood measure, 
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those in Study 2c completed both scales. Furthermore, the current mood measure was 
placed at the end of the questionnaire, after the state self-esteem scale. By this stage 
any impact of the questionnaires on mood may have been negated. 
Taking together the results from across the outcome variables, there is evidence 
(contrary to Steele et al., 1993) that those with low self-esteem may have as much to 
gain from completing a self-affirmation manipulation as those with high self-esteem. 
This finding is in line with Spencer et al. (2001) who suggest that those with low self-
esteem may have difficulty spontaneously engaging in self-affirmation following a 
self-threat, but may adequately engage in these processes following a values salience 
self-affirmation task. 
Whether all self-affirmation techniques may have benefits for those with low, 
self-esteem, or whether this is specific to techniques involving consideration of 
personal strengths, remains an empirical question. Past research examining reflection 
on strengths (Sia, Czuchry, & Dansereau, 1999) has demonstrated that the selection, 
rather than the generation, of personal strengths may provide a non-threatening task for 
those with low self-esteem. During such a task those with low self-esteem may attempt 
to self-enhance, and compared to those with high self-esteem, may find the task even 
more beneficial. As with the present study, this may suggest that in some contexts 
those with low self-esteem may experience equal benefit from self-affirmation 
manipulations. Further research may shed light on when self-esteem moderates the 
effectiveness of self-affirmation techniques. For example, using techniques that are 
perceived as either daunting to complete, such as having to generate your own 
personal strengths, or less credible, for example receiving non-customised positive 
personality feedback, may have differential effects for those with high and low self-
esteem. Thus the effectiveness of a chosen technique may in part depend on the self-
esteem of the sample. 
The finding that self-affirmation does not appear to act by simply bolstering~ 
for example, state, self-esteem or mood, prior to an unexpected threat, does not rule out 
the possibility that these processes may mediate or initiate self-affirmation in response 
to a self-threat. For example, people may only naturally self-affirm after experiencing 
changes in affect, possibly implicitly (Tesser et al., 2000). Self-affirmation 
manipulations themselves may simply act to make accessible positive and central 
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aspects of the self-concept that, once made salient, can be drawn upon when self-
threats are faced. For instance self-affirmation does not boost perceptions of posi~ve 
mood or state self-esteem when a threat is not present. But if a threat is encountered, 
then self-resources made salient by a self-affirmation task can be employed to deal 
with a self-threat and restore self-esteem or pos,itive mood. 
The current studies have provided evidence that the character strength 
questionnaire used here provides an effective means of self-affirmation, especially 
useful in settings in which pre-testing of participants' values and assignment to 
different value conditions may be problematic. However, there may be some possible 
limitations to the self-affirmation task. Firstly, the values covered in the strengths task 
may not be exhaustive of those people hold. Though the technique is based on ; 
contemporary research examining people values, the authors themselves acknowledge 
that the study of values is ongoing (peterson & Seligman, 2004). Further research into 
participants' values may lead to changes in the current self-affirmation technique. 
Secondly, though using a technique that can be applied to all participants without pre-
testing has practical benefits, it is possible that by focusing on a range of strengths, 
some self-descriptive and others not, the effects of the self-affirmation task may have 
been diluted. For example, part~cipants may have received an opportunity to affirm 
their values, but also have been reminded of areas in which they do not hold strengths. 
However, results from the studies reported here do suggest overall that participants 
found the task focused their attention on positive aspects of the self. Furthermore, 
Tesser (2000) argues that self-affirmation can equally involve focusing on what you 
are not, as well as who you are. The present task does provide participants with an . 
opportunity to focus on their central values and who they were, a task that could be 
used to restore self-integrity when faced with threats to their self-conceptions. 
Based of the findings of the present studies, the character strength 
questionnaire was employed in Studies 3 and 4. The use of the character strength 
questionnaire provides a practical technique of self-affirmation. This proved 
particular~y useful for Study 4, which is an Internet-based study, which required a self-
affirmation technique that was relatively quick to complete and did not requir~ pre-
testing. 
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CHAPTER 4: ORIENTATION AND ATTENTION TO NEGATIVE HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
Models of defensive processing suggest that there are multiple ways in which 
biased processing can occur (Blumberg, 2000; Chaiken et al., 1996; Erdelyi, 1974). 
For instance, biased processing is associated with the avoidance of processing relevant 
health information, denial of the threat, denial of implications of the thre~t, and 
minimisation of the implications of the threat (Blumberg, 2000). To illustrate this point 
when encountering a relevant health message outlining the link between FBD and 
caffeine a person could avoid paying attention to the message, read the message but 
deny the link between FBD and caffeine, accept the link between FBD and caffeine 
but deny its personal relevance, or accept personal risk of FBD from caffeine 
consumption but downplay the seriousness of the disease. Study 1 provided evidence 
that self-affirmation can promote personal acceptance of a relevant health message. 
The current study set out to test whether self-affirmation can reduce biased processing 
at other levels of processing by examining the impact of self-affirmation on attentional 
avoidance. In addition, the current study was intended to examine the effects of self-
affirmation on depth of processing applied to a health message, and whether the effe~ts 
of self-affirmation are detectable in the accessibility of thoughts associated with 
defensive and accurate processi~g. 
General acceptance of a threat 
. Of the few studies that have attempted to test what effects self-affirmation may 
have on participants' processing of threatening or preference-inconsistent infonnation, 
findings have indicated self-affirmation may have the potential to reduce . 
. defensiveness at various levels of information processing. Firstly, self-affirmation has 
been found to increase participants' message acceptance on general measures of 
acceptance (Cohen et aI., 2000; Sherman et aI., 2000). For example, Sherman et al. . 
(2000) found that, in comparison to non-affirmed participants, self-affirmed coffee 
drinkers reported greater belief that there was a link between FBD and caffeine, and 
believed it more important for women to reduce their caffeine consumption after 
reading a message outlining the risks of caffeine. Reed and Aspinwall (1998) also 
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found that self-affirmed participants reported being more convinced by relevant 
health-risk information, than those who were non-affirmed. 
. Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000) examined the impact of self-affirmation on 
the processing of messages incongruent with participants' prior beliefs, such as those 
. on capital punishment or abortion. Self-affirmed participants reported more favourable 
evaluations of attitude-incongruent information, and found it marginally more 
convincing, than those who were non-affirmed. Cohen et aI., also demonstrated that 
self-affirmation could reduce biased evaluation of attitude-congruent information, as 
opposed to attitude-incongruent information. Self-affirmed participants were found to 
rate an advocate presenting attitude-congruent information less favourably than those 
who were non-affirmed, thus suggesting that self-affirmed participants did not 
mindlessly accept information congruent with their prior beliefs, but that self-
affirmation promoted less biased processing and evaluation of attitude-congruent 
information. 
Attentional avoidance 
Biased processing can take the form of attentional avoidance (Blumberg, 2000; 
Chaiken et aI., 1996). Chaiken et al. claim that, to maintain positive self-conceptions, 
people can avoid attending to information that may threaten the self. Attenti,!nal 
avoidance can take the form of cognitive or behavioural distractions (Blumberg, 2000). 
For example, a person can either pay less attention to a message incongruent with their 
beliefs or, if given a choice of information read, non-threatening, as opposed to 
threatening information (Chaiken et aI., 1996). Reed and Aspinwall (1998) provide a 
test of self-affirmation's ability to influence biased processing at the level of 
attentional avoidance. In their study participants were provided with the choice of 
reading three different pieces of information about caffeine and fibrocystic disease 
(FBD), including neutral, risk-confirming and risk-disconfirming evidence. 
Participants were able to read as many of the pieces of information as they wanted and 
in any order. Reed and Aspinwall found that participants who were self-affirmed 
appeared to orientate more quickly to the risk-confirming information. That is, self-' 
affirmed participants chose to read the risk-confirming information earlier than 
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participants who were non-affirmed. Thus, self-affirmation appeared to be able to 
reduce attentional avoidance. However, this finding clearly needs replicating. 
Recall of threat 
Another level of information processing at which defensiveness can occur is at 
recall of information. Croyle, Sun and Hart (1997) examined participants' recall of a . 
cholesterol test result after either one, three or six months. Participants were asked to 
recall both their cholesterol level and their risk category (Le.; if their result indicated 
they were at high risk, borderline risk or was desirable). Most participants were fairly 
accurate in their recall, especially of their risk category. Examining the recall errors 
they did make, however, revealed that, when people were inaccurate it tended to be a 
result of recalling their test result to be more rather than less desirable. Consistent with 
a defensive hypothesis the tendency to misremember risk information to be more 
favourable was most prominent in those who had received the most negative test 
results; thus those for whom the health information was potentially most threatening 
displayed the greatest bias in recall (Croyle et aI., 1997). . 
To test whether self-affirmation affects participants' recall of a health message, 
Reed and Aspinwall (1998) measured recall of information about the risk of caffeine 
after one week. Their findings indicated that self-affirmed participants recalled less of 
the risk-disconfirming evidence than those who were non-affirmed. This finding may 
reflect a reduction in defensive recall, with non-affirmed participants focusing more on 
information congruent with a defensive goal, i.e., information that enabled them to 
dismiss the threat. However, one weakness of Reed and Aspinwall's study was that 
participants differed in the order in which the information was presented, and 
participants did not necessarily read all three pieces of risk-confirming, risk-
disconfirming or neutral information. These factors could influence participants' 
subsequent recall (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). 
Study 1 also examined whether self-affirmation affected recall of information, 
testing whether self-affirmed participants were more accurate in their recall of facts 
presented in the threatening health leaflet, both immediately after reading it and one . 
week later. The results indicated that higher risk, self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
women did not differ in their recall of information central to the leaflet's claims about 
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alcohol and breast cancer. However, on the item measuring recall of information 
peripheral to the message, regarding the risks of smoking cigarettes, self-affirmed 
participants incorrectly agreed more that smoking increased the risk of breast cancer. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that self-affirmed participants either paid 
less attention to aspects of the leaflet not specifically relevant to them or alternatively, 
less attention to the message as a whole. If this were the case this may suggest self-
at-firmed participants processed the message less systematically. 
. . One of the limitations of Study 1 is that it is unclear whether self-affirmation 
promoted message acceptance through systematic or heuristic processing of the 
message (Chaiken et al., 1996). If self-affirmed participants did not engage in 
systematic processing of the information, this could have two important implications. 
Firstly, any changes in attitudes or beliefs might be short-lived and vulnerable to' . 
change because participants did not carefully consider the information. Secondly, if 
self-affirmation is associated with less in-depth processing of a health threat, this 
would challenge Steele's claims about the effects of self-affirmation. Rather than self-
affirmation providing a source for self-objectivity and enabling participants to face up 
to a threat to the self, it would suggest that self-affirmation might promote a mindset of 
"agreeableness". In other words, self-affirmed participants might accept a message, but 
not through thoughtful consideration of the evidence, but mindlessly. Furth'er tests are 
needed, both to establish whether self-affirmation may affect the depth of processing 
applied to a message, and recall of threatening health information. 
Indirect measures of defensiveness 
1 
Previous studies examining the effects of self-affirmation on the processing of 
health threats and self-threats in general have commonly relied on direct or explicit 
measures to assess whether self-affirmation reduces the motivation to engage 
• • I • 
processes to restore self-integrity. For example, past studies have measured the impact 
of self-affirmation on measures of message acceptance or attitude change (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al., 2000). Demonstrating that self-
affirmed participants evaluate an attitude-incongruent message less harshly, report less 
attitude change after a dissonance task, or accept a threatening health message more 
readily, are all indicative of self-affirmation restoring self-integrity and reducing 
biased responses to threat. Currently, there is little research examining the effects of 
/ 
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self-affirmation following threat using indirect or implicit measures. The use of 
implicit measures offers a useful additional method of measuring defensive responding 
to health information, providing an estimate of biased information processing without 
relying on self-reports that can be subject to response biases, such as demand 
characteristics (Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
In one study that has included in~rect measures, Koole. Smeet, Van 
Knippenberg, and Dijksterhuis (1999) examined the effects of self-affirmation on a 
lexical decision task after failing an IQ test. Rather than examining defensive 
responses to the test, Koole et al. examined cessation of rumination. That is to what 
extent participants continued to think about their failure after completing the test. 
Participants were presented with words related or unrelated to the IQ test, and asked to 
judge whether words presented were words or non-words. Koole et al. hypothesised, 
. based on the literature on the accessibility of goals (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
1996; Neely, 1977), that if participants continued to ruminate over their failure, they 
would respond faster to words related to the test, rather than those unrelated to it .. 
However, for self-affirmed participants, who had been offered an opportunity to 
resolve the threat to their self-integrity, rumination should cease, and thus there would 
be no differences in reaction times for words related or unrelated to the IQ test. This 
hypothesis was supported, providing evidence on an implicit task that self-affirmation 
can influence cognitions associated with failure following threat. 
The literature examining the accessibility of attitudes, goals and motives (for 
example, Bargh, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Sanna, Chang, & Meier, 2001) 
also suggests that participants' reaction times to agree or disagree with statements 
reflecting motivation to be defensive or accurate in processing a health message could 
- provide an index of how accessible these motives are. For example, Roese and Olson 
(1997) demonstrated that, after failure, participants were faster to respond to 
counterfactuals, such as "my score could have been higher" than after success. Shorter 
latencies of response are argued to be indicative of stronger activation of the 
counterfactuals. 
Using indirect measures to assess the effects of self-affirmation provides an 
additional method to complement more questionnaire-based measures, and help 
provide converging evidence that self-affirmation can reduce defensiveness in 
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response to a threat. If self-affirmation directly reduces the motivation to engage in 
strategies such as denial, counter-arguing or minimisation of the threat, then thoughts 
relating to these defensive strategies should be less accessible following a threat. 
The Current Study 
Participants in the present study were presented with a message detailing the 
risks of Fibrocystic Disease and breast cancer associated with drinking caffeine, a 
message previously used in research examining both defensive processing of health 
messages (Kunda, 1986; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992) and the effects of self-
affirmation (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et al., 2000). Study 3 provides an 
additional test of the findings of Study 1, and included cognitive and affective 
measures of message acceptance both immediately after the health message was 
presented, and after one week. In addition, the present study also sought to test 
participants' orientation to threat, recall of the message, depth of processing, and the 
accessibility of thoughts associated with defensive strategies, such as denial, counter-
arguing or minimisation. 
Firstly, to test participants' orientation to threat, the current study used a 
different measure of orientation to that of Reed and Aspinwall (1998). Their measure 
of time to orientate was confounded by how long participants spent reading 
information prior to choosing the threatening information, i.e., both self-affirmed and 
non-affirmed participants may have chosen to read the risk-disconfirming evidence, 
but self-affirmed participants may have spent less time reading it, and thus chose to 
read the risk-confirming evidence earlier. Indeed the results do suggest that non-
affirmed participants spent longer reading the risk-disconfirming information. Further 
- research is needed to establish whether self-affirmation does reduce attentional 
avoidance of threat. In the present study, participants were offered a choice of two 
articles to read. The titles suggested that participants would either be presented with a 
neutral health article, or a more threatening and personally-relevant message. 
(However, irrespective of their choice of title participants were presented with the 
same article.) This method has the benefit of overcoming the problem in Reed and 
Aspinwall's method. If self-affirmation acts to reduce biased processing at the level of 
attentional avoidance, participants given an opportunity to affirm important self-
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aspects should be more likely to choose the article apparently presenting more 
threatening and relevant health information, than will those who are non-affirmed. 
To control for the possible effects of trait anxiety on orientation to threat the 
current study also included a measure of general anxiety. Research examining the 
effects of trait anxiety on orientation to threat, and specifically visual selective 
attention, suggests that those with high anxiety orient towards negative stimuli more 
than those with low anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Matthews, 1988, 1997). Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene's (1970) 
measure of trait anxiety was included to ensure self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants did not differ on this variable, and to test whether trait anxiety moderated 
the effects of self-affirmation on orientation to threat. 
Secondly, the present study included a measure of participants' recall of the 
, health information after one week. This acted both as a measure of depth of 
processing, such that recalling more information is indicative of greater depth of 
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and to examine any biases in participants' recall 
of information. If non-affirmed participants were more defensive, they may recall 
more of the risk-disconfirming evidence, or be less accurate in their recall of risk-
confirming information. In addition, by presenting all participants with the same 
message, in the same order, the current study's measure of recall has some benefits 
over that of Reed and Aspinwall (1998). 
As further tests of depth of processing applied to a threatening health message, 
the time participants spent reading the message was recorded, as well as measures of 
self reports of depth of processing and participants' accuracy of recalling of words 
presented in the message immediately after reading the message. 
Thirdly, the present study aimed to test the accessibility of statements that 
could reflect denial or minimisation of the threat. Based on the literature examining the 
accessibility of goals and motives (Koole et aI., 1999, Roese & Olson, 1997; Sanna et 
aI., 2001) it was hypothesised that participants would be faster to respond to statements 
that were congruent with their current motive and activated attitudes. For example, a 
participant denying personal inferences would be faster than a non-biased participant 
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to agree with a statement such as "I do not drink as much caffeine as other women" 
(Le., a statement reflecting denial of personal relevance). Thus in the present study, 
participants were presented with statements associated with both defensive (denial of 
. relevance, counter-arguing, and minimisation) and accuracy goals. 
Finally, measures of self-esteem and mood were also included. Though the 
findings· of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that self-esteem does not moderate the effects of 
self-affirmation, including this measure would allow a further test of this finding using 
the character strength self-affirmation techniques in conjunction with a self-threat. 
Measures of mood, pre- and post-manipulation were included to test whether changes 
in mood mediated the effects of self-affirmation. 
Participants and Design 
Study 3 
Method 
Undergraduate females (N = 51) were recruited to take part in the experiment 
in return for course credit or payment. Participants were selected on the basis of their > 
responses to a preliminary questionnaire measuring a variety of health-related 
behaviours ~aken at the beginning of the academic year. All participants who were 
recruited reported drinking more than 2 caffeinated drinks on a daily basis. Participants 
were randomly assigned to affirmation condition, to which the experimenter was blind. 
. . ' 
Key dependent variables were measured immediately and also after 1 week. 
Materials 
Pre-manipulation measures (Questionnaire 1). The preliminary questionnaire 
was entitled a "Lifestyle Questionnaire" and contained questions about smoking, 
caffeine consumption and current mood. The smoking items helped camouflage the 
. . ( .'-
true goals of the study. Participants reported whether they smoked or not (Yes / No), 
. . 
, 
and if so how many cigarettes they smoked on average each day. Caffeine 
consumption was measured using 2 items: "How many caffeinated drinks (e.g., tea, 
coffee, cola, Red Bull) have you consumed in the last 24 hours?", and "In a typical day 
1 drink approximately __ caffeinated drinks". 
Participants completed the measure of current mood (Raghunathan & Trope, 
2002) described in Chapter 3. Participants were presented with 8 adjectives, two 
measuring positive mood (happy I elated), two items for negative mood (sad I 
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depressed), and four filler items. Participants were instructed to indicate to what extent . 
each adjective described how they currently felt, indicating their position on a four 
point scale (Definitely does not apply to my feeling at this moment [0] I definitely does 
apply to my feeling at the moment [3]). 
Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants completed the character strength 
questionnaire (personal values or David Beckham's values) as described in more detail 
in Chapter 3. This task was presented as a questionnaire the experimenter was handing 
out on behalf of her supervisor. 
Health article. Using PsyScope software on an Apple Macintosh Computer, 
participants were presented with two titles of FBD-related articles (neutral title, "What 
is FBD?"; more threatening title, "Understanding my personal risk of FBD"). 
Participants responded by choosing the article that they wanted to read by pressing 
either "p" or "q" on the compute~, keyboard. The order in which the article titles 
appeared, and their keyboard button response, were counter-balanced across conditions 
and handedness. The article (Appendix E) was presented under 7 separate 
subheadings: "What is FBD?", "Who is affected?", "Is it serious?", "What is known?", 
"What should I do?", "How strong is the evidence for the link between caffeine and 
FBD?", and "Recommendations". The article described Fibrocystic Disease, its effects 
and possible risk factors, and suggested t~at there was evidence that caffeine 
consumption was linked to FBD, and that FBD could increase the risk of breast cancer. 
The article concluded by recommending that women should consume no more than 2 
caffeinated drinks per day .. 
Word recall task. Participants were instructed to recall as quickly and 
accurately as possible whether presented words had appeared in the article. They were 
told to "think about whether each word appeared in the article you have just read. 
Please be as accurate as possible. We want to know if the EXACT word appeared in 
the article, not words with similar meaning or appearance." Responses were made by 
pressing 'z' or om' on the computer keyboard. The labels of agree and disagree were 
counterbalanced, such that for half the participants 'z' corresponded to 'agree', and for 
the other half em' corresponded to 'agree'. This was counterbalanced not only across 
conditions but also handedness. 
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After responding to two practice words, participants were presented with 
. neutral and threat-related words that either did or did not appear in the article. The 
words were presented in a random order (Table 4.1). All words were matched across 
. the 4 word sets (noveVthreatening; non-noveVthreatening; noveVneutral; non-
noveVneutral) for word length, number of syllables, and frequency in the English 
language using the norms in Francis and Kucera (1982). The words were also piloted 
for 'emotional valence to ensure that there were no significant differences on this 
variable between the non-novel and novel stimuli. (In a pilot study, female 
undergraduates (N = 45) were provided with information about FBD, and were asked 
to imagine having read information describing a link between FBD, breast cancer and 
caffeine. Participants th~n rated a pool of 60 words for their emotional valence, from 
which the fina. word groups were selected.) 
The final word groups were analysed using two-way ANDV As, with between-
groups variables of valence (neutral or threatening) and whether the word was 
presented in the article (in or out). The threat and non-threat words did not differ in 
terms of word length, F(1 ,19) = 1.60, p = .22, number of syllables, F(1, 19) < 1, or 
word frequency, F(1,19) < 1. Nor did the words that were or were not presented in the 
message differ with respect to word length, F(I,19) < 1, number of syllables, F(I,19) < 
1, or word frequency, F(I,19) < 1. Analysis of participants' ratings of the emotional 
valence of the words revealed the predicted main effect of valence, F(1,19) = 154.57, 
p < .001. Participants rated the threatening words as mor~ threatening than the neutral 
words. The main effect of presentation was not significant, F( 1,19) < 1, indicating that 
emotional valence did not differ between those words that were and were not 
presented. Examination of the interaction terms of Valence X Presentation on the 
various dependent variables revealed that the word groups did not differ with regards 
to word length, F(I,19) < 1, ~umber of syllables, F(I,19) < 1, ~r word frequency, 
F(I,19) < 1. 
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Table 4.1. List of Neutral and Threatening Words by Presentation and Word Group 
Characteristics. 
Neutral In Threatening In Neutral Out Threatening 
Out 
Word lists Cycle Painful Observe Terror 
Yearly Swelling Eaten Fatigue 
Linear Illness Border Helpless 
Match Growth Write Guilt 
Measurable Susceptible Periphery Coronary 
Word length 6.40 (1.91) 8.00 (2.35) 6.40 (1.67) 7.00 (1.58) 
Syllables 2.60 (0.89) 2.40 (0.89) 2.40 (0.89) 2.40 (0.89) 
Word 21.00 (14.04) 39.40 (54.56) 33.80 (41.06) 19.60 (10.33) 
frequency 
Threat 3.11 (0.14) 0.97 (0.41) 3.00 (0.16) 1.01 (0.58) 
Note. Standard deviation in parenthesis (applies throughout this chapter). 
Each word was presented in the center of the screen, and remained on the 
screen until participants made a response. There was a two second delay between each 
word presentation, during which the screen was blank. 
Statement task. Participants were presented with 23 statements (Table 4.2) and 
some filler statements (e.g., "I did not like reading the information"). Agreement or 
disagreement with each statement was indicated by pressing 'z' or 'm' on the 
computer keyboard, and response labels were counterbalanced. Participants were . 
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to each statement. 
Statements were primarily generated from pilot work, in which 4~ female 
participants completed a thought-listing task, while reading a relevant health message 
(alcohol and breast cancer message). Based on the literature examining biased 
. processing of health information (Blumberg, 2000; Chaiken et aI., 1996; Raghunathan 
& Trope, 2002) two independent judges categorised participants' thought-listings into 
statements counter-arguing the message, minimising the message, denying personal 
relevance of the message and those suggesting participants took the message 
seriously. The two judges' ratings were significantly correlated between r(45) = .72, 
p < .001 and r( 45) = .94, p < .001 . These categories and participants' thought listings . 
were used to generate the statements used in the present study. Appendix F presents 
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examples of thought listings to illustrate how statements in the present study were 
developed. 
In total, seven statements reflecting minimisation of threat were selected and 
five statements s~ggesting that the article was considered serious and genuine. A 
further three statements measured thoughts reflecting counter-arguing of the 
information, and five statements measured denial of personal relevance of the article. 
Participants also responded to three statements measuring depth of processing. 
Table 4.2. Statements Presented and Associated Motive. 
Statement 
Drinking caffeine is ok in moderation 
You can not worry about all the things that are meant to be bad for 
you 
You can not avoid every behaviour that might be risky 
Other factors influence the development of breast cancer 
Many factors are likely to impact your risk of FBD 
Many factors are likely to impact your risk of breast cancer 
FBD is not a serious illness condition 
Drinking caffeine increases the risk of developing breast cancer 
Drinking caffeine increases the risk of FBD 
The article provided valuable information 
The article provided useful information 
The information provided will help improve my health 
The information was unreliable 
The information source was not reliable ' 
Drinking caffeine has benefits 
I do not drink as much caffeine as other women 
FBD is not something I need to worry about at my age 
Other women drink more caffeine than me 
The content of the article was relevant to mea 
Breast cancer is not something I need to worry about at my age 
While reading the article I thought deeply about the information 
While reading the article I thought deeply about my risk of breast 
cancer 
While reading the article I thought deeply about my risk of FBD 
Associated motive 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Minimisation 
Serious I Genuine 
. Serious I Genuine 
Serious I Genuine 
Serious I Genuine 
Serious I Genuine 
Counter-arguing 
Counter-arguing 
Counter-arguing 
Denial relevance 
Denial relevance 
. Denial relevance 
Denial relevance 
Denial relevance 
Thought deeply 
Thought deeply 
Thought deeply 
Note. a This item was later recoded to reflect denial of personal relevance. 
As with the word recall task, each statement was presented in the center of the 
screen, and remained on the screen until participants made a response. There was a 
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two second del~y between each statement present~tion; during which the screen was 
blank. 
Post-manipulation measures (Questionnaire 2). Written instructions asked 
participants to complete questions relating to their reactions to the health article. They 
were encouraged to answer the questions "as honestly and accurately" as possible. The 
first section contained items measuring perceptions of risk and severity. Participants 
were asked: "How likely do you think YOU will be to experience FBD from your past 
caffeine consumption?", followed by the equivalent item for the average student, 
"How likely do you think the average Sheffield University student of your age and sex 
will be to experience FBD from their past caffeine consumption?". These two items 
were repeated for risk of breast cancer. Responses were given on an ll-point scale, 
impossible (0) to extremely likely (10). Two items measured perceptions of severity, 
"In your opinion, how serious (severe) a health disorder is FBD I breast cancer?", 
responses were given on a ll-point scale, not serious (0) to very serious (10). 
Next followed items measuring: beliefs, "I believe that drinking caffeine 
increases the chances of people developing FBD", "I believe that drinking caffeine 
increases the chances of people developing breast cancer" (Strongly disagree [0] / ' 
Strongly agree [6]); worry, "I feel my level of caffeine consumption is something 1. .. " 
(don't need to worry about [0] I do need to worry about [6]), "I feel worried about the 
possible effects of drinking caffeine." (Not at all worried [0] / Extremely worried [6], 
two items combined into single item, r(51) = .69, p < .001); ratings of evidence 
strength, ''The evidence linking caffeine and FBD I breast cancer is weak" (2 items: 
Strongly disagree [0] / Strongly agree [6]); and an intention item, "I intend to cut 
down on the amount of caffeine I drink in a typical day" (Definitely do not intend to 
[0] / Definitely intend to [6]). All items were measured on 7-point scales. , 
Participants then completed 5 items measuring their response while reading the 
article, for example, "I thought about my risk of breast cancer" and "I tried not to think 
about how the information applied to me". Responses were given on a 7-point scale, 
Not at all (0) to Very much (6). 
-
The final section contained the following items in sequence: two perceived 
relevance items, "The content was relevant to me I relevant to the average University 
student of your age and sex" (7-point scale, Strongly disagree [0] / Strongly agree [6]), 
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an impact item, "I will probably forget about the article within a couple of days" (7-
point scale, Strongly disagree [0] / Strongly agree [6]), and two ease o/imagination 
items, "How easy is it for you to imagine yourself experiencing FBD as a result of 
your past caffeine consumption", and the same item as a result of breast cancer. The 
ease of imagination items were measure~ on a 6-point scale, not at all easy (0), slightly 
easy, quite easy, moderately easy, very eaiy, extremely easy (5). Participants then 
completed a second intentions item, "I intend to cut down on the amount of caffeine I 
drink in the next 7 days" and an expectation item, "I expect to cut down on the amount . 
of caffeine I drink in the next 7 days'. The two intention items, separated by 12 items, 
were significantly correlated and combined into a single item, r(51) = .82, p < .001. 
Finally, participants completed the same measure of current mood as in the pre-
manipulation questionnaire. 
One-week/ollow-up. After one week, participants returned to complete a 
surprise recall task. Participants were asked to write down as many details as possible 
about the article they read the previous week, aiming to fill a minimum of a sheet of 
paper. Then they completed the dependent measures as per the previous week, 
including measures of reported caffeine consumption over the previous week and last 
24 hours, perceptions of risk (both self and other), severity, belief, worry, intentions~ 
ease o/imagination, and relevance. Participants also responded to the following 
statements: "Since reading the article about FBD last week, which of the following 
have applied to you? .. I have thought about the amount of caffeine that I drink, I have 
thought about my risk of developing breast cancer, I have worried about the amount of 
caffeine I drink, I have thought deeply about the information, I have tried not to think 
about how the ar,tic1e applied to me, I have talked to friends about the FBD article, I 
_ have researched information about FBD (for example using the Internet)". Responses 
were given on 7-point scales (Not at all [0] to Very much [6]). , 
Finally, participants completed the trait anxiety component of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The STAI consists 
of twenty items designed to assess trait anxiety (e.g., "I feel nervous and restless', "I 
feel difficulties piling up that I cannot overcome"). Participants indicated their 
agreement with each statement on a four-point scale (not at all [1] to very much so 
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[4]). Positively worded items were recoded and the items summed to provide a total 
score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of trait anxiety .. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited to take part in a study examining reactions to health 
information, and were tested individually. Participants were instructed that they would 
be taking part in a study to evaluate health information and would be asked to choose 
one of two health-related articles to read. After completing the preliminary questions 
(Questionnaire 1) participants were asked whether, while waiting for the experimenter 
to ostensibly finish setting up the computer-based task, they would be willing to 
complete a questionnaire (the self-affirmation manipulation or control task) on behalf 
of the experimenter's supervisor. All agreed. The experimenter set up the computer 
while participants read through the instruction information for the affirmation I control. 
task, and then left the room while they completed the manipulation itself. 
After completing the self-affirmation I control task, participants were seated in 
front of the computer, and were asked to work through the tasks presented on the 
screen. The experimenter left the room while participants read the article, and 
completed the word recall and statement response task. Following this, the 
experimenter provided participants with a copy of the final questionnaire. 
Before they left, the experimenter reviewed participants' responses to the final 
questionnaire. If participants reported being overly anxious in response to the article 
they were debriefed about the nature of the study immediately, and were not asked to 
return the following week to complete a follow-up. Those who were asked to return 
were not given any details about what the follow-up would involve, but were simply 
asked to return to complete the second part of the study. Those who did return the 
following week completed the surprise recall task~ followed by the questionnaire. 
Participants were then as~ed to complete the measure of general anxiety. Finally, 
participants were debriefed about the nature of the study, and reassured about the risks 
of FBD and breast cancer. 
Results 
Preliminary Measures 
Participants' reports of caffeine consumption on a typical day and the previous 
day were significantly correlated, r(50) = .65,p < .001, and combined into a single 
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item. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in their reports of past 
caffeine consumption, F(I, 50) < 1, p = .69 (Table 4.3). Examination of participants' 
mood prior to the self-affirmation manipulation also revealed no significant 
differences between condition for positive, or negative mood. Self-affirmed and non-
affirmed participants did not differ in their level of reported trait anxiety or self-
esteem. 
Table 4.3. Mean Responses to Randomisation Check Measures. 
SA NA F P 
(n = 26) (n = 25) (1,50) 
Prior caffeine consumption 4.05 (1.56) 3.86 (1.78) 0.16 . .69 
Positive mood 1.40 (0.57) 1.50 (0148) 0.43 .52 
Negative mood 0.44 (0.62) 0.24 (0.48) 1.68 .20 
Self-esteem 2.77 (1.14) 2.88 (1.09) 0.13 .73 
General anxiety 42.43 (9.29) 41.79 (11.59) 0.04 .85 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels of positive and negative mood, self-esteem, 
trait anxiety and caffeine consumption. SA = self-affirmation; NA = non-affirmed 
(applies throughout this chapter). 
One-way ANCOV As were performed to examine whether self-affirmation 
. ' 
acted to boost positive mood or reduce negative mood, with condition as a between. 
participants variable and pre-manipulation mood as a covariate. Analysis of positive 
mood, revealed only mood prior to the manipulation, F(I, 50) = 36.38, p < .001, and 
not condition predicted positive mood, F(I, 50) < 1. Similarly, negative mood pre-
manipulation predicted negative mood afterwards, F(1, 50) = 51.35,p < .001, but 
condi~ion did not, F(I, 50) < 1. 
Reaction time data 
Data from non-affirmed and self-~ffirmed participants were screened 
separately', and where participants' responses fell more than three standard deviations 
below or above the mean, their response was changed to be one unit (millisecond) 
higher or lower than the next most extreme value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1983). 
Orientation and reading time 
The orientation andreading tiIJ?e data are presented in Table 4.4. Self-affirmed 
participants were more likely to choose to read the more threateningly titled article 
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than those who were non-affirmed, F(1, 50) = 4.84, P = .033. Hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted. At step 1 main effects of condition and anxiety were entered, 
and at step 2 the Condition X Anxiety interaction. The analysis revealed that general 
anxiety did not predict article choice, B = -.23, p= .14, or moderate the effects of self-
affirmation, B = -.02, p = .88. 
A two-way between-participants ANOV A, with condition (self-affirmed or 
non-affirmed) and article choice (threatening or neutral) as independent variables 
revealed only response choice, F(I, 50) = 17.28, p < .001, and not condition, F(1, 50) 
< 1, or Condition X Choice, F(1, 50) < 1, predicted time taken to choose an article. 
People were quicker to choose the more threateningly titled article than the neutral 
article. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in the amount of time 
they spent reading the article (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. Choice of Anicle and Reading Time' by Condition. 
SA NA F 
(n = 26) (n = 25) (1,50) 
Participants choosing 15 7 4.84 
threatening articlea 
Time to choose article 12.8 (2.7) 14.2 (4.1) 2.00 
Total reading time 128.2 (29.4) 125.4 (24.0) 0.14 
Note. aNumber of participants. Reading time and orientation speed reported in 
seconds. 
Recall of words 
p. 
.033 
.16 
.71 
The accuracy and latency of participants' judgements of whether words were· 
presented in the message were analysed using three-way ANOV As for mixed designs, 
with condition as between participants variable, and valence of word (neutral or 
threatening), and whether the word was presented in the article (in or out), as within 
participants variables. Analysis of data for accuracy of participants' recall (Figure 4.1) 
revealed significant main effects of threat, F(I, 50) = 126.89, P < .001, and 
presentation, F(I, 50) = 148.83, p < .001, and a Threat X Presentation interaction, F(I, 
50) = 21.39,p < .001. Participants were more accurate inthejudgements of 
threatening words and words that were presented in the article. The analysis also 
revealed a significant interaction of Condition x Presentation, F(1, 50) = 5.55, p = 
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·023. Self-affirmed participants were marginally more accurate at identifying words 
that were presented in the text, F(l, 50) = 3.55, p = .065, than those who were non-
affirmed. There was little difference between conditions in terms of accuracy of recall 
for words that did not appear in the text, F(1, 50) = 2.11, p = .15 . No other effects 
'involving condition approached significance, Condition, F(I,49) < I,p = .43; 
Condition X Threat, F(l,49) < l,p = .76; Condition X Threat X Presentation, F(1,49) 
=2.81,p=.IO. 
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Figure 4.1. Accuracy of word recall, by condition and threat. ,. 
, 
Analysis of latency of responses revealed significant main effects of threat, 
f(l, 50) = 10.73, p = .0~2, and presentation, F(l, 50) = 21.66, p < .001, and a Threat X 
Presentation interaction; F(1, 50) = 30.10,p < .001. Participants were quicker to . 
. . 
respond to words that were not presented in the text and to threatening words (See 
Figure 4.2). The analysis also produced a three way interaction of Condition X Threat 
X Presentation, F( I, 50) = 4.76, p = .034. Inspection of data in Figure 4.2 suggested 
that self-affirmed participants were slower to respond to all the word groups except 
threatening words that appeared in the message. However, analysis of simple effects 
did not reveal any significant differences between self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants at the individual word group levels, NeutrallIn, F(1, 50) < l,p = .33; 
'. . 
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Threat/In, F(1, 50) < l,p = .69; NeutraVOut, F(I, 50) = 2.69,p = .11, Threat/Out, F(I, 
50) = 2.44,p = .13. 
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Figure 4.2. Latency of responses to recall of words. 
Motive statements 
Responses to statements in each category (e.g., counter-arguing, minimisation, 
'"," ' 
denial of relevance, message serious and genuine, and depth of processing) were 
combined for further analysis. One-way between-participant ANOV As, with coi1Cliti~n 
as the independent variable, revealed a significant difference in the number of counter- '. 
arguments self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants endorsed, with self-affirmed 
participants agreeing with fewer counter-arguments (Table 4.5). There were no 
differences in the'tendency of self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants to agree 
with statements minimising or suggesting the evide~ce was genuine and serious, or in 
their responses to the depth of pro~e~sing or denial of personal rel~vance statements. 
Table 4.5. Agree"!ent with Statements Reflecting Response to the Article. 
Statement agreement SA NA F(1,50) p 
Counter-arguing 0.85 (0.92) 1.36 (0.76) . 4.69 .035 
Minimisation 5.73 (0.72) . 5.60 (1.15) . 0.24 .63 
Serious and genuine 4.07 (1.14) 4.30 (1.06) 0.25 .62 
Denying relevance 1.12 (1.11) 1.56 (0.96) 2.34 .13 
Thought deeply about information 2.12 (1.11) 2.08 (1.19) , 0.01 .91 
Note. Higher values indicate participants agreed with more of the statements. 
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Latencies of responses 
Reaction times to respond to each of the statement categories are in Table 4.6. 
The data were analysed using 2 X 2 mixed design ANOV As, with condition as the 
between participants variable and response (disagreement or agreement with 
statement) as the within participants variable. 
Table 4.6. Mean Reaction Times in Milliseconds to Respond to Statements as a 
Function of Condition and Agreement. 
Statement SA NA 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Minimisation 3162.6 3313.3 2972.0 3255.1 
(601.1) (1180.9) (439.7) (1115.0) 
Serious and genuine 2536.9 3886.8 2636.2 3273.7 
(520.1) (1229.1) (693.9) (443.8) 
Counter-arguing 3306.2 3026.6 2922.7 3267.5 
(1235.1) (811.8) (808.7) (1200.6) . 
Denying relevance 3118.2 2739.6 3097.8 . 2806.9 
(1022.9) , (862.3) (723.3) . (842.4) 
Thought deeply about 2171.7 3207.2 2355.4 2438.5 
. information (612.7) (1055.2) (591.7) (688.9) 
Minimisation. Analysis of participants' responses to the minimising statements 
revealed no significant effect of condition, F(1, 45) < 1, or response, F(1, 45) = 2.27, p 
=.14. Nor was the Condition X Response interaction significant, F(1, 45) < 1. 
Serious and Genuine. For the statements suggesting that participants thought 
the health informatioq was genuine and serious, there was no main effect of condition, 
-F(l, 25) < 1. However, both response, F(1, 25) = 14.88,p = .001 and the Condition X 
. Response interaction, F( 1, 25) = 4.31, p = .049, were significant. Examination of the 
means suggests tha~ though both non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants were 
slower to disagree than agree with the accuracy statements, this effect was most 
pronounced in the self-affirmed participants. Though cell numbers were small, tests of 
simple effects supported this; self-affirmed participants were significantly faster to 
128 
agree than disagree, F(1, 13) = 15.04, p = .002, and non-affirmed participants were 
not, F(I, 10) = 2.48, p = .15. 
Counter-arguing. There were no significant main effects, F(1, 34) < 1 or an 
interaction, F(1, 34) = 1.17, p = .29, for latencies to respond to the counter-arguing 
statements. 
Denial of Personal Relevance. For reaction times to respond to the denial of 
. . 
. .. . 
relevance items there was a main effect of response, F( 1, 36) = 4.62, p = .039, with 
both non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants responding quicker to disagree with 
the denial statements. There were, however, no significant effects involving condition, 
F(I, 36) < 1. 
. . 
Depth of Processing. Analysis of reaction time to respond to the depth of 
processing items revealed a main effect ofresponse,F(I, 18) = 1O.03,p = .007, and 
that the interaction of Condition X Response approached significance, F(1, 18) = 4.18, 
p = .060. Examination of the means suggests that though both non-affirmed and self-
affirmed participants were slower to disagree than agree with the depth of processing 
statements, this effect was most pronounced in the self-affirmed piuticipants. 
Unfortunately, however, cell numbers (6 < n < 8) did not permit tests of simple effects. 
Questionnaire data 
Unless otherwise stated, questionnaire data were analysed using 2 X 2 . 
ANOV A for mixed designs, with condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) as a 
between-participants variable and time (immediately after self-affirmation [Time 1] or 
after one week [Time 2]) as the within-participants variable. Where item wording 
differed at Time 1 and 2, data at each time point were analysed separately using one-
way between-participants ,ANOV As, with condition as the independent variable. 
In total, 45 (88%) participants completed the one-week follow-up. Of the six 
participants who did not complete the follow-up, five were self-affirmed and one non-
affirmed. Two self-affirmed participants were debriefed at week one for ethical 
reasons, as they showed signs of anxiety after reading the health information. The 
further participants were debriefed either in person or via email.' 
Personal acceptance. Data for participants' risk perceptions are in Table 4.7. 
Participants' risk perceptions were analysed using three-way ANOV A for mixed 
designs, with condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) as a between-participants 
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variable and time (Time 1 or Time 2) and target (self or average other) as within-
participants variables. 
Table 4.7. Mean Responses to Measures of Risk Perceptions by Self-affirmation 
Condition 
SA NA 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
(n = 26) (n = 21) (n = 25) (n = 24) 
FBD risk 
Self 5.92 (2.21) 4.38 (1.72) 4.84 (2.85) 4.71 (2.68) 
Other 5.77 (1.97) 4.52 (1.72) 4.92 (2.25) 4.71 (1.97) 
Breast cancer risk 
Self 4.04 (2.37) 3.38 (1.80) 3.92 (2.27) 3.17 (2.10) 
Other 3.96 (2.30) 3.24 (1.79) 3.84 (1.91) 3.08 (1.89) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher risk perceptions. 
Analysis of participants' risk perceptions for FBD revealed a significant main 
. , ~, 
effect of time, F(I, 43) = 22.86, p = .001. Participants reported lower risk perceptions 
after one week. The Condition X Time interactio~ also approached significance F(1, 
43) = 3.38, p = .07. Self-affirmed participants reported a greater reduction in risk 
) 
perceptions after one week. Tests of simple effects, however, did not reveal a 
< • " " t, 
significant difference between condition at either Time 1, F(1, 50) = 2.48, p = .12, or 
at Time 2, F(I, 44) < 1. No other effects involving condition approached significance, 
Condition, F(1, 43) < 1; Condition X Target, F(I, 43) <: 1; Condition X Time X 
. ' 
. ' 
Target, F(I, 43) < 1. Interestingly, both self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants 
reported themselves to be at about the same risk ofFBD as the average other, F(1, 43) 
< 1, demonstrating no optimistic bias in their judgements .. 
Analysis of participants' risk perception for breast cancer revealed only a 
, ~ , 
significant main effects oftime, F(1,44) = 11.97, p = .001. Both self-affirmed and non-
affirmed participants reported lower risk perception after one week. No effects 
involving condition approached significance, Condition, F(1, 43) < 1; Condition X 
. , . 
Time, F(I, 43) < 1; Condition X Target, F(I, 43) <, 1; Condition X Time X Target, 
; , 
F(I, 43) < 1. Both self-affirmed and non-affirmed partiCipants did not report an 
optimistic bias in the risk judgments for breast cancer, F(1, 43) < 1. 
There were no significant effects of self-affirmation on intentions or 
. 
expectation to change, perceptions of personal relevance, or relevance to the average 
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other, worry, ease of imagination for either FBD or breast cancer, or likelihood of 
forgetting content of article (Table 4.8). There was a significant main effect of time for 
participants' reports of worry, F(1, 43) = 4.76, p = .035, and ease of imagining FBD, 
F(I, 43) = 5.76, p = .02. Participants in both conditions reported being less worried 
after one week, and finding it harder to imagine developing FBD. 
Both self-affirmation and non-affirmed participants reported the article to be 
personally relevant, being marginally worried, and that they were unlikely to forget 
about the article in a couple of days. Those in both conditions also reported difficulty 
in imagining developing either FBD or breast cancer as a result of ~nking caffeine. 
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The data for measures of general message acceptance are in Table 4.9. 
Analysis of participants' perceptions of the severity of FBD revealed a significant 
interaction of condition and time. Self-affirmed participants reported an increase in 
perceptions of severity after one week, and those who were non-affirmed a decrease. 
Test of simple effects, however, did not indicate significant effects of self-affirmation 
at either Time 1, F(l,50) = 0.14, p = .71, or Time 2, F(l,44) = 2.58, p = .12. 
The interaction of condition and time for participants' belief in the link 
between caffeine and FBD approached significance, F(1,44) = 3.55, p = .06. Tests of 
simple effects revealed that self-affirmed participants reported significantly greater 
. ' 
belief at Time 1, F(l,50) = 3.99, p =.05, but not at Time 2, F(1,50) < 1. 
Table 4.9. Mean Responses on Items Measuring General Message Acceptance . 
SA NA F F ... F 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Condition Time CXT, 
(n = 26) (n = 21) (n = 25) (n = 24) (C) (T) (1,43) (1,43) (1,43) 
FBD 
Severity 5.54 6.14 5.72 5.17 0.38 1.27 13.77** 
(1.82) (1.77) (1.67) (2.24) 
Belief 4.77 4.05 4.00 3.96 0.82 3.55 3.55 
(1.21) (1.20) (1.53) (1.68) 
Evidence 2.31 2.29·· 2.56 2.75 0.87 0.09 0.09 
strength (1.46) (1.35) (1.64) (1.92) 
Breast cancer 
Severity 9.04 9.10 9.28 9.25 0.92 0.30 0.30 
(1.15) (0.77) (0.84) . (0.85) 
Belief 3.04 . 2.71 2.76 2.46 0.71 2.97 0.11 . 
(1.61) (1.23) (1.61) (1.56) 
Evidence 3.62 3.76 3.56 4.04 0.76 1.19 0.19 
strength (1.55) (1.51) (1.83) (1.81) 
Note. Higher values indicate greater belief in message and perceptions in severity, and 
that participants perceived the evidence as weaker. **p < .01. 
Self-affirmation did not influence participants' ratings of evidence strength, 
their belief in the link between caffeine and breast c~ncer, or how severe a health 
disorder they perceived breast cancer to be. Those in both groups reported believing in 
the link between caffeine and FBD, and disagreed that the evidence was weak. 
Overall, participants saw the evidence linking breast cancer and caffeine as weak. 
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Thoughts about article. There were no significant differences in the extent self-
affirmed and non-affirmed participants reported having thought deeply about the 
information; about the amount of caffeine they drank, their risk of breast cancer, 
having avoided thinking about how the article applied to them, or worried about their 
caffeine consumption either immedia~ely after reading the article or after one week 
(Table 4.10). Participants did not differ in their reports of talking to friends about the 
article or researching the risks of caffeine for themselves. 
Table 4.10. Participants' Thoughts During and After Readin~ the Article." 
SA NA TI T2 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 F ·F 
(n = 26) (n = 21) (n = 25) (n = 24) (1,50) (1,43) 
Thought deeply about 4.04 2.62 4.36 3.00 0.39 0.59 
the information (1.31) (1.91) (1.32) (1.41) 
Thought about .. 4.81 3.24 5.04 . 3.33 0.66 0.04 
caffeine intake (1.02) (1.70) (1.02) (1.46) 
Thought about risk of 3.54 2.48 4.08 2.58 : 0.26 0.04 
breast cancer (1.63) (2.06) " (1.73) (1.61) 
Worried about 3.73 2.52 ,3.84 3.04 0.83 1.01 
caffeine consumption (1.97) (3.04) (1.57) (1.57) 
A voided thinking 1.58 1.62 1.64 1.67 0.02 0.01 
about article (1.45) . (1.53) (1.52) ; (1.40) 
Talked to friends 2.05 2.42 0.45· 
about article (2.01) (1.69) 
. Researched FBD for 0.05 0.08 0.22 
myself (0.22) (0.28) 
Note. Empty cells mean data not collected. 
Recall of information 
Participants' recall of the article after one week are in Table 4.11. Data were 
analysed using one-way between-participants ANOV A, with condition as the 
fndependent variable. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in the 
. ., ". ' 
number of facts they recalled about the article overall. Self-affirmed participants did, 
~ . '- . 
however, recall less risk-disconfirming evidence and more information about the risks 
of FBD assoc~ated with smoking, compared to those who were non-affirmed. There 
were no differences between the two groups in terms of the amount of general, risk- ' 
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confirming, or recommendation information they recalled, or the number of incorrect 
recalls. 
Table 4.11. Participants' Recall of the Article after One-Week. 
SA NA F P 
(n = 21) (n = 24) (1,44) 
Total facts recalled 7.95 (2.58) 7.88 (2.21) 0.01 .91 
Recall general information 2.33 (1.15) 2.38 (1.28) 0.01 .91 
Recall risk confirming information 3.52 (1.50) 3.58 (1.35) 0.02 .89 
Recall risk disconfirming information 0.52 (0.75) 1.13 (1.14) 4.26 .045 
Recall recommendations 0.62 (0.59) 0.58 (0.50) 0.05 .83 
Recall information about risk of smoking . 0.71 (0.72) 0.13 (0.34) . 12.45 .001 
Recall information incorrectly 0.33 (0.58) 0.54 (0.83) 0.92 .34 
Note. Higher scores indicate more facts recalled. 
Caffeine' consumption. Participants' reports of their typical caffeine 
consumption over the last week and their consumption the previous day were 
combined into a single item, r(45) = .78, p < .001. A one-way ANCOV A ~ith 
condition as a between participants variable (self-affirmed or non-affirmed), and pre-
manipulation reports of caffeine consumption as a covariate was performed. . 
Participants' caffeine consumption prior to the manipulation significantly predicted· 
their caffeine consumption after one week, F(l, 44) = 18,00, p < .001. Self-affirmed 
participants reported drinking slightly less caffeine a week after reading the health 
message (mean = 2.76), than those who were non-affirmed (mean = 3.56), a difference 
that approached significance, F(I, 44) = 3.82,p = .057. 
Linear regressions were conducted to test whether participants' belief in the 
link between caffeine and FBD at Time 1 mediated the reduction in caffeine 
consumption. Following Baron and Kenny (1986), three regressions were conducted. 
A first regression confirmed that condition predicted the mediator, belief in the FBD 
caffeine link, R2 = .08, B = .27, t(50) = 2.00, p = .05. Second, condition predicted the 
dependent variable, change in caffeine consumption, R2 = .09, B = .29, t(44) = 2.00, 
p = .052. Finally, when change in caffeine consumption was regressed simultaneously 
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on belief in link and condition, R2 = .28, F(2, 44) = 8.25, p = .001, the effects of belief 
in link remained significant, B = .46, p = .002, but condition was not, B = .18, p = .18. 
Thus there is evidence that the effects of self-affirmation upon caffeine consumption 
were mediated by belief in the link between FBD and caffeine. 
To test whether the reduction in self-affirmed participants' risk perceptions for 
FBD reflected a reduction in participants' caffeine consumption, risk perceptions of 
those in the self-affirmed condition were examined using linear regression analysis. 
Changes in caffeine consumption were calculated by subtracting caffeine consumption 
at Time 1 from caffeine consumption at Time 2, with lower scores corresponding to a 
reduction in caffeine intake. Change in caffeine consumption signific.antly predicted 
risk perceptions at Time 2, B = -.33, p = .029. However, those who reported the . 
greatest reductions in caffeine consumption also reported the highest risk perceptions 
at Time 2. 
Self-esteem as a moderator 
Moderated regressions were conducted to test whether self-esteem moderated 
the effects of self-affirmation on the dependent measures (see Chapter 2 for more 
detailed description). At step one condition and self-esteem were entered, and the 
interaction at step two. 
Though self-esteem was found to predict article choice, B = .12, p = .049, with 
those with higher self-esteem choosing the more threateningly titled article more often, 
self-esteem did not moderate the effects of self-affirmation on choice of article, B =-
.10, p = .44. Nor did self-esteem moderate the effects of self-affirmation on agreement 
with statements reflecting defensiveness or depth of processing. 
, I", ';< 
Moderat~d regression for participants' questionnaire responses at Time 1 
revealed that self-esteem did not moderate the effects of condition on the measures of 
general message acceptance (Table 4.12). 
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Table 4.12. Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis for Condition X Self-esteem to 
. Predict Measures of General Acceptance. 
Variable B SEB B p F R2 
(1,49) 
FBD 
Belief .41 .35 .16 .25 2.25 .13 
Evidence strength -.04 .37 -.01 .91 3.70 .19 
Severity -.42 .45 -.14 .34 0.68 .04 
Breast cancer 
Belief .22 .42 .07 .61 0.40 .03 
, Evidence strength .22 .44 .07 .63 0.22 .01 
Severity .07 .26 .04 .78 1.18 .07 
.-
Analysis of participants' response on measures of personal acceptance 
indicated that self-esteem typically did not moderate the effects of self-affirmation. 
The exceptions were the measures of self-risk of FBD and ease of imagining breast 
cancer (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13. Summary of Moderated Regression Analysis for Condition X Self-Esteem 
to Predict Measures of Personal Acceptance. 
Variable B SEB B P F R2 
(1,49) 
FBD 
Self risk 1.40 .61 .30 .026 4.14 .21 
Other risk .72 .54 .19 .19 1.59 .03 
Imagine .54 .36 , .20 .14 3.21 .17 
Breast cancer 
, Self risk 
.53 .59 .13 .37 0.97 '.06 
. Other risk .23 .55 ' .. 06 .68 0.21 .01 
Imagine .. 72 .31 .31 .025 2.62 .14 
Worry .09 .36 .04 .26 1.79 .05 
Intentions .20 .44 .06 .65 1.49 .03 
Expectations .18 .46 .06 .70 0.46 .03 
Relevance 
Self -.11 .29 -.05 .70 2.59 .14 
Other .04 .32 .02 .91 0.20 .01 
Behaviour .81 .52 .23 .13 1.48 .10 
change 
136 
Analysis of participants' FBD self risk perceptions revealed that both self-
esteem, ~ = -.29, P = .032, and the Condition X ~elf-esteem interaction, (3 = -.30, p = . 
. 026, were significant predictors. Those with higher self-esteem made lower risk 
judgments. Simple slopes analysis revealed that self-affirmation significantly increased 
. . 
risk perceptions of those with high self-esteem, (3 = .47, p = .01, but had no effect on 
those with moderate, (3 = '.20, p = .136, or low self-esteem, ~ = -.08, p = .67 (Figure 
4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. The effect of self-affirmation on FBD risk perceptions as a function of 
self-esteem: Simple slopes at three levels of self-esteem. 
Self-esteem was also found to moderate the effects of condition on ease of 
imagining developing breast cancer. Simple slopes analysis revealed that self-
affirmation marginally increased ease of imagination for those with high self-esteem, ~ 
= .32, P = .087, but had no effect on those with moderate self-esteem, ~ = .03, p = .81, 
or low self-esteem, (3 = -.25,p = .17. 
Discussion 
. The results of the present study suggest self-affirmation can influence 
orienta?on to threat, motives for processing information, and caffeine drinking 
behaviour, following a health threat outlining the potential negative effects of drinking 
caffeine. Self-affirmation also'promoted general acceptance of the message in terms of 
an increase in belief in the link between FBD and caffeine at Time 1. However, self-
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affirmation was not found to influence personal acceptance of the message. 
. Furthermore, examination of the durability of the effects suggested that after one week 
there were no differences between self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants' reports 
of belief in the message. There was, however, some evidence that self-affirmed and 
non-affirmed participants differed in their recall of the health threat after one week and 
their caffeine consumption, suggesting self-affirmation may have had some durable 
effects .. 
Self-affirmed participants were more likely to choose to read the more 
threateningly titled health information than those who were non-affirmed. In 
comparison to Reed and Aspinwall (1998), the current study provides stronger 
evidence that self-affirmation can reduce attentional avoidance of potentially 
threatening self-relevant health information. Thus self-affirmation can reduce 
defensive processing at multiple levels of information processing, both influencing . 
orientation to threat, and denial of personal inferences (Study 1). By promoting greater 
: 
openness to negative health information self-affirmation could provide an important. 
first step in a health intervention, allowing people to recognise a potential threat. 
The present study also sought to test whether self-affirmation influences the . 
depth of processing of a health message, measuring how long participants spent 
reading the health article, their recall of information and self-reports of depth of 
processing. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in terms of 
reading time, which suggests that participants did not differ in the effort they applied 
to understanding the content of the message or their depth of processing. 
Examination of participants' recall of words that appeared in the message 
immediately after reading the article revealed that those in both conditions were fairly 
accurate at identifying words that did not appear in the text. For the words that did 
appear in the message, self-affirmed participants were more accurate than those who 
were non-affirmed, particularly at identifying neutral words in the message. This 
increase in accuracy of recall suggests that self-affirmed participants may have paid 
more attention to the content of the article, and thus been better able to recall neutral 
words presented. 
The speed at which participants made judgements about which words appeared 
in the text also suggests that self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants may have 
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differed in their depth of processing. Self-affirmed participants were slower to make 
decisions for all word groups apart from the threatening words that appeared in the 
message. This greater thinking time could reflect the fact that self-affirmed 
participants paid mor~ attention to the niessage and thus required more time to 
consider the content before making a judgement. Alternatively, self-affirmed 
participants may have processed the information in less depth and taken longer to 
make judgements as they were less sure which words appeared in the message. It is 
also plausible that ~elf-affirmed participants did not differ in their depth of processing, 
but an increase in thinking time could reflect self-affirmed participants taking the task 
more seriously. Self-affirmation may act not just to influence participants' reaction to 
the health message, but also to the task itself, such that self-affirmed participants felt it 
was more important to complete the task accurately. This explanation could suggest 
that self-affirmed participants had a greater desire to be accurate in all aspects of the 
task, or perhaps that they displayed greater demand characteristics. 
. Further evidence relevant to the depth of processing participants applied to the 
message comes from their self-reports of depth of processing. Non-affirmed and self-
affirmed participants did not differ in their agreement with these statements. However, 
condition did have a marginal impact on participants' latencies to respond. The pattern 
of results suggests that, for self-affirmed participants, the goal to process the 
information deeply was more accessible. In line with Steele (1988), this finding may 
indicate that self-affirmation promoted a greater desire to process information with a 
goal of accuracy and to reach objective conclusions. However, depth of processing 
does not necessarily indicate more accur~te processing. For example, defensive 
participants could apply a great deal of effort to processing a message, but not with the 
goal to be accurate, but in an attempt to find flaws and counter-argue the information 
(Chaiken et aI., 1996, Chen & Chaiken, 1999). 
The findings both in terms of reading time, recall of words and accessibility of 
depth of processing statements do not support the hypothesis that self-affirmation 
promotes mindless acceptance of the message. Instead, self-affirmed participants 
appeared to apply the same amount of effort as those who were non-affirmed in terms 
of reading time, and possibly engaged in more elaborative processing, being more 
accurate in their recall of words. This finding is also supported by faster reaction times 
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of self-affirmed participants to endorse rather than reject statements congruent with 
engaging in in-depth processing. Thus the increase in belief in the message 
immediately after reading the article did not appear to be a result of less in-depth 
processing. 
Further evidence indicative of non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants' 
depth of processing comes from their recall of the article a week later. Overall, there 
were no differences in the amount of information participants recalled, suggesting that 
self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in their original processing 
of the message. However, non-affirmed participants did recall more of the risk- . 
disconfirming evidence than those who were self-affirmed. Reed and Aspinwall (1998) 
also reported that their self-affirmed participants recalled less of the risk-disconfirming 
evidence. This finding could reflect differences in the way non-affirmed and self-
affirmed processed the information, such that non-affirmed participants paid more 
attention to information undermining the threat while reading the article, or that non-
affirmed participants subsequently recalled information in a biased manner. In either 
case self-affirmation appeared to reduce this bias. 
Not only did non-affirmed participants recall more risk-disconfirming 
evidence, but differences were also seen in recall of information relating to smoking 
and FBD. The information linking smoking and FBD was peripheral to the main threat 
information and suggested that there was weak evidence to indicate that smoking 
increased the risk of FBD. Self-affirmed participants recalled more of this information, 
even though all but one were non-smokers, for whom this information was not 
relevant, and therefore not potentially threatening. Whereas in Study 1, self-affirmed 
participants appeared to recall information peripheral to the main threat message less 
accurately, in the present study self-affirmed participants recalled more peripheral 
information and did so accurately. Contrary to the findings of Study 1, this suggests 
that, while non-affirmed participants focused more on the risk-disconfirming evidence 
(recalling more of it), possibly with a goal to defend against the message, in contrast, 
self-affirmed participants examined the message more broadly and were able to recall 
more peripheral information. 
Examination of the responses to the motive statements revealed that self-
affirmed participants were less likely to endo!se counter-arguing statements than were 
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those who were non-affirmed. This difference provides further evidence that self-
affirmed participants were less defensive in their response to the article. Reaction time' 
data for responses to the "serious and genuine issue" statements were also consistent 
with self-affirmation promoting an accuracy as opposed to a defensive motive. Self-
affirmed participants, but not those who were non-affirmed, were faster to agree than 
disagree with accuracy ,statements, suggesting that accuracy statements were more 
accessible to self-affirmed participants. There were, however, no differences in the 
accessibility of statements minimising, counter-arguing or denying the persona~ 
relevance of the message. These findings provide evidence that self-affirmation can 
. 
reduce accessibility of cognitions thought to be associated with defensiveness and 
increase the salience of thoughts associated with an accuracy motive, using an implicit 
measure that is less likely to be subject to response biases (Fazio & Olson, 2003). ' 
The data from the questionnaires provided mixed evidence for the effectiveness 
of self-affirmation and its durability. At Time 1, although self-affirmation promoted 
general acceptance of the message, in terms of belief in the link between caffeine and 
FBD, self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in terms of personal 
acceptance, with no differences on, for example, measures of risk, worry, intentions to 
change, or personal relevance. Nor did partiCipants differ in how much they had 
considered the message and their risk during the following week. Furthermore, though 
self-affirmed participants showed an increase in their belief in the link between 
caffeine and FBD at Time 1, by the following week there were no differences between 
the non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants. There was, however,-some evidence to 
suggest self-affirmation did have some long-term effects. At Time 2, non-affirmed 
participants reported reduced perceptions of severity for FBD, while self-affirmed 
participants reported an increase. Reduction in non-affirmed participants' perceptions 
of severity may indicate attempts to minimise the threat, which self-affirmed 
participants did not do. Overall, the findings suggest that, contrary to Study 1 and the 
recall data in the present study, self-affirmation had little durable impact upon 
participants' acceptance of the health message. 
One possible explanation for self-affirmation having less robust (i.e., affecting 
fewer explicit measures of message acceptance) and durable effects on measures of 
message acceptance than in Study 1 is that self-affirmation resources can be depleted. 
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If self-affinnation provides participants with a resource to deal with threat, by boosting 
their sense of self-integrity, this resource could potentially be used up. Steele (1988) 
argues that self-affinnation will only be effective at reducing the impact of a self-threat 
when the values being affirmed are as important as those threatened (p. 291). In other 
words, a self-affirmation has to be as effective at restoring self-integrity as a health 
message is at threatening it. In the present study, the ability of self-affinnation to 
reduce biased processing was tested at different levels of processing. Self-affinnation 
was found to promote greater orientation to the more threateningly ,titled message. By 
reducing defensiveness at this (attentional) level of processing, there may have been 
fewer self-affirmational resources available to reduce defensive at higher levels of 
processing, such as personal acceptance of threat. Further research examining whether 
self-affirmation can be used up in such a manner would provide a valuable avenue of 
research. 
An alternative account for the less consequential effects of self-affirmation on 
the questionnaire measures could be that completing the motives statement task prior 
to the questionnaire influenced respons~s on the dependent measures. Presenting 
participants with defensive statements may have caused theIll. to re-evaluate their 
perceptions of the message and reduced the impact of self-affirmation on message 
acceptance. For example, presenting statements such as "You cannot worry about all 
the things that are meant to be bad for you" or "Drinking caffeine is ok in moderation" 
may have made salient defensive cognitions that could have provided an alternative. 
route to restore self-integrity through defensive processing, and undermined the effects 
of the self-affinnation manipulation. 
Though there were no differences in intentions between conditions, unlike the 
findings of Reed and Aspinwall (1998), self-affirmed participants in the present study 
reported drinking marginally less caffeine after one week. This change in behaviour 
was mediated by an increase in the belief that caffeine was linked to FBD at Time 1. 
. . 
The fact that self-affinnation was able to impact upon participants' caffeine drinking 
suggests that, despite the few changes on questionnaire-based measures, affinning . 
'one's values did provide an effective means of increasing acceptance of a health threat 
and lead to changes in behaviour. In Study 1, though self-affirmed participants 
reported increased intentions to change this was not reflected in actual alcohol 
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drinking behaviour. The fact that the present study was more effective in inducing 
changes in behaviour may result from the nature of the behaviour targeted. Caffeine 
drinking is a behaviour less complex in its aetiology, and possibly easier to change 
than alcohol consumption. Thus this finding does not necessarily indicate that self-
affirmation in the present study had a stronger impact upon participants, but may 
reflect differences in the behavioural responses measured. 
In contrast to the effects of self-affirmation on participants' belief in the link 
between FBD and caffeine, which decreased over time, the data for caffeine 
consumption supports self-affirmation having some durable effects. However, the 
presen~ data do not permit speculation as to whet~er this change in caffeine 
consumption would be maintained, especially in light of reduction in the belief in the 
link between FBD and caffeine over the follOWIng week. Due to the fictitious nature of 
the health information participants had to be debriefed about the health threat and 
further follow-ups were not possible to test for more long-term changes in behaviour. 
Self-esteem as a moderator 
Self-esteem was found to moderate the effects of self-affirmation on 
participants' risk perceptions of FBD and ease of imagining developing breast cancer, 
. such that self-affirmation was most effective at boosting risk perceptions and ease of 
imagination among those with high self-esteem. This finding is consistent with Steele 
, 
et al. (1993) who argue that those with high self-esteem are more adept at self-
affirmation following a threat. Also consistent with Steele, those wi~h high self-esteem 
were found to be more likely to choose the more threateningly titled article, regardless 
of condition. Thus, those with high self-esteem appeared to have more resources to 
orientate towards negative, personally-relevant information. The findings relating to 
, ' 
self-esteem were not however consistent. Contrary to Steele, those with high self-
esteem in the non-affirmed group reported the lowest risk perceptions for personally 
experiencing FBD. Rather than those with high self-esteem having greater resources to 
- ' " •• • < ~ 
accept the health-threat, they appeared to be more defensive in their risk judgments. In 
'. 
addition, self-esteem did not moderate all the effects of condition. For example, self-
. '. '. 
esteem did not moderate orientation to threat, with self-affirmation being effective in 
. . . 
reducing attentional avoidance for both those with high and low self-esteem. 
Furthermore, self-~steem did not moderate the effects of self-affirmation on behaviour, 
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general acceptance of the message, or the majority measures of personal acceptance. 
Study 5 provides a further test of self-esteem as a moderator of the effects of self-
affirmation using, in addition to the Robin et al (2001) measure of self-esteem, the 
more widely used Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale .. 
Mood as a mediator 
The present study provided further evidence that positive and negative mood, 
as rated on explicit measures, do not mediate the effects of self-affirmation. 
Limitations 
A limitation of the present study is the relatively small sample size. In the 
present study, participa~ts we~e naIve to the fact that they were selected on the basis of 
their reports of caffeine consumption. This was done to reduce demand characteristics, 
for instance the participants may have been less likely to respond in ways to please the 
experimenter if they were not aware of the true nature of the study. Though this 
approach to recruiting participants has some benefits it also made recruiting 
participants more challenging, as there were only a limited number of women who 
reported regularly drinking more than 2 caffeinated drinks each day on the self~reports 
collected prior to the experiment. To overcome this problem with recruiting 
participants Study 4 uses a different ~edium, by recruiting par:ticipants via the 
Internet. This allowed a much larger sample to be recruited, as well as having the. 
benefit of targeting a non-student sample~ thus providing a further test of the validity 
of the effects of self-affirmation. 
Summary 
The findings of this study provide evidence that self-affirmation can reduce 
biased processing at an attentionallevel. Consistent with the predictions of Steele 
(1988), self-affirmed participants' greater belief in the health message did not appear 
to be associated with a reduction in depth of processing. Although in comparison to 
Study 1 self-affirmation had a less robust effect on the explicit measures of message 
acceptance, self-affirmed participants did report reducing their caffeine consumption 
after one-week. Both the change in behaviour and the reduction in attentional 
avoidance "of threat suggest that self-affirmation may have potential as an applied 
technique. 
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CHAPTER 5: DEPTH OF PROCESSNG AND SENSITIVITY TO MESSAGE 
'STRENGH 
In Study 1 self-affirmation promoted acceptance of the personal implications of 
a health message and increased participants' intentions to change. Study 3 provided 
evidence that self-affirmation could increase orientation to a negative and self-relevant 
health message. Self-affirmed participants in Study 3 also reported a greater belief in 
the health message, which did not appear to be a result of less in-depth processing. The 
present study provides a further test of the effects of self-affirmation on depth of 
processing, examining participants' sensitivity to arguments presented in a message as 
an index of depth of processing. 
In Study 3 the balance of evidence suggested that self-affirmation did not 
reduce participants' depth of processing. For instance, self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants spent equally as l,ong reading the article, recalled the same;: amount of 
information after one week, and did not differ in their self-reports of depth of 
processing. Indeed, self-affirmed participants were slightly more accurate in their 
recall of words in the article than those who were non-affirmed. Examination of the 
latencies of participants' responses, however, revealed that self-affirmed participants 
were slower to decide whether a word appeared in the text for all but threatening 
words in the message. This fin~ng could reflect the fact that self-affirmed participants 
processed the message in greater depth, with more information interfering with 
retrieval of words, or that they processed the message in less depth, and took longer to 
decide because they had paid less attention to the message. Alternatively, the 
difference may reflect the fact that self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants differed 
in the effort they applied to the task. For instance, self-affirmed participants may have 
taken more care in their judgements. The reason for the difference in time taken to 
recall is unclear, and may reflect differences in depth of processing. 
Previous research including measures indicative of depth of processing have 
suggested that self-affirmation does not necessarily lead to systematic processing of 
threatening messages. Reed and Aspinwall (1998) found that self-affirmed participants 
were faster to orientate to threat, but also spent less time than non-affirmed participants 
reading threatening information. In Reed and Aspinwall's study, self-affirmed 
participants also reported risk-confirming evidence to be more convincing than non-
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affirmed participants, but did not recall it better a week later. In fact self-affirmed 
participants remembered less of the risk-disconfirming evidence than did controls. 
This finding was replicated in Study 3 and could either reflect a reduction in biased . 
processing of the risk-disconfirming evidence, or the fact that self-affirmed 
participants paid less attention to the message. 
Further evidence that self-affirmation may reduce systematic processing of 
health threats comes from Sherman et al. (2000). In Study 2, in which participants 
watched a video about the risks of mv, non-affirmed participants who recognised 
their potential risk of mv in terms of similarity to people with AIDS, reported greater 
risk perceptions. This was not the case for self-affirmed participants. This might 
suggest that self-affirmed participants .did not base their risk perceptions on 
information presented to them, and engaged in less thoughtful consideration when 
evaluating their risk. Non-affirmed participants in Sherman et al.'s study also reported 
a stronger association between their risk perceptions and intentions to use condoms 
(cited in Klein, 2004). Furthermore, Klein et al. (2001) found that, whereas non-
affirmed and non-threatened participants' risk perceptions for heart disease were based 
on their risk factor standing, risk perceptions of those who were both self-affirmed and 
threatened were associated with their level of self-esteem. These findings suggest that 
self-affirmed participants were not necessarily processing risk information in a 
systematic manner or reaching conclusions based on elaborate processing of the 
information. Instead self-affirmation may lead to more deductive (i.e., top-down) 
processing of health threats. 
As an additional test of whether self-affirmation promotes objectivity and 
unbiased systematic processing, or mindless acceptance of a health message, the 
current study therefore presented non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants with 
either a weak or strong version of a threatening health message, as a test of depth of 
processing. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, dual process models of attitude change (e.g., the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model [ELM], Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Heuristic-Systematic 
Model [HSM], Chaiken, 1980) suggest that people process information using two 
concurrent modes: an effortful, analytical, systematic approach and a less effortful, 
heuristic, rule-based approach. The HSM, as the name suggests, refers to these modes 
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as systematic and heuristic processing, while the ELM identifies these as central or 
peripheral routes to persuasion. These models predict that people are better able to 
distinguish between strong and weak messages when engaging in systematic 
processing, with more in-depth processing increasing the persuasiveness of strong 
messages and reducing the persuasiveness of weak ones (Chaiken, 1980). 
According to the HSM the depth of processing people will apply to a message 
and the outcome for persuasion depends on both capacity, and level and type of 
motivation. Capacity refers a person's ability to process a message. Chaiken et al. 
(1996) describe capacity as knowing" e1'lough about the issue to be able to process 
arguments about it, anq [having] enough time to be able to concentrate on the 
message" (p. 556). When processing capacity is low, systematic processing is less 
likely to occur. Greater levels of motivation, for example a strong goal to process a 
message accurately, may also lead participants to process a message more 
systematically (Chaiken et al., 1996). The level motivation to process a message can 
be influenced by factors such as personal relevance or involvement with the message, 
. with evidence suggesting people process personally-relevant information more 
systematically and extensively (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For instance, 
the strength of arguments presented is more influential for high involvement 
participants. Conversely, heuristic cues, such as expertise of the source, have been 
found to have a greater impact on attitudes when involvement with the message is low 
rather than high (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) . 
. Type of motivation also influences level of processing and outcomes for 
persuasive communications. Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla and Chen (1996) propose that 
people can process information with an accuracy, defensive or impression motive. 
Information that is both self-relevant and negative tends to be processed defensively. 
Though defensive processing can occur at both levels of processing, people tend to 
systematically process negative, self-relevant information, scrutinising it for potential 
flaws and generating counter-arguments (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Ditto & Lopez, 
1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996) . 
. According to Chaiken et al. (1996) relevance may increase the motivation to be 
accurate, and prompt unbiased systematic processing for non-threatening messages. 
However, if a message is both relevant and threatening people may engage in biased 
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systematic processing. Liberman et al. (1992) tested this giving high vs. low caffeine . 
drinkers either a low or high threat message about the risk of FBD and breast cancer 
associated with drinking caffeine. High relevance participants were found to expend 
, 
more effort reading the information, suggesting they were engaging in more elaborate 
processing. They also reported a reduced belief in the link between caffeine and FBD, 
evidence of more biased processing. 
The stage model of processing of fear appeals (Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003) 
also suggests that participants' appraisal of the threat (how serious the threat is; how 
vulnerable they are) determines both the depth of processing and the processing goal. 
If a message is perceived as severe and relevant, this should arouse a defence 
motivation and in-depth processing, leading to biased systematic processing. This 
model suggests that, when a threatening health message is relevant, people engage in 
systematic processing in an attempt to counter-argue the message and minimise the , 
impact of the threat. 
These models of information processing suggest that at low levels of 
involvement, where participants will be less motivated to process the message in 
depth, self-affirmation should have little effect on message acceptance. Non-affirmed 
participants, for whom a message is relevant and threatening, should engage in 
systematic processing of the message. This processing, however, should be biased, 
with participants attempting to process the message to maintain their prior beliefs, or 
. according to Steele (1988) their self-integrity. These non-affirmed participants 
distinguish weak and strong messages, such that a strong health message will be harder 
to counter-argue than a weaker message. If self-affirmation promotes acceptance of the 
message through the central route to persuasion and in-depth processing, then self-
affirmed participants for whom the message is relevant, should also distinguish weak 
and strong messages. If self-affirmation also promotes less biased processing, self-
affirmed participants should 3:1so show an increase in message acceptance, in 
comparison to controls. Alternatively, if self-affirmation promotes mindless 
acceptance of the message, self-affirmed participants m~y not distinguish between 
weak and strong arguments, and accept a message regardless of the strength of 
arguments .. 
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One plausible explanation for self-affirmation leading to mindless acceptance 
of a message is that it acts to increase positive mood. Those in positive moods have 
been found to be equally persuaded by strong and weak messages (Worth & Mackie, 
1987). Furthermore, compared to those in neutral moods, heuristic cues, such as 
message length, have a greater impact on persuasion in those in pleasant moods. These 
effects do not appear to be due to differences in motivation, but rather to differences in 
capacity (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989). Self-
affirmation manipulations, such as receiving positive feedback, are likely to be i 
associated with positive affective states (Forgas, 1998). Although mood provides a 
plausible mechanism for the effects of self-affirmation it should be noted that studies, 
including those in the present thesis, have repeatedly failed to find changes in mood 
associated with self-affirmation (Cohen et aI., 2000, Fein and Spencer, 1997; Klein et 
aI, 2001; Sherman et aI., 2000). The current study set out to measure negative and 
positive mood both prior to self-affirmation and after receiving the threatening health 
message to rule out mood as a possible mediator. 
In addition to testing the effects of self-affirmation on processing of weak and 
strong messages, the present study also sought to extend the findings of Study 1 by 
presenting the same alcohol and breast cancer message to an older, non-student 
sample. To target older women, an Internet-based version of Study 1 was developed. 
The Internet is becoming an increasing important source of health information. For 
example, Nicholas, Gunter, Russell, and Withey (2003) estimated that more than 40% 
of Internet users have sought health-related information on the Internet, while in a 
survey of over 1100 UK Internet users, 90% reported having visited a web site for 
health information and medical treatment advice in the past 12 months (Brown & 
Williams, 2003). Using an Internet-based study not only allowed the recruitment of a 
non-student sample, but presented the health information in a medium many 
participants will be increasingly familiar with. 
Self-affirmed and non-affirmed women were recruited to read either a weak or, 
strong version of an article depicting the links between alcohol and breast cancer. 
, . 
Participants reported how persuaded they were by the message, how strong the 
evidence was, and their intentions and expectations that they would change their 
drinking behaviour. Following Klein et a1. (2001), a measure of self-esteem was also 
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included to test whether self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants differed in what 
predicted their self-judgements. 
Material development 
. Two versions of the alcohol and breast cancer article differing in strength were piloted. 
Both versions of the article were entitled "Alcohol and Breast Cancer", and were 
approximately 550 words in length. The strong argument version was based on the 
breast cancer and alcohol leaflet previously used in Study 1. As the original message 
was very persuasive, with participants in Study 1 rating the article as convincing and 
providing strong evidence, and for ethical reasons it was decided that the research from 
Cancer Research UK should not be altered to appear any stronger. However, the 
stronger version in the present study did contain further research from Prince Henry's 
Institute of Medical Research that did not appear in either Study 1 or the weaker 
version in the current study. This research was used to explain why the association 
between drinking alcohol and increases in oestrogen are significant, highlighting how 
oestrogen can playa role in both triggering the development of cancer and 
encouraging the growth of tumours (Appendix G) .. 
In the weaker version of the article, the quality of the arguments was reduced, 
with the changes made presented in Appendix G and F. The changes generally fell 
under the following headings: use of less conclusive language, providing contradictory 
evidence, down playing the size of the research, and changing the source. One example 
of how the decisiveness of the arguments was altered is as follows: while the stronger 
message stated ''This research tells us that there is a definite link between alcohol and 
breast cancer", the weaker version informed participants: "Our research suggests that 
there may be a connection between alcohol and breast cancer" (text that was altered is 
highlighted in it~lics). An example of where the message was altered to contain 
contradictory evidence is presented in an extract taken from the weaker message: "Past 
re~ear~h has been inconclusive about the role of alcohol in the development of breast 
cancer, with one recent large-scale international study, funded by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), suggesting ~lcohol consumption has no link to breast cancer", 
The strong version of the message highlighted the scale of the research, "The sheer 
size of the new study, including data from around 150,000 Women around the globe, 
allows the researchers to make the most accurate estimates ever of the risks associated 
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with drinking", while the weaker version did not specify the size of the study: ''The 
Clean Living researchers claim that their new study allows them to estimate the risks 
associated with drinking more precisely". 
The source of the article was also altered because the Cancer Research UK 
source was highly credible, and without making the research extremely weak and 
unbelievable it was difficult to get participants in the pilot study to rate the information 
as weak. The fictitious source chosen was designed to appear both credible and expert. 
and this was confirmed in participants' ratings of the source as both reliable and 
credible. Thus, if participants did process the message heuristically they were unlikely 
to rate the article as unconvincing based on the source. 
, Several versions of the articles were designed and tested; only data from the 
final versions are presented here. In total, 50 participants rated the final versions of the 
articles. The majority of the participants were female (n = 36), and participants ranged 
in age from 17 to 46 years old (M = 19.8). Participants were asked to read the article 
and complete a brief questionnaire. All the responses were given on a 9-point scale 
(anchored at 0 and 8). 
Participants rated the content of the article on the following items: "Overall, 
how believable did you find the content of the article?" (unbelievable I believable). and 
"How convincing did you find the content of the article?" (unconvincing I convincing). 
Participants were asked about their beliefs: "I believe that drinking alcohol increases a 
woman's chance of developing breast cancer" (strongly agree I strongly disagree). 
Two items measured how persuasive they found the article: "In your view, how 
persuasive are the arguments that there is a link between alcohol consumption and 
breast cancer?" and "How persuasive do you think the article will be in getting women 
to reduce their alcohol consumptionT (not at all persuasive Ivery persuasive). 
Perceptions of evidence strength were measured using the items: "The evidence 
linking alcohol cons.~mption and breast cancer is ... " (very weak I very strong, not at 
all conclusive Ivery conclusive, not at all reliable Ivery reliable). Source credibility 
was also measured: ''The source of the research (i.e., Clean Living research team or 
Cancer Research UK) is ... " not at all reliable Ivery reliable, not at all credible Ivery . 
credible. After completing the questionnaire, all participants were given a debrief sheet 
detailing where the information was taken from and, in the case of the weaker article. 
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explaining where changes had been made to the article and what the real evidence 
suggests (Appendix I) . 
. The results of participants' ratings of the two articles are presented in Table 
5.1. Both the strong and weak versions of the article were rated as convincing and 
believable, and those in both conditions believed that alcohol could increase the risk of 
breast cancer. The evidence presented in the stronger version was rated as being 
stronger, more conclusive, and more reliable. The source of the stronger version was 
also rated as more reliable, and more credible. The stronger version was also rated as 
. . 
more persuasive in general, and the effect for the ratings of how persuasi ve the article 
was to get women to reduce their alcohol consumption approached significance, 
F(1,49) = 3.14, p = .083.' -. . 
Table 5.1. Results of Pilot Test Examining Perceptions of Weak and Strong Arguments. 
Strength of article 
Weak Strong F 
(N=30) (N= 20) (1,49) 
. Article believable 5.16 (1.57) 5.26 (1.53) 0.05 
Article convincing 5.06 (1.01) 5.32 (1.34) 0.33 
Belief in link 4.71 (1.64) 5.16 (1.57) 0.91 
Evidence: Strength 3.59 (1.76) 4.85 (1.96) 5.50* 
Conclusi veness 2.82 (1.87) 4.00 (2.04) 4.39* 
Reliability 3.32 (2.19) 4.93 (1.82) 20.33*** 
Source: Reliability 4.37 (1.76) 6.36 (1.91) 11.13** 
Credibility 4.41 (1.67) . 6.36 (1.69) 12.46** 
Persuasive arguments 3.75 (1.93) 4.79 (l.48) 5.00* 
Persuasive arguments to others 2.00 (1.57) 2.79 (1.59) 3.14 
Note. **'" p < .001, '" P < .05. 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 795 women accessed the website. Of these 67 did not complete the 
preliminary measures and were excluded from the analysis, leaving a total of 728 
participants. Of these, 718 of the participants completed the study. Participants were 
recruited either through listservers of university staff and postgraduates, or through 
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links on the university website. Participants from the UK were most prevalent (96.2%, 
n = 700), with the rest of the participants coming from 16 other countries, including 
China (n = 8), Ireland (n = 3) and Taiwan (n = 2). The majority of the participants 
were aged between 26 and 55 years of age (57.2%, n = 416), with 39.2% falling 
between 17 and 25 years of age (n = 285), and 3.6% between the years of 56 and 69 (n 
= 26). Around half ofthe participants were in full-time employment (50.1 %, n = 370), 
12.5% were employed part-time (n = 91),35.6% were in full-time study (n = 259), 1 % 
(n = 7) were currently unemployed, and one participant was retired (0.1 %). 
Procedure and materials 
, On accessing the website participants were provided with inforynation about 
what was described as a "personality and health information experiment". Participants 
were informed that the experiment would involve completing measures of "health 
behaviour and views on personal strengths". Participants were told that they would 
also be asked to read a short, hea1th~related article and describe their reactions to it. 
Participants were reminded that their responses were confidential and that they could 
withdraw from the study at any point. After providing consent to participate in the 
. study participants completed the following items: gender (male / female), age, the 
country they lived in, and occupational status (employedfull-time/ employed part-time! 
, ' 
retired! unemployed! full-time study). Participants were then asked to answer a set of 
lifestyle questions. Participants were asked how often they exercised, smoked 
cigarettes or cigars, and ate high fat foods; these acted as filler items. The final two 
questions in this section assessed participants' alcohol consumption. Participants were 
firstly asked how much alcohol they had consumed in the past 7 days. Responses were 
given in terms of pints ofbeerliager/cider, shorts, glasses o/wine, and bottles (with 
illustrative examples of brands of alcoholic drinks). Participants then indicated 
whether or not this was typical of the amount they would drink in a normal week. 
Those who responded negatively were asked to record their typical consumption. The 
reports of alcohol consumption were later translated by the experimenter into units of 
. alcohol. Participants' estimates for the previous week ranged from 0 units to 41.5 
units, and 0 units to 60 units for a typical week. Participants' reports of alcohol 
consumption for the previous week and typical week were highly correlated and 
combined into a single item for analysis, r(728) = .84,p < .001. Participants were 
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randomly assigned to both affinnation condition and strength of article presented by 
the Internet programme. 
Participants' attitudes towards exercise and alcohol and current mood were also 
measured. However, due to a technical problem, data from these items were not 
recorded, so no analysis was carried out involving these measures. 
After completing the preliminary measures, participants were assigned 
randomly to either the self-affinnation task (participant's personal strengths) or non-
affinnation task (David Beckham's personal strengths). These are described in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
, The computer then presented the health infonnation section. Participants were 
asked to read an article related to a health topic. T~ey were infonned that some --
participants would be asked to comment on how easy the article was to understand, but 
the experimenter was interested in their reactions to the infonnation and how it made 
them feel. Participants were then presented with either the weak or strong message. 
After reading the article, participants were presented with questions about their 
. . 
response to the article. They were asked to answer the questions as honestly and 
accurately as possible, without spending too much time on anyone question. All 
responses were given on a 7-point scale unless otherwise stated (anchored at 0 and 6). 
Participants first reported whether the message was novel: "Had you heard about the 
link between alcohol and breast cancer before reading this article?" (Yes I No I 
Uncertain). Participants then completed three measures of p~rsuasion: general 
persuasion, "In your view, how persuasive are the arguments that there is a link 
between alcohol and breast cancer?" (Not at all persuasive I very persuasive), 
persuasion for women, "How persuasive do you think the article will be in getting 
women to reduce their alcohol consumption?" (Not at all persuasive Ivery 
persuasive), persuasion/or self, "How persuasive do you think the article will be in 
getting you personally to reduce your alcohol consumption?" (Not at all persuasive I 
very persuasive). Participants reported their beliefs associa~ed with the message, "I 
believe that drinking alcohol increases a woman's chances of developing breast 
cancer" (strongly disagree! strongly agree), and ratings of evidence strength, ''The 
evidence linking alcohol and breast cancer is ... " (very weak I ve ry strong ). Next 
followed two risk ite~s: "How likely do you think YOU will be to experience breast 
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cancer as a result your current alcohol consumption at some stage in the future?", 
"How likely do you think the average person of your age and sex will be to experience 
breast cancer as a result their current alcohol consumption at some stage in the future?" 
(II-point scale, impossible [0] I extremely likely [10]). Then followed measures of 
. worry about alcohol consumption, "I feel my level of alcohol consumption is 
something I. ... " don't need to worry about I do need to worry about, and "The article 
made me feel worried about my alcohol consumption, (strongly disagree I strongly 
agree). The worry items were significantly correlated, r(662) = .63, p < .001, and 
combined into a single item. 
./ 
.. The final section included the following measures: intentions to reduce alcohol 
intake ("I intend to cut down on the amount of alcohol I drink in the next 7 days", 
definitely do not intend to I definitely intend to), expectations to reduce drinking ("I 
expect to cut down on the amount of alcohol I drink in the next 7 days", definitely do 
not expect to I definitely expect to), current mood ("What is your current mood" 
. . 
negative Ipositive), and self-esteem ("I have high self-esteem", 5-point scale, not very 
true of me Ivery true of me). 
After completing the dependent measures participants were fully debriefed 
about the nature of the study, and provided with the complete information about the 
health information, including links to the original article and telephone numbers of 
helplines for those wanti.ng more information about alcohol misuse and breast cancer 
(Appepdix I). 
Results 
. Randomisation check / 
A two-way ANDV A with condition (self-affirmation or non-affirmation) and 
article strength (weak or strong) as between-participant variables revealed that level of 
alcohol consumption did not differ with respect to either condition, F(I,727) < I, or 
strength of message, F(1,727) = 1.73,p = .19 (Table 5.2), neither was the Condition X 
. Strength interaction significant, F(I,727) < 1. In t~tal, 73.7% of the participants 
reported that they had never heard of the link between alcohol and breast cancer 
before. One-way ANOVAs revealed that the distribution of those who had heard of the 
link did not differ with respect to condition, F(1,710) < I, strength of message, . 
F(I,710) < I, or alcohol consumption, F(1,710) = 1.53, P = .22. 
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Table 5.2. Alcohol Consumption by Affirmation and Strength Condition. 
NA . SA Weak . Strong 
Alcohol consumption . 7.93 (7.35) 8.18 (7.92), 8.41 (7.99) 7.68 (7.25) 
Note. NA = non-affirmed; SA = self-affirmed (Applies throughout this chapter). 
. The present study was primarily intended to examine whether self-affirmation 
promoted sensitivity to strength of argument, and predicted that this relationship would 
be moderated by level of risk (alcohol consumption). For those who drank the highest' 
levels of alcohol, the health message should provide a stronger threat to self-integrity. 
The analysis of the outcome measures involved the following between-participant 
independent variables: condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed), strength of message 
(weak or strong), level of alcohol consumption. Self-affirmation condition and article 
. , 
strength were dummy coded 0 and 1. Data were analysed using three-step hierarchical 
. . 
regressions. At the first step, main effects of condition, strength and risk were entered. 
At Step 2, interactions of pairs of variables were entered, ~md at Step three the final 
three-way interaction of Condition X Strength X Risk. For ease of interpretation, meall 
responses on the key dependent measures as a function of condition and article 
strength are reported. 
Measures of general message acceptance 
participants' responses to the measures of general message acceptance (e.g., 
ratings of article persuasiveness, evidence strength and belief) are in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Mean Responses on Measures of General Message Acceptance as a 
Function of Condition and Article Strength. 
'SA NA 
'Weak Strong Weak Strong 
(n = 209) , (n = 214) (n = 170) , (n = 208) 
Persuasion 
General 2.43 (1.33) . 3.11 (1.42) 2.31 (1.41) 3.28 (1.42) 
Women 1.59 (1.18) 1.93 (1.36) 1.73 (1.41) 1.90 (1.20) 
Self 1.63 (1.64) 1.88 (1.63) 1.64 (1.75) 2.13 (1.67) 
Belief . 2.79 (1.29) 3.37 (1.27) 2.91 (1.37) 3.53 (1.32) 
Evidence strength 2.44 (1.40) 3.15 (1.37) 2.30 (1.51) . 3.46 (1.33) 
Note. Higher values indicate the article was rated as more persuasive, to contain 
stronger evidence and a greater belief in the link between alcohol and breast cancer. 
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Persuasion ratings. Participants made three ratings of persuasion. These items 
were not highly correlated (rs ranging between .40 and .49), and as participants who 
did not drink any alcohol at all did not respond to the item measuring the impact of the 
article on them personally cutting down their alcohol consumption, the three items 
were analysed separately to reduce loss of power from those who we're low at risk. 
Analysis of the general persuasion item revealed no significant effects 
associated with either condition or risk (Table 5.4). Only the strength of the message 
affected how persuasive the arguments were perceived to be, J3 = .28, p .::: .001. Both 
non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants reported that the weak message was 
generally less persuasive than the strong message. 
Table 5.4. Moderated Regression Analysis for Measures of General Persuasiveness. 
Variable Step Variable B SE J3 P R2 F 
entered 
General 1.. Condition(C) -.00 .10 -.01 .89 
persuasion Risk (R) 
-.00 . 01 -.03 . .35 
Strength (S) .81 ,-.. 10 .28 <.001 .08 20.84*** 
2. CxR .02 .01 .04 .25 
CxS -.26 .21 . -.05 .21 
RxS -.01 .01 -.03 .44 .09 11.03*** 
3. CxRxS .00 .03 .01 .73 .09 9.46*** 
Note. *** p < .001. 
Participants' reports on the item concerning how persuasive the message would 
be to reduce women in general's alcohol consumption suggested participants in all 
conditions found both versions of the article to be only slightly persuasive (Table 5.5). 
Hierarchical regression revealed a main effect of strength, J3 = .10, p = .009. There was 
also an interaction of Condition X Risk, J3 = .07, p = .05. Simple slopes analysis 
revealed that when drinking was moderate self-affirmation had no effect on 
persuasion, J3 = -.03, p = .44. However, at high, J3 = -.09, p = .067, and low levels of 
consumption, J3 = -.11, P = .055, self-affirmation had a marginally non-significant 
effect, acting to reduce persuasion regardless of the strength of the message. 
The final measure of persuasion, examining impact on personal alcohol 
consumption, revealed a main effect of risk, J3 = -.09,p = .022, strength, J3 = .11,p = 
.004, and a Risk X Strength interaction, J3 = -.08, P = .035. While participants at all 
levels of alcohol consumption were more persuaded by the strong rather than weak 
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message, this effect was most pron~unced in those who drank low and high levels of 
alcohol (low: ~ = .20,p = .001; moderate: 13 = .11,p = .003; high: 13 = .18,p = .001). 
The analysis yielded no significant effects involving condition. 
Table 5.5. Moderated Regression Analysis for Measures of Persuasiveness. 
Variable Step Variable B SE 13 P R2 '. F 
, entered 
Persuasion 1. Condition(C) -.06 .10 -.03 .50 
Women Risk (R) -.01 .01 -.06 .10 
Strength (S) .25 .10 .10 .009 .02 3.67* 
2. CxR .02 .01 .07 '.05 
CxS .22 .19 .04 .27 
RxS .00 .01 -.03 .48 .02 2.65* 
3. CxRxS .02 .03 .03 .51 .02 2.33* 
Self 1. C -.11 .13 -.03 .36 
R -.02 .01 -.09 .022 
'S 
.38 .13 .11 .004 .. 02 4.40** 
2. CxR .02 .02 .03 .50 
CxS -.21 .26 -.03 .50 
RxS -.04 .02 -.08 .035 .03 ·2.97** 
3. CxRxS .05 .04 .06 .14 .03 2.87** 
Note. ** p < .01, * P < .05. 
Belief. Participants' ratings of belief revealed no significant effects involving 
condition (Table 5.6). Only a main effect of strength reached significance, ~ = .22, p < 
.001. Participants reported that they believed in the link between alcohol and breast 
cancer after reading the stronger message, but not after reading the weaker message. 
Evidence. A main effect of strength, ~ = .31, P < .001, indicated that 
participants rated the evidence in the stronger message as strong, and that in the 
. weaker message as weak (Table 5.6). Analysis also revealed a significant Condition X 
Strength interaction, J3 = -.07, p = .049. Regardless of level of risk, and contrary to 
predictions, non-affirmed participants rated the weaker message as weaker and the 
stronger message as stronger, compared to those who were self-affirmed (Figure 5.1). 
No other effects approached significance. 
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Table 5.6. Moderated Regression Analysis for Measures of Belief and Evidence 
Strength. 
Variable Step Variable B SE f3 P R2 F 
entered 
Belief 1. Condition(C) -.14 .10 -.05 .17 
Risk (R) e -.01 .01 -.06 .13 
Strength (S) .59 .10 .22 <.001 .06 14.28··* 
2. CxR .02 .. 01 .03 .36 
CxS -.02 .20 -.00 .94 
RxS .03 .01 .00 .98 .06 7.26··* 
3. CxRxS -.00 .03 -.00 .97 .06 6.21*** 
Evidence 1. C -.08 .11 -.03 .46 
Strength 2. R -.01 .01 -.03 .40 
S .92 .11 .31 <.001 .10 25.98*** 
CxR .02 .01 .06 .12 
3. CxS -.42 .21 ·-.07 .049 
RxS -.18 .01 -.05 .20 .11 14.45"* 
CxRxS .02 .03 .03 .. 49 .11 12.44*** 
Note. *** p < .OOL 
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Figure 5. 1. Mean ratings of evidence strength as a function of self-affinnation 
, 
condition and article strength. ' 
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Measures of personal acceptance 
Participants' responses to the measures of personal message acceptance (e.g., 
risk perceptions, worry, intentions and expectations) are in Table 5.7. Participants' 
intentions to cut down their alcohol consumption and expectations that they would 
were highly correlated, (r(650) = .90, P < .001), and combined into a single item . 
. Table 5.7. Mean Responses on the Measures of Personal Message Acceptance as a 
Function of Condition and Article Strength. 
Self risk 
Other risk 
Worry 
Intentions and 
expectations 
Weak 
(n = 209) 
2.62 (2.00) 
3.15 (2.10) 
1.58 (1.60) 
1.78 (1.77) 
SA 
Strong 
(n =214) 
2.68 (1.99) 
3.58 (2.06) 
1.78 (1.64) 
1.72 (1.73) 
Weak 
(n = 170) 
2.55 (2.16) 
3.05 (2.13) 
1.78 (1.77) 
1.52 (1.82) 
NA 
Strong 
(n =208) 
3.05 (2.08) 
3.90 (2.21) 
1.77 (1.69) 
1.78 (1.70) 
Note. Higher values indicate greater risk perceptions, worry, and intentions. 
Risk perceptions. Analysis of perception of self risk revealed main effects of 
both level of risk, ~ = .41, p < .001, and strength, ~ = .09,p = .013 (Table 5.8). 
~ Participants who either drank more alcohol or read the stronger message saw 
themselves as at greater risk. There was also a significant interaction of Condition X 
Strength, ~ = -.07, P = .037. Test of simple effects revealed that non-affirmed 
participants' risk perceptions were sensitive to strength of the message, F(I, 335) = 
4.44, p = .036; with a stronger message eliciting higher risk perceptions. Self-affirmed 
participants did not show this same sensitivity to strength, F(I, 335) < 1 (Figure.5.2). 
Table 5.8. Moderated Regression Analysis for Measure of Self-Risk. 
Variable Step Variable B SE ~ P R2 F 
entered 
Self risk 1. Condition(C) -.15 .14 -.04 .. 28 
Risk (R) .11 .01 .41 <.001 
Strength (S) .34 .14 .09 .013 .16 46.71*** 
2. CxR -.03 .02 -.06 .10 
CxS -.59 .29 :".07 .037 
RxS .02 .02 .04 .28 .17 24.76*** 
3. CxRxS -.03 .04 -.02 .48 .17 21.28*** 
Note. * .. P < .001 
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Figure 5.2. Participants' risk perceptions for self as a function of self-affirmation 
condition and article strength.' 
Risk perception for the average other only revealed significant main effects of 
level of risk, J3 = .16,p < .001, and strength, J3 =.15,p < .001 (Table 5.9). Participants 
who drank higher levels of alcohol or had read the stronger version of the message saw 
the average other to be at higher risk of breast cancer as a result of alcohol. No effects 
. " 
involving condition approached significance. 
, To test for any effects of self-affirmation on optimism, participants' self-risk 
, .' 
judgements were subtracted from risk judgements for the average other, to compute a 
difference score with more positive scores denoting greater optimistic bias. The data 
are in Table 5.9. No effects involving condition approached significance. 
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Table 5.9. Moderated Regression Analysis for Measures of Risk and Optimism. 
Variable· Step Variable B SE (3 p R2 F 
entered 
Other risk 1. Condition(C) -.12 .16 -.03 .43 
Risk (R) .05 .01 .16 <.001 
Strength (S) .66 .16 .15 . <.001 .05 11.88*** 
2. CxR -.02 .02 -.03 .43 
CxS -.47 .32 -.05 .14 
RxS -.01 .02 -.01 .74 .05 6.41*** 
3. CxRxS .02 .04 .01 .71 .05 5.51*** 
Optimism 1. C .04 .13 .01 .77 
R -.06 .01 -.28 <.001 
S .32 .13 .09 .014 .08 21.05*** 
2. CxR .01 ,.02 .03 .44 
·CxS .15 .27 .02 .57 
RxS -.03 .02 -.06 .09 11.04*** 
3. CxRxS . .04 .04 .05 .09 9.69*** 
Note.,*** p < .001 
'., ~ 
Worry. Results of the analysis for the combined measures of worry are in Table 
5.10. Analysis revealed a main effect of risk, (3 = .46, P < .001, and interaction of Risk 
X Strength, (3 = .09, p = .014. Those who drank more alcohol reported being more . 
worried. Simple slopes analysis revealed that strength of message had no significant 
effects at any level of risk. 
There was also a significant interaction of Condition X Risk, (3 = -.08, p = .029. 
Simple slopes analysis revealed self-affirmation did not have a significant effect at any 
of the individual levels of risk. However, the trends suggested that for moderate 
drinkers self-affirmation slightly reduced the worry, p =-.03, p = .36, while for low, p 
= .05, p = 040, ~nd high drinkers, (3 = .03, p = .54, self-affirmation was associated with 
higher levels of worry. 
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Table 5.10. Moderated Regression Analysis/or Measure o/Worry 
Variable Step Variable B SE (3 p R2 F 
entered 
Worry 1. Condition(C) -.12 .12 -.04 .31 
Risk (R) .10 .01 .46 <.001 
Strength (S) I .14 .12 .04 .24 .22 59.90*** 
2. CxR .01 .02 -.08 .029 
CxS .04 .23 .00 .97 
RxS -.03 .02 .09 .014 .23 31.95*** 
3. CxRxS -.00 .03 -.00 .97 .23 27.35*** 
Note. *** p < .001 
Intentions and expectation to change. Analysis of participants' intentions and 
expectations to change revealed a three-way interaction of Condition X Risk X 
Strength, ~ = .10, p = .014 (Table 5.11). Simple slopes analyses were conducted 
separately for the non-affirmed and self-affirmed conditions (Figure 5.3 and 5.4). In 
the non-affirmed condition, reading the stronger message was associated with greater 
intentions to change at low, (3 = .19,p = .050, and high levels of consumption, (3 = .17, 
p = .043, and was marginally significant at moderate levels of consumption, (3 = .10, 
p = .076. However, in the self-affirmation condition, strength of the message did not 
predict intentions at moderate levels of consumption, (3 ~ -.04, p = .52. At high levels 
of alcohol consumption, (3 = -.15, P = .051, the stronger message was associated with 
. marginally lower intentions and expectations to change, whereas at low levels of 
consumption, (3 = -.18, P = .036, the stronger message was associated with 
• 
significantly lower intentions and expectations to change. 
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Figure 5.3. Interaction of level of risk and strength of article for reports of intentions 
and expectation to change among non-affirmed participants: Simple slopes for article 
strength at three levels of risk. 
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Figure 5.4. Interaction of level of risk and strength of article for reports of intentions 
and expectation to change among self-affirmed participants: Simple slopes for article 
strength at three levels of risk. 
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Table 5.11. Moderated Regression Analysis fo~ Measures of Intentions and 
-' 
Expectations. 
Variable Step Variable B SE (3 p R2 F 
entered 
Intentions I 1. Condition(C) .10 .14 .03 .47 
expectation . Risk (R) .04 .01 .19 <.001 
Strength (S) .11 .14 .. 03 .43 .04 8.42*** 
2. CxR -.04 .02 -.08 .04 
CxS -.41 .27 -.06 .14 
RxS .02 .02 .04 .28 .05 5.39*** 
3. CxRxS .09 .04 .10 .014 .06 5.51 *** 
Note. ***p < .001 
Mood 
Hierarchical regression indicated that condition, level of risk, and strength, i 
neither alone nor in combination predicted participants' mood after reading the health 
message (Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12. Moderated Regression Analysis for Reports of Explicit Mood 
Variable Step Variable .B SE (3 p R2 F 
entered 
Mood 'I. Condition(C) -.02 ' .12 -.01 .89 
Risk (R) , -.01 . 01 -.07 . '.09 
Strength (S) -.12 .12 -.04 .30 .00 1.06 
2. CxR .01 .02 .03 .51 
CxS -.20 .23 -.03 .39 
RxS -.02 .. 02 -.04· .31 ,,01 0.82 
3. CxRxS .05 .03 .06 .12 .01 1.06 
Self-esteem as a predictor· 
To test whether self-esteem acted as a significant predictor of risk perception in 
either the non-affirmed or self-affirmed conditions separate regression analyses were 
conducted. Data were analysed using three-step hierarchical regressions. At Step 1, 
main effects of strength, risk and self-esteem were entered. At Step 2, interactions of 
pairs of variables were entered, and at Step three the three-way interaction of Strength 
X Risk X Self-esteem. The variables were mean centred to aid interpretations. In the 
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non-affirmed condition, no effects involving self-esteem approached significance 
(main effect: p = -.04, p' = .45). However, in the self-affirmed condition self-esteem 
did predict risk perceptions, p = -.09, P = .049. There were no other significant 
interactions involving self-esteem. Following Edwards (1984), the Betas in the non-
affirmed and self-affirmed condition for self-esteem (e.g., non-affirmed, p =.-.04; self-. 
affirmed, p =-.09) and risk standing (e.g., non-affirmed, p.=: .43, p < .001; self-
affirmed, p = .38,p < .001) were compared. Past drinking behaviour was found to be a 
stronger predictor of risk perceptions in the non-affirmed condition, t(713) = 2.05, p < 
.05, and self-esteem a stronger predictor in the self-affirmed condition, t(713) = -5.33, 
, 
p < .001. Self-affirmed participants with higher levels of self-esteem reported lower 
risk perceptions, regardless of their risk standing. This finding suggests that in 
comparison to non-affirmed participants, self-affirmed participants based their risk 
judgements to a lesser extent on their level of alcohol consumption but more on their 
perceptions of self-worth. 
Comparison with Study 1 
. ' 
Hierarchical regressions were conducted to examine whether there were 
differences between participants: responses to the health, message in Study 1 and the 
strong version of the message in the present study. The following between-participant 
, 
. factors were included in the analysis: study (Study 1 vs. present study), condition (self-
affirmed vs. non-affirmed), level of alcohol consumption. Data were analysed using 
three-step hierarchical regressions. At the first step, main effects of condition, study 
. . 
and risk were entered. At Step 2, interactions of pairs of variables were entered, and at 
Step three the final 3-way interaction of Condition X Study X Risk. 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of study for participants' belief in 
the link, p = .38, P < .001 and how persuasive they perceived the article to be in .. 
general, p = .17, P = .001. Participants in Study I, regardless of condition or alcohol 
consumption, reported a greater belief in the link, and rated the article as more _ 
persuasive (Table 5.13). Analysis revealed there was no difference between the two 
,studies in participants' ratings of evidence strength, p = .05, p = .40. 
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Table. 5.13. Comparison of Impact of Health Leaflet on Measures of General Message 
Acceptance in Study 1 and Present Study. 
Belief 
General Persuasion 
Evidence strength 
Study 1 
4.71 (1.02) 
3.76 (1.18) 
3.49 (1.22) 
Present Study 
3.45 (1.29) 
3.19 (1.42) 
3.30 (1.36) 
Note. Higher values indicate greater belief, persuasion and ratings of evidence 
strength. . 
Analysis of participants' self risk perceptions revealed a three-way interaction 
of Condition X Study X Risk, (3 = .13, p = .006. Whereas in Study 1 there was a 
significant two-way interaction of Condition X Risk, (3.= .29, p = .008, such that self-
affirmation in higher risk participants was associated with greater risk perceptions, in 
the present study there were both main effects of Risk, (3 = .44, p < .001, and 
Condition, (3 = -.12, p = .016. In the present study higher consumption of alcohol was 
associated with greater risk perceptions, while self-affirmation was associated with a 
reduction in risk perceptions. Self-affirmation had a different impact on those in Study 
1 and the present study (Table 5.14). 
Table. 5.14. Comparison of Impact of Health Leaflet on Risk Perceptions in Study 1 
and Present Study. 
. Study 1 Present Study 
SA NA SA NA 
Self Risk 3.65 (1.80) 2.98 (1.77) 2.68 (1.99) 3.05 (2.15) 
Note. Higher values indicate greater risk perceptions. 
Discussion 
The results of the present study suggest that self-affinnation did not increase 
general or personal message acceptance, but instead was associated with less 
persuasion and sensitivity to message strength. Se,lf-affinned participants at high and 
low levels of risk rated both the strong and weak messages article as less persuasive in 
terms of getting women to reduce their alcohol consumption. Regardless of level of 
risk, self-affirmed participants showed less differentiation of message strength, 
compared to those who were non-affirmed. Furthennore, while non-affirmed 
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participants' risk judgements were sensitive to the strength of the message, self-
affirmed participants were not. Non-affirmed participants' intentions and expectations 
to change were also sensitive to the strength of the message, with the stronger message 
produc~ng greater intentions and expectations to change. However, in the self-affirmed 
condition, strength of the message had no effect on moderate drinkers intentions, and 
for those at high and low risk the stronger message actually produced marginally 
weaker intentions and expectations to change. 
The data for participants at higher levels of risk suggest that self-affirmation 
led to less sensitivity to the strength of the message, indicating they may have engaged 
in less elaborative processing thim those who were non-affirmed. For self-affirmed 
participants, the stronger message actually elicited poorer outcomes (intentions and 
expectations of change), suggesting that they may have reacted more defensively than 
those in the non-affirmed condition. These findings are contrary to those in ,Study 1, in 
which self-affirmation had little effect on measures of general persuasion, but 
promoted acceptance of personal relevance of the message. The present findings lend 
support to research suggesting that self-affirmation techniques may not always have , 
positive consequences for processing health threats (Boney-McCoy et a1. 1999; Klein 
et aI, 2001; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). 
The present study replicated the findings of Klein et a1. (2001), suggesting that 
compared to non-affirmed participants, those who were self-affirmed based their risk 
judgments more on their level of self-esteem, and less on their drinking behaviour. 
This finding is consistent with self-affirmation leading to more deductive (top-down) 
processing. Klein et a1. (2001) argue that high cognitive load could lead to less 
inductive self-judgements. Just as research suggests positive mood reduces cognitive 
capacity and leads to less elaborate processing of the persuasive messages (Bless. et aI., 
1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989), self-affirmation in the present se~ting may have 
reduced people's capacity to process the information, leading to less sensitivity to the 
argument strength and less inductive self-judgments. Consistent with previous findings 
in this thesis, self-affirmation was not found to boost participants' positive mood, 
suggesting that although self-affirmation may act at times in a similar manner to mood, 
its effects are no! mediated by mood. Unlike Klein et aI., the present study also found 
less inductive processing and less sensitivity to the message in both higher and lower 
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risk self-affirmed participants. In the present study, however, even those at lower risk 
may have found the message somewhat threatening even though they only drank 
alcohol at relatively low levels. 
The impact of self-affirmation on those at lower levels of risk also raises an 
interesting question about the effects of self-affirmation. The participants at lower· 
levels of risk showed a similar pattern to those at higher levels of risk, reporting 
reduced persuasion, weaker intentions and expectations to change following the 
stronger message, while also showing less sensitivity to the strength of the message in 
their risk perceptions and rating of the evidence. Study 1 also provided some evidence 
consistent with this pattern with self-affirmation reducing negative affect and 
perceptions of risk not associated with the message in lower risk participants. These 
findings suggest that self-affirmation may reduce cognitive capacity and elaborative 
processing in the lower risk participants. 
For moderate drinkers, self-affirmation also reduced sensitivity to the strength 
of the message when reporting risk perceptions and rating the strength of the evidence. 
However, moderate drinkers' level of persuasion was not reduced by self-affirmation, 
and intentions and expectations were not affected aversely by message strength. This 
suggests that for moderate drinker~ who were potentially more involved with the 
message than those at low risk, but presumably had les·s motivation to be def~nsive 
than those at high risk, self-affirmation had slightly less negative effects. 
Comparison of Study 1 and 4 
Companson of the data from Study 1 and 4 revealed that, regardless of 
condition or alcohol consumption, participants in the present study saw the article as 
. ~., 
less persuasive and reported a reduced belief in the link between alcohol and breast 
cancer. Furthermore, self-affirmation had different effects on risk perceptions, 
promoting acceptance of risk among those at higher risk in Study 1 and reducing risk 
perceptions, regardless of level of risk, in the present study .. 
There are various possible explanations that may help account for differences 
between the findings of the two studies, including the mode of communication and the 
sample used. RunniI'!g an experiment in a laboratory setting has a variety of differences 
from conducting research over the Internet. The Internet has various advantages, such 
as providing a straightforward means of recruiting a large, non-student sample. 
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However, the Internet provides less controlled conditions with no guarantees of under 
what circumstances participants completed the experiment. Participants on the Internet 
have been argued to invest less time in completing studies (Kraut et al., 2003), though 
others have argued that Internet participants may be more motivated than 
undergraduate participants (Birnbaum, 2004). A review of 9 studies run both on the 
Internet and in laboratory settings suggests that there is often little difference between 
the findings of the studies (Krantz & Dalal, 2000), whereas other research has 
identified a variety of differences between laboratory and on-line completion of 
psychological studies, which could have implications for the present study. 
Murphy, Long, Holleran, & Esterly (2003) investigated the impact of 
persuasive messages on paper or on-line, and found that an identical message was 
rated as more difficult to understand, less credible, and less persuasive when on-line 
than when on a paper. Based on Murphy et al.'s research,the difference between the 
findings of Study 1 and the present study could reflect the mode of communication, 
such that participants in Study 1 found the message more persuasive because it was on 
paper as opposed to a computer. 
Another possible difference between the two modes is that the Internet 
provides more anonymity. Anonymity in Internet-based studies has been found to be· 
associated with less social desirability in responding (Joinson, 1999), although this is 
not always the case (Knapp & Kirk, 2003). The use of the Internet in the present study 
may have led participants to feel they could respond more honestly. Differences could. 
, reflect reduced demand characteristics in responses of those taking part over the 
Internet, leading to the article being rated as less persuasive. In a laboratory setting 
participants may feel a greater demand to accept the message and rate the article 
, positively because the experimenter, who may appear to have a vested interest in the 
article, is present. This could account for why participants in the present study reported 
being less persuaded by the message. However, this explanation does not explain why 
self-affirmation had conflicting effects in Studies 1 and 5. Participants in Study 1 
reported being naIve to the true nature of the self-affirmation task, indicating that the 
findings of Study 1 are unlikely to be due to participants responding in a manner in 
which they believed was desired. 
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-. - Another explanation for the differences between the two studies could be the 
samples recruited. The sample in the present study were older than those in Study 1. 
Older women's perceptions of risk of breast cancer are likely to significantly differ 
from those of young women. Indeed, younger women are more likely to overestimate 
their life-time risk of breast cancer, compared to older women (Herbert-Croteau, 
Goggin, & Kishchuk, 1997; Lermen, Kash, & Stefanek, 1994). Though older women 
are actually at greater risk of breast cancer, their perceptions of factors that might 
contribute to the disease may differ from that of younger women, such that the risk 
associated with alcohol may seem less significant. Furthermore, for older women, as 
the health message itself points out, there may be greater protective benefits of alcohol, 
for example against heart disease. These older women may have been better equipped 
to counter-argue the message, for example, recruiting information about the benefits of 
drinking alcohol. Perhaps when a message is easily counter-argued and minimised, 
self-affirmation does not provide the most direct route to restore self-integrity, and 
regardless of self-affirmational status participants chose to defend against the message. 
This explanation, however, does not in itself explain why self-affirmation in the 
present study may have led to more biased and deductive processing than in the non-
affirmed condition. If both non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants in the present 
study counter-argued the message and engaged in biased processing, why did self-
affirmed participants do this to a greater extent? 
Raghunathan and Trope (2002) offer one possible explanation. Raghunathan 
and Trope conducted research examining the effects of positive mood on acceptance of 
health communication. Their findings suggest that, when a message has personal 
implications with long-term benefits, positive mood can reduce biased processing. 
However, if a message is perceived to have no long-term benefits, mood acts as 
information, with a positive mood serving to indicate well-being, and this leads to a 
'reduction in elaborative processing. Raghunathan and Trope suggest that boosts to 
self-esteem may act in the same way, such that only when health information is 
perceived to have long-term benefits will self-affirmation reduce biased processing. If 
health infonnation is perceived to have no long-term benefits self-affirmation'may act 
as information, reassuring participants and leading to greater biased proceSSing. In the 
present study, the message may have been perceived to have fewer long-term benefits 
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for the older sample. For example, they may have perceived their risk of breast cancer 
to be greater from sources other than alcohol, or there to be greater benefits from 
drinking alcohol. If this were the case, in the present study, self-affirmation may have 
signalled well-being and reduced elaborative processing. This could explain why self-
affirmation resulted in reduced differentiation of weak and strong arguments, and why, 
in comparison to controls, self-affirmed participants reported reduced persuasion and 
risk perceptions. 
An additional account of what might moderate the effectiveness of self-
affirmation is that the older women perceived themselves as having less self-efficacy 
to reduce their drinking behaviour. For younger women, the target of reducing their 
, . ' ' 
" " 
alcohol consumption in the next couple Of years may have appeared feasible. The 
younger women were in the early years of university and their drinking habits may 
have been viewed as short-term behaviour that they planned to reduce o~ le'aving. In 
fact many of the won:en debriefed in Study 1 reporte? that they planned to reduce their 
alcohol consumption after finishing university. For older women, whose drinking 
patterns are likely to be more established, the target of reducing their alcohol . 
consumption could have appeared less achievable. When presented with a health 
message targeting an integral and well-established behaviour, the self-affirmation 
.' , 
manipulation may not have been strong enough to overcome the t~reat, leading to 
participants seeking other ways to reduce it, for example, by directly denying or 
rationalising the health threat. In this case the positive self-beliefs that were salient 
may have acted as information, leading to feelings of invulnerability and signalling no 
action was needed to deal with the threat. 
According to these two accounts (e.g., fewer long-term benefits of information 
.. 
and less self-efficacy) non-affirmed participants in the present study should also show 
a reduction in persuasion in comparison to non-affirmed women in Study 1. For 
example, models of processing fear appeals sugges~ that, w~en coping appraisals are, 
low, and threat appraisals are high, message rejection is more likely to occur (Witte, 
1992). Thus, for non-affirmed participants in the present study, if their coping 
, , 
appraisals were lower than those in Study 1, they should have reported reduced 
, - 'I , , . _ • 
persuasion. There was some evidence to support this, with non-affirmed participants in 
the present study reporting reduced persuasion on measures of general message 
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acceptance. Examination of participants' risk perceptions, however, indicated that the 
non-affirmed participants did not differ in their likelihood judgements for experiencing 
breast cancer as a result of drinking alcohol. Clearly further research is needed to 
establish what factors may moderate the effectiveness of self-affirmation. 
Present literature 
Since undertaking the present study, Correll, Spencer, and Zanna (2003) have 
published a study also examining the effects of self-affirmation on the processing of 
weak and strong arguments, aiming to investigate whether self-affirmation increased 
the acceptance of counter-attitudinal informatioq, not by increasing objectivity, but by 
promoting agreeableness or trivialisation. Correll et al. presented students with a 
debate for and against increases in tuition fees, with both positions putting forward 
weak and strong arguments. Participants who had previously reported being opposed 
, < ~ • , • 
to tuition increases were recruited to the study, and the level of attitude importance 
'. . 
was also measured. Correll et al. found that self-affirlned participants, for whom the 
issue was personally important, reported being more persuaded by strong as opposed 
to weak arguments. In contrast, non- affirmed participants did not rate strong 
arguments as being any more persuasive than weak ones. For those who reported low 
involvement with the issue, self-affirmation had little effect, with participants in both 
conditions rating the strong arguments as stronger than the weak ones. 
Clearly the findings of Correll et a1. contradict those of the present study and 
suggest that, in some circumstances, self-affirmation appears to promote elaborative 
processing. One factor that may account for the differences between the findings of . 
the two studies 'could be the threat used. Pi-oviding participants with information 
contrary to their attitudes on tuition fees may have not provided as strong a threat to 
self-integrity as information about the personal risk of breast cancer. Furthermore, 
participants in Correll's study may have found it easier to change their beliefs about 
tuition fees than it was for women in the present study to accept their need to change a 
complex behaviour such as drinking. Thus the differences in the findings between the 
two studies could ,reflect the centrality of the threat and the ease with which 
participants could change their attitudes or behaviour. 
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Limitations of present research 
One possible explanation for the differences between the present study's 
findings and those of Study 1 could be differences in women's perceptions of their 
ability to change their drinking behaviour. However, no measures were taken of 
perceptions of self or response efficacy and whether these variables predicted 
outcomes differently for non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants. Study 5 therefore 
includes measures of coping appraisals to examine whether these might moderate the 
effects of self-affirmation. Furthermore, in the present study no measures of women's 
past alcohol use were taken. Though women reported on their typical alcohol 
consumption, participants may have been high alcohol drinkers in the past, and 
perceptions of their past use may have influenced their message processing. In addition 
no measures were taken of whether participants were already intending to change their 
alcohol consumption, and whether this influenced the effects of self-affirmation. Study 
5 includes a measure of stage of change to examine whether this variable might 
moderate the effects of self-affirmation. 
A further limitation of the present study is that only a limited number of 
measures of affective reactions were included. Study 5 includes both self-reports of 
affect experienced while reading a relevant health message and reports of worry after 
reading the message. Study 5 also includes measures of self-related negative affect' to 
measure the consequences of self-affirmation more' specifically on negative affect 
related to the self. 
Summary 
In comparison to Study 1 women in the present study were less persuaded by a 
message outlining the risks alcohol for breast cancer. The present study provides 
'evidence that self-affirmation is not always associated with a reduction in biased 
processing. Consistent with Klein et al. (2001), self-affirmation appeared to be 
associated with less inductive processing. Further research is needed to establish what 
factors might moderate the effectiveness of self-affirmation. 
I • 
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CHAPTER 6: MECHANISMS OF SELF-AFFIRMATION 
The final study replicates Study 1, using a non-novel health message that aimed 
to promote adopting a healthy behaviour rather than refraining from an unhealthy 
behaviour. The health information chosen was the 5-a-day fruit and vegetables 
message. Diet, including the consumption of fruit and vegetables, is highlighted as a 
key issue in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000), with evidence that increasing 
consumption of fruit and vegetables would reduce the risk of diseases such as heart . 
disease, stroke and cancer by around 20%. Currently, these diseases account for 60% 
of early deaths in the UK (Cullum, 2003). Targeting the dietary habits of 18 to 24 year 
olds is particularly important, not only because this a period of transition from 
adolescence to adulthood, which for many involves new control and responsibility of 
their own diet (Ma, Betts, Horacek, Georgiou, & White, 2003), but also because this 
group shows poor dietary choices. For example, younger adults have the poorest level 
of fruit and vegetables consumption among UK adults (Henderson, Gregory, & Swan, 
2002; Hoare et al., 2004). 
Fear appeals and self-affirmation 
Models of how people process health messages, such as the Extended Parallel 
Process Model (EPPM, Witte, 1992, 1994,2000) and Protection Motivation Theory 
(pMT, Rogers, 1975) suggest that there are a number of cognitive variables that 
determine whether a health message is effective in persuading an at-risk participant to 
change behaviour. Both the EPPM and PMT highlight the role of threat and coping 
appraisals. Threat appraisals are a combination of perceptions of severity and 
vulnerability (Rogers, 1975; Witte, 2000). Coping appraisals include perceptions of 
. self- and response-efficacy (Rogers, 1975; Witte, 2000). Rogers (1983) also argues 
that the perceived rewards of the maladaptive behaviour and costs of the adaptive 
behaviour are further mediating variables. 
As outlined in Chapter 1, Witte (2000) proposes that the arousal of fear 
associated with a health message can motivate biased responding (see also Hovland et 
aI., 1953; Janis, 1967; McGuire, 1969). Witte (1992) suggests that when perceptions of 
threat (vulnerability and severity) are high, people experience fear, the arousal of 
which motivates appraisals· of self- and response-efficacy. If both coping and threat 
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appraisals are high, danger control should be initiated, with people generating adaptive 
responses to directly reduce the danger (e.g., by accepting the message and deciding to 
change a risky behaviour). However, if threat appraisals are high, but coping appraisals 
are low,fear control should be initiated, with people generating defensive responses to 
reduce the threat without reducing the danger. PMT also predicts an interaction of 
threat and coping appraisals, such that high threat appraisals but low coping appraisals 
should be associated with message rejection and biased processing and rationalisation. 
However,. evidence has only somewhat supported this proposed interaction. In Rogers 
& Prentice-Dunn's (1997) review of PMT research they found evidence for an 
interaction in only half the studies they examined. 
What does self-affirmation theory predict about the roles of variables such as 
coping and threat appraisals? In non-affirmed participants these variables will still play 
an important role in whether a message is accepted or rejected. According to self-
affirmation theory, when health information threatens self-integrity, participants will , 
select the most accessible route to reduce this threat (Steele, 1988). If threat and coping 
appraisals are both high this may lead to acceptance of the message and changing 
behaviour. If coping appraisals are low, however, this may lead to engaging in other 
processes to restore self-integrity, such as denial or avoidance of the message (as .. 
models such as EPPM and PMT suggest). However, if a person is self-affirmed, they 
have a direct route by which to restore self-integrity, and accept the message. In this 
case, coping appraisals should be less predictive of whether a message is accepted or 
not. Put differently. self-affirmation theory suggests that people reject a message when 
threat appraisals are high and coping appraisals are low because changing their 
behaviour is not an accessible route to restoring self-integrity. For self-affirmed, 
participants, self-integrity has been restored allowing participants to accept the 
message, regardless of their coping appraisals. 
Using EPPM and PMT, alternative predictions could also be made about the 
mechanisms of self-affirmation. For instance, self-affirmation may work by boosting 
coping appraisals, threat perceptions, or influencing the level of negative affect 
experienced. Study 1 tested whether self-affirmation increased perceptions of self-
efficacy. Though there was a significant interaction of condition and risk, the increase 
in self-efficacy in higher risk, self-affirmed participants was not significant, indicating 
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that at best self-affirmation had only a marginal effect on perceptions of self-efficacy . 
. 
Reed and Aspinwall (1998) measured participants' perceptions of perceived 
behavioural control (PBC), and found that higher risk, self-affirmed participants 
reported greater PBC in comparison to non-affirmed participants. However, this 
increase in PBC was not translated into an increase in intentions or changes in health 
behaviour. In fact higher risk, self-a~firmed participants in Reed and Aspinwall's study 
reported lower intentions to change. Further tests 'are needed to assess whether self-
affirmation does influence self-efficacy, and whether self-efficacy is less predictive of 
message acceptance in self-affirmed participants. 
Threat appraisals may also provide a possible mediator of the effects of self-
affirmation. Both Sherman et a1. (2000) and Study 1 demonstrated that higher risk, 
self-affirmed participants reported higher risk perceptions than those who were non-
affirmed. However, Study 1 also demonstrated that the increase in risk perceptions did 
not mediate the effects of self-affirmation on intentions to change. Models such as 
EPPM and PMT indicate that increases in threat appraisals alone are not sufficient to 
'. . . 
increase message acceptance, but rather the interaction of threat and coping appraisals 
predicts message acceptance. Further tests are needed to establish whether self-
affirmation influences the impact of the interaction of threat and coping appraisals on 
, 
message acceptance. 
.... " ' . 
The impact of self-affirmation on negative affect was also examined in ~tudy 
1. Higher risk, self-affirmed participants reported experiencing higher levels of 
negative affect. This finding could reflect the fact that those who were non-affirmed 
engaged in more fear control. Self-affirmation theory predicts that people are 
motivated to defensively process a message, not to reduce fear but because the health 
message poses a threat to a participant'S positive experience of the self. However, little 
research has directly examined whether health messages have conseque~ces f~r 
. . , 
negative self-feelings (e.g., shame, disappointment, inadequacy) as well as fear, or 
whether these' self-related, negative affective states predict message acceptance. 
Dillard and Peck (2000) measured the impact of a range of health messages on 
affective reactions, including anger, fear, surprise, sadness, happiness and guilt, and 
found evidence that, for at least two of their eight health messages, gUilt significantly 
predicted message acceptance. Increased levels of gUilt were asso'ciated with increases 
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in message acceptance. Furthermore, gUilt had distinctive effects from fear, suggesting 
that these affective states contribute uniquely to predicting message acceptance. Witte 
and Allen (2000) also recognise that health·messages have affective consequences 
other than fear, such as irritation, tension, and increased anxiety. Leventhal and 
Trembly (1968) also identified disgust and feelings of impotence as affective 
consequences of negative health messages. The relationship between these affective 
responses and message acceptance is unclear (Witte et al.. 2000). Further research is 
needed to test self-affirmation theory's prediction that negative and personally-relevant 
health messages are associated with negative self-feeling and to test whether changes 
in this variable might mediate the effects of self-affirmation. 
Message novelty 
The use of health campaigns means'people are regularly presented with health 
messages that are not novel. For instance, the government campaign to encourage 
people to quit smoking means that many smokers will have been exposed to 
information outlining the risks associated with smoking many times. However, 
empirically, research examining defensive processing has tended to focus on the use of 
novel health threats (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kunda. 1987; ~iberman .& Chaiken, 1992). 
Using novel health messages has the benefit of controlling for the prior beliefs people . 
have about the risk behaviour targeted. thus controlling for alternative accounts for 
biases in processing (Kunda, 1990). Nevertheless, to establish the practical importance 
. . 
of self-affirmation as a technique of reducing biased processing of health messages. 
research is needed to examine its effects on well-established health messages. 
. . . 
Targeting an established health risk has been argued to provide a different 
challenge to that of a novel threat (Johnson, 1994). For instance. there is evidence that 
prior kn~wledge reduces the persuasiveness of a message (Janis & Feshbach, 1953), 
presumably because "non-attitudes" (e.g .• holding no strong beliefs either way about 
an issue) are easier to change than pre-existing attitudes (Johnson, 1994). Furthermore. 
participants who have already been presented with a negative and relevant health 
message, but have not changed their behaviour, may have already engaged in 
processes such as rationalisation of the threat (e.g., "I don't need to change my 
behaviour because ... 1 am healthy in general I I'm too young to get ill I I'll do 
something about it when 1 have more time"). These established rationalisations may 
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make further exposure to the health message ineffective. For instance Buunk and 
Dijkstra (2001) found that people at high risk of mv did not deny they were at risk, 
but had rationalised their behaviour (e.g., believed the risk was exaggerated by the 
media, or that their partner was probably not infected). Thus, Buunk and Dijkstra, 
(2001) argue that further health information about their risks would be less effective at 
changing behaviour, than for example an intervention targeting pre-existing 
rationalisations. Stage models of health behaviours, such as the Precaution Adoption 
Process Model (Weinstein, 1988; Weinstein & Sandman, 1992), also suggest that an 
intervention should be matched to a person's stage of behaviour change. For example, 
one message may be effective for those who are unaware of their risks, but not for 
those who are aware but have currently decided not to change (Weinstein, Rothman, & 
Sutton, 1998). 
Can self-affirmation influence acceptance of an established health risk? There. 
has only been one direct test of the effects of self-affirmation on an established health 
message. Sherman et al. (2000) provided participants with information about the risks 
of mY. Although Sherman et al. did not explicitly measure participants' past 
knowledge of the risks of mv and AIDS, college students have been found to have a 
relatively high knowledge of the risks (Shapiro, Radecki, Charchian, & Josephson, 
1999). Sherman et aI. found self-affirmation promoted message acceptance for an 
established health-risk, with self-affirmed participants reporting greater perceived 
personal risk and engaging in more AIDS preventative behaviours. In a further study, 
Sherman et ~. (2000) also, demonstrated that self-affirming participants, after they had 
already read a health message, promoted message acceptance in terms of beliefs, risk 
perceptions and intentions. Thus self-affirmation appeared to allow participants to 
reappraise the health message at least very shortly after it had been originally 
, 
processed. Clearly further tests of the effects of self-affirmation on the processing of 
established health-risk information are needed. 
Current Study 
The previous studies in this thesis have examined whether self-affirmation 
reduces biased processing and have provided evidence that sometimes, but not alw,ays 
(Study 4), self-affirmation can reduce biases in participants' response to a health 
message. For instance, self-affirmation was found to reduce avoidance of personal 
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inferences (Study 1) and attentional avoidance (Study 3). The current study aimed to 
extend the findings of these previous studies by testing the effects of self-affirmation 
on biased processing using models from the fear appeal literature, including the EPPM 
and PMT. By measuring the variables implicated by the ~PPM and PMT as being 
important for message acceptance it is possible to test two alternative mechanisms by 
which self-affirmation may act. Examining whether the effects of self-affirmation are 
,. 
mediated by changes in for example, threat appraisals, coping appraisals or fear, or 
alternatively, as Steele's theory suggests self-affirmation works independently of these 
processes and acts to restore self-integrity, reducing defence motivation and directly 
impacting upon message acceptance. By including measures of n,egative self-feeling as 
well as fear it is also possible to test whether these variables predict message 
acceptance. The present study will examine whether the role of these variables differs 
for non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants. 
The current study aimed to investigate whether self-affirmation could increase 
message acceptance of a well-established health threat by providing participants with a 
health message outlining the negative health consequences of not regularly eating 5 
portions of fruit and vegetables a day. As with Study 1 and 3, the present study also 
included measures of risk perceptions (for self and average other), worry, ease of 
imagination, beliefs about the message, mood and self-esteem. By including these' 
measures it is possible to compare the effects of self-affirmation on novel health 
messages that aimed to reduce an unhealthy behaviour, with the effects for an 
I 
established health message that promoted adopting a healthy behaviour. Following 
Rogers (1983), further cognitive measures assessing participants' perceptions of the 
costs and benefits associated with eating more fruit and vegetables were also included. 
Pilot Study 
To examine whether participants did report negative self-feeling as a result of 
receiving a negative and self-relevant health message, and to develop items to measure 
negative self-feeling, a pilot study was conducted. Participants consisted of 32 male 
and 49 female university undergraduates and postgraduates who were recruited from 
, 
around the university campus (mean age = 20.3 years). Participants were recruited to 
take part in a study examining reactions to health information. Participants were 
instructed to: "think of a recent time when you were told (for example, by a doctor, 
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nurse, the media, friends) that by doing Or not doing something you personally were 
risking damage to your health. For example, b~ing told that you should cut down the 
amount of alcohol you drink, or eat less high fat food to prevent damaging your body 
and health, or that you need to exercise more regularly, and eat more fruit and 
vegetables to prevent illness and stay healthy." Participants were asked to briefly 
describe the information that they received, and then "take a couple of seconds to think 
about how you felt when you received this information". Participants were then 
presented with a list of 52 adjectives. These corriprised measures of: fear (frightened, 
tense, nervous, anxious, uncomfortable, nauseous, taken from Rippetoe & Rogers, 
1987); sadness (sad, upset, generated for this' study); negative self-feeling 
(disappointed with self, annoyed with self, guilty, self-critical, angry towards self, 
dissatisfied with self, disgusted with self, embarrassed, and shame, all taken from 
Elliot & Devine, 1994, with the additional items of humiliated, inadequate, inept, 
pathetic, immature, failure, useless, stupid, foolish, taken from Mathews, Mogg, 
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995); discomfort (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered, taken from 
Elliot & Devine, 1994); positive affect (good, happy, optimistic, friendly, energetic, 
Elliot & Devine, 1994); control (capable, in control, generated for this study); loss of 
control (uncertain, helpless, generated for this study); irritation (irritated, annoyed, 
angry, generated for this study) and some filler items (enlightened, peaceful, restless, 
calm, bored, motivated, curious, defensive, small, reassured, interested, tired,' 
generated for this study). Participants were asked how the health information made 
them feel, and they responded to each item on 9-point scales, not at all (0) to very 
much (8). The order of the adjectives was counter-balanced using a Latin square. 
Participants also completed two measures to assess whether health was an 
important personal value, "How important TO YOU is it to be healthy and free from 
disease?", and "How important TO YOU is it to engage in activities to promote health 
. , 
and prevent illness (e.g., safe sex, take exercise, eat healthily). Both items were 
measured on 7-point scales, not at all (0) to extremely important (6). 
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. Pilot Data Results 
.Table 6.1 presents the main categories of health risks participants reported 
thinking about. Of the pieces of health information participants had recently been 
exposed to, diet was most frequently reported. . 
Table 6.1. Health Information Participants Reported Being Exposed To Recently 
Health Information 
Diet 
Alcohol 
Exercise 
- , 
25 
23 
7 
. Smoking 9 
Teeth. 11 
Other (e.g., safe sex, vaccinations) 6 
Note. aNumber of participants reporting exposure to each type of health information. 
The mean responses to adjectives listed were calculated to examine which 
items participants responded to most strongly. The data for the, 10 most frequent 
responses are in Table 6.2, along with the number of participants who reported 
experiencing each emotion to some extent (e.g., provided response greater than 0 [not 
at all]). 
Table 6.2. Affective Responses Most Frequently Reported in Response to Health-Risk 
Information. 
Item Mean Na 
Self-critical 3.00 (2.25) 65 
Bothered 2.71 (2.33) 60 
Irritated 2.67 (2.62) 59 
In control 2.60 (2.35) 62 
Guilty . 2.53 (2.33) 56 ' 
Annoyed with self ' 2.52 (2.43) ,'" 54 
. Disappointed with self 2.51 (2.27) 60 
Capable 2.27 (2.26) 55 
Uncertain 2.23 (2.32) 53 
Optimistic' 1.86 (2.12) 49 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. ~umber of participants reporting 
experiencing affective response. 
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When recalling their reactions to personally-relevant health information 
participants reported a range of affective responses, including negative self-feelings, 
discomfort, uncertainty, as well as positive responses such as a sense of control and 
optimism. Interestingly, items measuring fear were not among the strongest affective 
responses reported. Consistent with the assumption that health threats act as threats to 
people's positive experience of themselves, negative self-feelings such as feeling self-
critical and disappointed with the self were among the emotions most commonly 
reported. Three items were selected to measure negative self-feeling from those 
scoring most highly and most commonly, (feeling self-critical, being annoyed with the 
self and disappointed with the self, a. = .84). 
Analysis of the two items examining whether participants reported health to be 
an important value revealed that participants thought it was very important to be 
healthy (M = 5.34, SD = .93) and to engage in activities to maintain health (M = 4.98, 
SD = 1.10). This finding supports past claims that people value health (Croyle et al., 
1997; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997). 
Participants 
Study 5 
Method 
Female (n = 73) and Male (n == 7) psychology undergraduates were recruited to 
the study for course credit (mean age = 19.1 years). Of the sample, 55% lived in 
catered student halls, 43.8% lived in self-catering flats or private houses, and 1.3% 
~ 
. lived at home with parents. All participants reported that they did not regularly eat 5 
portions of fruit and vegetables each day. 
Procedure 
Upon arriving at the laboratory participants were informed that they would be 
completing two studies, including a writing task (self-affirmation I control task), a 
reading task (health message), and a questionnaire. Firstly, participants gave "their age, 
year of study, an~ type of accommodation,. and were asked to verbally recall 
everything they had eaten the previous day. The experimenter asked participants if the 
food recalled was typical of what they might eat on a normal day, and if not to explain 
. why. Participants' fruit juice intake was also recorded. Participants were then asked to 
think about just the fruit and vegetables they had eaten the day before, and whether this 
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was typical of their normal intake. If it was not, they were asked to describe a more 
typical day. The experimenter then calculated the number of portions of fruit and 
vegetables that the participant had consumed the previous day, asking for further 
portion size information where necessary. The experimenter then estimated their intake 
on a typical day. (All the participants who took part in the study reported eating less 
then 5 portions of fruit and vegetables a day.) The participant was informed of their 
intake, and the experimenter indicated that she would record that the participant was 
not eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables regularly each day. The participant was 
asked to confirm whether they agreed with this statement; all participants did so .. 
Participants were then told that one of the experiments would be investigating 
people's knowledge of the 5-a-day message. The experimenter explained briefly what 
. . 
the 5-a-day message was and highlighted the fact that people should be eating at least 
5 portions of a variety of fruits and vegetables each day. The experimenter stressed 
that this should be an activity that people do everyday, such as brushing one's teeth, 
and that 5 portions should be a minimum. 
The experimenter then instructed participants to work through the three tasks, 
starting with a writing task (self-affirmation I control task). The experimenter stressed 
that this task was part of a separate project examining student values that she was 
. handing out on behalf of her supervisor. The experimenter was blind to experimental 
condition. Participants were told that, after spending at least 5 minutes on the first task, 
they should move on to the second study. The materials for the second study were 
placed in labelled envelopes and the participants first completed the reading task and 
then the questionnaire. The experimenter checked that the participants were clear on 
I 
what tasks they were to complete and the order in which to do so, before leaving the 
room. The experimenter monitored the participants from outside the room, and where 
necessary re-entered to remind participants to move on to the next task after 10 
minutes. 
After the study was complete, the experimenter told participants that she had 
some leaflets with information on portion sizes and tips for eating 5-a-day, and that 
they were welcome to help themselves to these. She also offered participants a token, 
which they could exchange for a piece of fresh fruit, from another room in the 
building. The experimenter left the room ostensibly to retrieve a slip to confirm the 
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participant had completed the study. Participants were left alone for approximately 10 
seconds to decide whether to help themselves to leaflets or a token. After the 
participants had left, the experimenter noted whether participants had taken leaflets or 
a token, which had been discreetly labelled. By labelling the tokens it was also 
possible to examine which tokens were later redeemed. 
Materials 
Non-affirmation / Self-affirmation condition. Participants completed the values 
affirmation and control tasks described in Study 1 (Appendix A). 
Health message. The article was entitled "The health benefits of fruits and 
vegetables" and was taken from UK government information about the S-a-day health 
message (Department of Health, 2003). The article was designed to resemble 
government information available on the Internet (Appendix J). All statements were 
true and it was around 450 words in length. The article described the benefits of 
regularly eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables everyday, for example for reducing 
\ ' ' 
the risk of heart disease, strokes and some cancers. The article also briefly explained 
why fruit and vegetables hold such health benefits. The article emphasised that people 
should eat at least 5 portions of a variety of fruit and vegetables each day. 
Post-manipulation measures. Instructions informed participants that they 
would be asked about the health inf0fII.1ation they had read and their thoughts about 
eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day. Participants were also 
reminded that the 5-a-day message is to eat at least 5 portions (400g) of a variety of 
fruit and vegetables each day. All items were measured on 7-point scales unless 
otherwise stated (anchored at 0 and 6). The dependent measures were intermixed with 
a number of filler items such as, for ex~ple, "The article explained the benefits of 
eating a healthy diet well" (strongly disagree / strongly agree). 
Threat Appraisals. Participants were asked "How serious are the health, 
consequences of not eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day?" (not at ' 
all serious I very serious). Participants also indicated how vulnerable they were of 
experiencing the negative consequences of a poor diet, "My chances of experiencing 
heart disease and some cancers in the future if I do not eat at least 5 portions of fruit 
, 
and vegetables each day are ... " (very low Ivery high), "How likely is it that you will ' 
experience poor health in the future if you do not eat at least 5 portions of fruit or 
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. 
vegetables each day?" (not at all likely! very likely). These three items were averaged 
to form the threat appraisal measure and analysed as a single item (0 = 0.77). 
Coping Appraisals. Participants completed two measures of response efficacy 
("Eating at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day will reduce my risk of 
heart disease and some cancers", "If I were to eat at least 5 portions of fruit and 
vegetables each day I would reduce my risk of heart disease and some cancers", 
strongly disagree [0] / strongly agree [6]). Participants also completed a 6-item self-
efficacy scale for eating fruit and vegetables, adapted from Fuchs, Leppin, Schwarzer 
and Wegner's (1993; cited in Schwarzer, 1993) self-efficacy towards healthy eating 
behaviour scale. The scale included the following items in sequence: "I know for sure 
that I could adhere to eating at least 5 fruit and.vegetables each day if I really wanted 
to.", "If! intend to take up eating at least 5 fruit and vegetables each day, I know that I 
can stick to it", "I doubt that I could manage to really carry through eating at least 5 
fruit and vegetables each day.", "I feel that I am unable to muster up the patience 
necessary for eating at least 5 fruit and vegetables each day.", "I could usually resist 
the temptation of delicious, but unhealthy food.", "I could take the time necessary for 
shopping for fresh and healthy groceries.", (Not at all true [1] I Barely true I 
Moderately true I Exactly true [4]). Items 3 and 4 of the self-efficacy scale were 
reverse coded. As the response-efficacy and self-efficacy scales were measured on 
. different scales, z-scores were calculated to combine the measures and the 8 coping 
appraisal items were analysed as a single item. 
Optimistic bias. Participants completed two risk perception items to assess any 
optimistiC bias. The two items were counterbalanced. Participants were asked: "How 
likely is it that you will experience poor health from your current intake of fruit and 
vegetables?", "How likely is it that the average student of your age and sex will '. 
experience poor health from their current intake of fruit and vegetables?" Responses 
were given on an II-point scale, not at all likely (0) to very likely (10). 
Beliefs. Participants were asked about their beliefs about not eating enough 
fruit and vegetables, "If I don't eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day' 
it will have negative effects for my health." (strongly disagree I strongly agree). 
Participants' beliefs about the relevance of the message were measured using the item, 
"I need to eat more fruit and vegetables", (strongly disagree I strongly agree). 
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Negative affect. Participants completed 4 items measuring negative affect 
experienced while reading the health message. For example. "How much did the 
article make you feel tense?". "How much did the article make you feel nervous?" • 
"How much did the article make you feel uncomfortable?" (not at all I very much). 
Apart from the fourth item, "I felt fearful while reading the article". (strongly disagree 
I strongly agree). the measures were taken from Witte (2004). The four items were 
averaged and analysed as a single item (a = .92). Three further items were included to 
measure participants' reports of worry after reading the article ("I am worried that I am 
not currently eating enough fruit and vegetables". "I worry about my current level of 
consumption of fruit and vegetables". "I worry about the consequences of not eating at 
least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day". strongly disagree I strongly agree. ex 
= .79). 
Negative self-feeling. The impact of the message on negative self1eelings was 
measured using 3 items. "How much did the article make you feel disappointed with 
yourself?" • "How much did the article make you feel self-critical?". and "How much 
did the article make you feel annoyed with yourself?". (not at aliI very much). The 
items were averaged and analysed as a single item (a = .90). 
Costs and benefits. Five items were included to measure perceptions of the 
costs associated with eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables and the benefits of 
eating less healthy options. These items were based on the literature on the perceived 
costs and benefits of eating 5-a-day (John & Ziebland. 2004; Ziebland. Thorogood. 
Yugkin. Jones. & Coulter. 1998). For example. ''The alternatives to fruit and 
-. 
I 
vegetables are less expensive .... "1 find fruit and vegetables less enjoyable than other 
options .... (strongly disagree I strongly agree). These items were averaged and 
analysed as a single item of costs of eating and benefits of not eating 5-a-day (a = .71). 
Intentions. Intentions to eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day 
for the next 7 days were measured by two items. "I intend to eat at least 5 portions of 
fruit and vegetables each day. in the next 7 days" and "Do you intend to eat at least 5 
portions of fruit' and vegetables each day in the next 7 days?", definitely do not intend 
to I definitely intend to. The items were averaged and analysed as a single item, r(SO) = 
.SS. P < .001. 
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Ease of imagination. A measure of ease of imagination was included, "How 
easy is it for you to imagine yourself experiencing poor health as a result of your 
current intake of fruit and vegetables" (not at all easy [0], slightly easy, quite easy, 
moderately easy, very easy, extremely easy [5]). 
Thoughts about change. Participants were presented with the following 
statement and response options, "Before today, 1 had thought about eating at least 5 
portions of fruit and vegetables a day, and decided to make this change ... " at no point 
in the future / in 10 years time / in 5 years time / in 2 years time / in the next year / in 
the next 6 months / in the next 2 months / in the next month / in the next week / I have 
already made this change / never thought about it (anchored at 0 and 10). 
Stage of change. To assess stage of change (prochaska & DiClemente, 1982) 
participants were also asked to read each of the following statements and indicate their 
current view: "I currently do not eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day 
and 1 do not intend to start in the next 6 months.", "I currently do not eat at least 5 
portions of fruit and vegetables each day but am thinking about starting doing so 
within the next 6 months.", "I c'urrently eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables 
some days but not regularly.", "I currently eat at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables 
each day but have only begun doi~g so within the last 6 month~.", "I currently eat at 
least 5 portions of fruit and v~getables each day and have done so for longer than 6 
months.", "I have eaten at least 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day before but 
currently do not do so." Five response options were available, strongly disagree / 
. . .' . 
disagree / uncertain / agree / strongly agree. The measure was adapted from Marcus, 
Selby, Niaura and Rossi (1992) and Jones, Harris, Waller, and Coggins (2005). 
Mood and self-esteem. Participants completed a single item measuring their 
current mood, "What is your current mood?" (negative / positive). Robins et al. (2001) 
single item measure of self-esteem was also included, "I have high self-esteem", 1 = 
. ~' ~ 
not yery true of me, 5 = very true of me. A subset of participants also completed the 
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale in a mass session at the beginning of the semester. 
The two self-esteem measures we~e significantly positively correlatedr(52) = .61, p < 
.001. 
Past exposure to message. Participants reported whether they had heard of the 
. , 
5-a-day message before from any of the following sources: friends I family, 
, . . ' '. ., 
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magazines, newspapers, the Internet, doctors I nurses, or TV. Participants responded to 
each source listed by indicating whether they had heard of the campaign before from 
the source, if they had not, or if they were uncertain. They were also asked to list any 
additional sources from which they had heard about the message. 
Manipulation check. As in Study 1, the value essays were rated (using 7-point 
" 
response scales, anchored at not at all [0] and very [6]), on the following items: (a) 
"Setting aside your own opinions and values, how self-affirmed would you estimate 
the writer of this passage to have been (at the end)?", (b) ''To what extent do they 
discuss the value in a manner that presents them in a positive light?", and (c) "How 
important does the value they have selected appear to be to them?". 
Results 
Manipulation check ' 
The values chosen were rated as being more important to participants in the 
self-affirmation condition (M = 6.95) than in the non-affirmation condition (M = 0.75), 
F(I, 79) = 334.36, p <.001. Those in the self-affirmation condition (M = 6.33) were 
judged to have been significantly more self-affirmed after writing the values statement 
than those who were non-,affirmed (M = 0.98), F(1, 79) = 272.68, p :< .001. Self-
affirmed participants (M = 6.03) were also rated as writing passages that presented 
them in a more positive light, than those who were non-affirmed (M = 0.90), F(1, 79) 
= 229.45, p < .001. Thus the self-affirmation task focused participants on important 
and positive aspects of th~ self and the non-affirmation task did not. 
Randomisation check 
The data for the randomisation checks are in Table 6.3, Self-affirmed and non-
affirmed participants did not differ in the amount of fruit and vegetables they reported 
consuming on a typical day, F(1,79) <1, or in the previous 24 hours, F(1,79) = 2.10, p 
= 15. All participants reported eating less than 5 portions of fruit and vegetables on a 
typical day. With regard to the novelty of the message, 98.7% of the participants had 
heard about the 5-a-day message from at least one of the sources listed. The self-
affirmed and non-affirmed groups did not differ in the average number of sources from 
which they had heard about the 5-a-day message, F(1,79) < 1. In total, 60% of the 
participants had been told by another person or had acknowledged for themselves that 
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they had not eaten enough fruit and vegetables in the past year. This did not differ 
between self-affirmed and non-affirmed conditions, F(1,79) < 1. After reading the 
article both those in the self-affirmed and non-affirmed conditions reported that they 
needed to eat more fruit and vegetables, F(1,79) < 1. 
Table 6.3. Mean Responses to Randomisation Check Measures by Self-affirmation 
,\ 
Condition 
SA NA 
(N=40) (N=40) 
Typical fruit and vegetable consumption 3.28 (0.94) 3.12 (1.00) 
Fruit and vegetable in past 24 hours 2.85 (1.24) 2.47 (1.10) 
Number of sources previously heard about 3.49 (1.27) 3.40 (1.30) 
5-a-day message from 
Told I acknowledge need to eat more fruit 24 (60%) 25 (62.5%) 
and vegetables 
Acknowledged need to change 5.00 (1.32) 4.73 (1.36) 
Contemplated need to change 37 (92.5%) 33 (82.5%) 
Mean stage of change 2.74 (0.75) 2.77 (1.13) 
Self esteem (Robins et aI. 2001) 3.53 (0.96) 3.48 (0.78) 
Self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) 31.08 (3.19) 29.69 (3.29) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher levels of fruit and vegetable consumption, having 
heard about the 5-a-day message from more sources, a greater acknowledgement of 
need to change, a more advanced stage of change and higher self-esteem. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. SA = self-affirmed; NA = non-affirmed (applies 
throughout this chapter). 
Non-affirmed and self-affirmed participants did not differ in terms of whether 
they had contemplated (e.g., reported having never thought about eating 5-a-day on the 
, ' 
thought about change item) eating five portions of fruit and vegetables everyday in the 
~ . . ' 
past, F(1,79) =1.83, P = .18. As there were low cell sizes for each of the options 
available, responses were divided into having thought about changing in the next 10 
years to six months, and in the next 2 months to next week. The 10 participants ~ho 
, , , 
• 
had never thought about changing and the 14 participants who claimed that they had 
, , 
already made the change, were exc~uded from the analysis. The distribution of those , .. 
who reported already making the change did not differ between those who were non-
affirmed and self-affirmed, F(1,70) = 2.44, P = .12. Non-affirmed and self-affirmed 
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participants did not differ in terms of when they reported having thought about 
. 
changing, before readhlg the message,F(1,53) = 1.53,p = .22. 
On the basis of the stage 'of change measure, 78 participants were classifiable: 
5.1 % (N = 4) reported not eating 5-a-day or intending to change in the next ~ months, 
32.1 % (N =' 25) were thinking of starting to eat 5-a-day in the next 6 months, 53.8% 
(N = 42) reported that they currently ate 5-a-day but not regularly, 3.8% (N = 3) 
reported that they were eating 5-a-day, but had been doing so for less than 6 months, 
1.3% (N = 1) reported that they were currently eating 5-a-day and had been doing so 
for longer than 6 months, 3.8% (N = 3) reported not currently eating 5-a-day, but to 
had done so in the past. Excluding those who reported to be in relapse, the non- . 
c', -
affirmed and self-affirmed participants did not differ in mean stage of change, F(1,74) 
<1. 
Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in self-esteem, on 
. . 
either the Robins et aI., F(1,79) < 1, or Rosenberg self-esteem scales, F(1,79) = 2.42,. 
p=.13. 
Main analysis 
Unless otherwise stated, data were analysed using one-way ANOV As, with 
, ' 
. condition (self-affirmed or non-affirmed) as a between participants variable, to 
examine whether self-affirmation affected cognitive and affective variables, as well as 
the key dependent measures (e.g., intentions to change). 
Key dependent measures. Analysis of the data in Table 6.4 revealed that self-
affirmed participants had greater intentions to eat at least 5 portions of fruit and 
vegetables each day in the next 7 days, than those who were non-affirmed, F(1,79) = 
5.08, p < .05. The affirmed group were also more likely to a take leaflets (90%) than 
those who were non-affirmed (65%), X2(1,80) = 7.17,p < .01. Among those who did 
take leaflets, there was no difference in the proportion of self-affirmed and non-, 
affirmed participants who took more than one leaflet, X2(1,62) = .25, p = .62. Self-
affirmed participants (57%) were no more likely than non-affirmed participants (50%) 
to take a token for a piece of fruit, X2(1,80) = 5.46, p = .14. They were also no more' 
likely to redeem the token, (self-affirmed: 22%; non-affirmed: 35%), X2(1,43) = .94,p 
=.33. 
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Table 6.4. Participants' Responses to Key Dependent Measures 
Intentions 
Number participants taking leaflets 
Number participants taking tokens 
Number participants redeeming token 
SA 
(N=40) 
4.61 (1.10) 
36 
23 
5 
NA 
(N=40) 
3.94 (1.54) 
26 
20 
7 
Threat and coping appraisals. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did 
not differ in their perception of how vulnerable they felt or how serious they believed 
the consequences of not eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables a day to be, F(l,79) = 
1.58, P = .21, (Table 6.5). There was no significant difference between self-affirmed 
and non-affirmed participants' coping appraisals, F(I,78) < 1. For ease of 
interpretation, means for self- and response-efficacy are reported separately in Table. 
6.5. 
Table. 6.5. Mean Responses to Threat and Coping Appraisal Measures by Condition. 
Threat appraisalsa 
Self-efficacyb - . 
Response-efficacya 
Note. aScored 0 to 6. bScored 1 to 4. 
SA 
(N=40) 
. 4.26 (0.81) . 
2.14 (0.61) 
5.01 (0.93) 
NA 
(N= 40)·' 
4.03 (0.77) 
2.03 (0.61) 
4.95 (0.85) 
Optimistic bias. Participants~ risk perceptions are in Table 6.6. Ratings for risk 
perceptions were analysed using a 2-way mixed design ANOV A with condition as a 
between-participants variable and target (self or other) asa within-participants . 
variable. There were no significant effects involving condition, either independently, 
F(1,79) < 1, or in interaction with target, F(l,79) = 1.32, P = .25. There was: however, 
a main effect of target, F(l,79) = 26.54, p < .001, with both self-affirmed and n.on-
affirmed participants reporting the average other to be at higher risk than them 
personally to experience poor health as a result of not eating 5-a-day. Therefore, self-' 
affirmation did not moderate optinustic bias .. 
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Table:6.6. Mean Responses to Risk Perception Measures by Condition. 
Risk 
Self 
Other 
SA NA 
(N=40) (N=40) 
5.45 (1.85) 
6.45 (1.60) 
~ 5.33 (2.27) 
6.90 (1.32) 
Note. Higher values indicate greater risk perceptions. 
J 
Negative affect. Ratings of negative affect experienced while reading the health 
message did not significantly differ between the self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
groups, F(1,79) = 1.63, p = .21. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not 
differ in level of worry about their risk after reading the message, F(1,79) < 1 (Table 
6.7). 
Negative self-feeling. There was no difference in the level of negative self-
feeling self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants reported, F(1.79) < 1 (Table 6.7). 
Beliefs. Both self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants believed that not 
eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables a day would have negative effects for their 
health, F(l, 79) < 1 (Table 6.7). 
Ease of Imagination. Self-affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ 
in how easy they found it to imagine experiencing poor health as a result of thei! 
current intake of fruit and vegetables, F(1,79) = 1.05, p = .31. 
Table. 6.7. Mean Responses to Measures of Affect, Beliefs, Ease of Imagination and 
Perceptions of Costs and Benefits by Condition. 
Negative affect 
Negative self-feeling 
Worry 
Beliefs 
Ease of imagination 
Cost I benefits 
Mood 
SA 
(N=40) 
·2.13 (1.28) 
2.80 (1.41) 
3.78 (1.29) 
4.72 (1.38) 
1.85 (1.12) 
2.71 (1.45) 
4.67 (1.08) 
Note. Higher values indicate higher levels on each of the measures. 
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NA 
(N=40) 
2.52 (1.38) 
3.04 (1.49) 
3.57 (l.40) 
. 4.68 (0.89) 
1.80 (1.06) 
3.13 (1.25) 
4.15 (l.48) 
Response costs and benefits. The self-affinned and non-affinned participants 
did not differ in tenns of their perceptions of costs of eating more fruit and vegetables 
and the benefits of more unhealthy alternatives, F(1,79) = 1.84,p = .18 (Table 6.7). 
Mood. The effect of self-affirmation on participants' mood approached 
significance, F(1,79) = 3.13,p = .08 (Table 6.7). Self-affinned participants reported 
that they were in a slightly more positive mood than those who were non-affinned. To 
test whether the difference in mood might mediate the impact of self-affinnation on 
intentions and leaflet taking behaviour, analysis was conducted following Baron and 
Kenny (1986). However, participants' mood was not found to predict intentions, R2 = 
.03, ~ = .17, P = .14, or leaflet taking, R2 = .02, ~ = .15, p = .20. Therefore, mood did 
not mediate the effects of self-affirmation. 
Regression Analyses 
" 
A series of two-step, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to 
examine whether the predictors of intentions and leaflet taking behaviour differed in 
the non-affinned and self-affirmed conditions. Table 6.8 shows the zero-order 
, 
correlations between the key outcome variables and predictors. Intentions to change 
were moderately correlated with coping appraisals and weakly correlated with threat 
appraisals. Participants'leaflet taking behaviour was only weakly correlated with 
coping appraisals. 
Table 6.8. Zero-order Correlations between Outcome and Dependent Variables. 
DVI DV2 IV3 IV4 IV5 
DVI. Intentions 
DV2. Leaflet taking .17 
IV3. Threat appraisals .26* .19 
IV 4. Coping appraisals .64*** .22 '.24* 
IV5. Negative affect. -.01 .21 .36** -.07 ; " 
IV6. Negative self- -.09 .01 .33** -.05 .62*** 
feeling 
Separate analyses were perfonned within condition. At the first step, coping' 
appraisals, threat appraisals, negative affect and negative self-feeling were entered. At . 
step two the Coping X Threat interaction was entered. 
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Intentions. For those who were self-affirmed, both coping appraisals, ~ = .52, 
. p = .001, and negative self-feeling, ~ = -.35, p = .033, emerged as predictors of 
intentions (Table 6.9). While greater coping appraisals predicted stronger intentions, 
higher levels of negative self-affect predicted weaker intentions. In the non-affirmed 
condition, only perceptions of coping appraisals predicted intentions, ~ = .75, p < .001. 
Following Edwards (1984), the Betas for the independent variables were compared. 
Coping appraisals were found to be a stronger predictor of intentions in t~e non-
affirmed condition, t(79) = 1.89, P < .05 (one-tailed), and negative self-feeling a 
marginally stronger predictor of intentions in the self-affirmed condition, t(79) = 1.53, 
p < .1 (one-tailed). 
Table 6.9. Betas for Multiple Regressions of Intentions in Self-affirmed and Non-
affirmed Participants. 
SA (N= 39) , ,NA (N=40) 
~ p R2 Model ~ p R2 Model F 
F' 
Threat appraisals .23 .12 -.04 .76 
Coping appraisals .52 .001 .75 <.001 
Negative affect .12 .45 .01 .96 
Negative self- , -.35 .033 .45 a 6.92*** .14 ,.42 .54a 10.20*** 
feeling 
Threat X Coping -.34 .009 .55b 8.20*** -.09 .53 .54b 8.10*** 
Note. aStep 1 variables. bStep 2 variables. 
Examination of the interaction of coping and threat appraisals revealed that the 
interaction was significant in the self-affirmed condition, ~ ='-.34,p = .009, but not in 
the non-affirmed condition, ~ = -.09, P = .53. Simple slopes analyses were conducted 
to test whether coping appraisals moderated the effects of threat appraisal f~~ self-
, ,. ; 
affirmed participants' intentions to change (Figure 6.1). Analysis revealed that at low, 
. - -
~ = .83, p < .001, and moderate levels of threat, ~ = .50, p = .001, greater coping 
appraisals predi,cted greater intentions to change. At higher level~'of perceived threat, 
however, coping appraisals did not predict greater intentions, ~ = .17, p = .39. 
Contrary to models such as EPPM and PMT, when self-affirmed participants appraised 
the threat to be high, but their coping resources to be low, they still reported message ' 
acceptance and intentions to change. In comparison, in the non-affirmed condition, 
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when participants reported high threat appraisals, higher coping appraisals did predict 
greater message acceptance, J3 = .51, P = .040 (Figure 6.2). Thus self-affirmation 
appeared to promote message acceptance and intentions to change in those reporting 
higli threat appraisals, but low coping appraisals. 
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Figure 6.1. Self-affirmed participants' intentions to change as a function of threat and 
coping appraisals. 
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Figure 6.2. Non-affirmed participants' intentions to change as a function ~f threat and 
coping appraisals. 
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Regression analysis was conducted to test whether differences in self-esteem 
~ , 
( 
mediated the effects of negative self-feeling on self-affirmed participants' intentions. 
This was found not to be the case, self-esteem did not predict negative self-feeling in 
response to the health message, R2 = .00, ~ = .01,p = .94. 
Leaflets. In the self-affirmed condition none of the variables individually 
predicted leaflet taking behaviour (Table 6.10). In the non-affirmed condition, 
however, higher levels of negative affect predicted greater leaflet taking, ~ = .75, p < 
.001, while negative self-feeling also approached significance, ~ = -040, p = .059, such 
that higher levels of negative self-feeling acted to reduce leaflet taking, whereas higher 
levels of negative affect promoted leaflet taking. Comparison of Betas for self-
affirmed and non-affirmed participants revealed no significant differences, either for 
negative affect, t(79) = .90, p >.1, or negative self-feeling, t(79) = -.50, p >.1. The 
Threat X Coping interaction did not approach significance for either self-affirmed or 
, non-affirmed participants. 
Table 6.10. Betasfor Multiple Regressions of Leaflet Taking in Self-affirmed and Non-
affirmed Participants . . , 
SA (N= 39) NA(N=40) 
~ p R2 'Model ~ p., R2 Model 
F F 
Threat appraisals .28 .13 -.08 .62 
Coping appraisals .07 .68 .22 .13 
Negative affect -.08 .69 .75 <.001 
Negative self- , .01 .96 .09a . 0.85 -040 .059 ' .34a 4.58** 
feeling 
Threat X Coping .26 .12 .16h 1.22 -.07 .67 .35h 3.62** 
Note. aStep 1 Variables. bStep 2 Variables. 
Self-esteem 
Moderated regressions were conducted to test whether self-esteem moderated 
, the effects of self-affirmation on participants appraisal of threat, coping and experience 
of fear and negative self-feeling. Analysis was conducted both with the single Robins 
et al. (2001) self-esteem item and for the subset of participants who had completed the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale. The data for the interaction of Condition x Self-esteem 
197 
are presented in Table 6.11. Self-esteem did not mode~a~e the effects of self-
affirmation on any of the measures. 
Table 6.11. Betas for Moderated Regressions Examining the Impact of Condition X 
Self-esteem Interaction. 
Robins et al. (N = 80) Rosenberg (N = 52) 
J3 p J3 p 
Intentions -.08 .49 .09 .50 
Leaflet taking -.16 .16 .02 .89 
Threat appraisals .05 .65 .21 .13 
Coping appraisals -.03 .80 .12 .39 
Negative affect -.15 .89 -.00 .98 
Negative self-feeling .16 .18 .15 .29 
Stage of change . 
Moderated regression analysts was conducted to examine whether the effects of 
self-affirmation on participants' intentions to change were moderated by their reports 
. -
of stage of change. Neither stage of change, J3 = .10, p = .35, nor the interaction, J3 = 
; 
.19, p = .12, predicted participants' intentions to eat 5-a-day. 
Moderated regression analysis of participants' leaflet taking behaviour revealed 
that, whereas stage of change did not predict leaflet taking, J3 = .09, p= .43, the 
interaction of Condition X Stage was significant, J3 = -.29, p = .013. Simple slopes 
analysis was conducted at three levels of the moderator: low levels of stage of change 
(1 SD below mean), moderate levels of stage of change (mean) and high levels of stage 
of change (1 SD above mean). The data are in Figure 6.3. Self-affirmation had a 
significant effect at low, f3 = .61,p < .001, and moderate levels of stage of change, J3 = 
.30, p = .005, but not at high levels of stage of change, J3 = -.004, p = .98. 
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Figure 6.3. Interaction of condition and stage of change for leaflet taking behaviour: 
Simple slopes for condition at three levels of stage of change. 
Discussion 
Self-affirming prior to receiving an article outlining the 5-a-day fruit and vegetables 
message increased intentions to eat 5 portions of fruit and vegetables over the next 7 . 
days. Self-affirmed participants were also more likely to take leaflets providing tips on 
I . . 
how to increase their intake and describing portion sizes. Self-affirmed participants 
did not however take more tokens to exchange for fruit after the experiment. Self-
affirmation promoted personal acceptance of a health message, which was both an 
established health risk and promoted adopting a healthy behaviour, rather than 
reducing an unhealthy behaviour. 
In the present study. there was no evidence that self-affirmation increased 
threat appraisals, coping appraisals, or message acceptance in terms of increased risk 
perceptions, ease of imagination, or belief in the link. Nor did self-affirmed 
participants report changes in negative affect or negative self-feeling in comparison to 
the non-affirmed participants. This suggests that the effects of self-affirmation on 
intentions to change and leaflet taking were not mediated by changes in these 
variables. 
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" Though self-affinnation did not directly influence any of the mediating 
variables identified by models such as the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 
I 1992,2000), or Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975), there was evidence that 
these variables predicted the outcomes differently for self-affinned and non-affinned 
participants. This was also the case for the measure of negative self-feeling. Self-
affinnation did not reduce the level of negative self-feeling that participants 
experienced while reading the article, as could be predicted from self-affinnation 
theory. However, negative self-feeling did have a different impact for non-affinned 
and self-affinned participants. 
, The interaction of threat and coping appraisals was a significant predictor of 
intentions for self-affinned participants, but not those who were non-affinned. 
Contrary to EPPM and PMT, when threat appraisals were high, coping appraisals did 
not increase intentions to change for self-affinned participants. Thus, even participants 
who reported low coping appraisals still intended to change., In comparison, for non-
affinned participants coping appraisals increased message acceptance regardless of 
threat appraisals. This finding is contrary to that of Reed and Aspinwall (1998), who 
found an increase in perceived behavioural control following self-affinnation. In the 
present study self-affinnation did not 'increase coping appraisals, but actually reduced 
the importance of perceptions of coping resources. This finding supports self-
, ' 
affinnation theory, suggesting that for participants with high threat appraisals, self-
affinnation provided a resource to accept the threat even when coping resources were 
low. 
An alternative explanation for self-affinnation promoting intentions to change 
among those with high threat but low coping resources is that self-affinnation 
promoted mindless acceptance of the message. Self-affinned participants who reported 
high threat appraisals but low coping appraisals may not have considered their 
~esources to carry out the behaviour change. 
For self-affinned participants, negative self-feeling also emerged as a 
significant predictor of intentions, with higher levels of negative self-feeling 
interfering with message acceptance. In contrast, negative self-feeling did not predict' 
n0!1-affinned participants' intentions. Thus, only when positive aspects of the self were 
made salient prior to reading the health message did negative self-feeling interfere with 
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intentions to change. This finding may reflect a limitation of the effects of self-
affirmation. For participants who felt the most negative self-feeling in response to the 
article,' self-affirmation was unable to promote acceptance of the message in terms of 
intentions to change. Negative self-feeling was not found to be associated with self-
esteem, indicating that this effect could not be explained in terms of low self-esteem. 
In predicting leaflet taking, for non-affirmed participants negative affect and 
self-related negative affect predicted leaflet taking. Non-affirmed participants who 
experienced the most fear in response to the article were more likely to take a leaflet. 
For these participants, who did not intend to change, taking a leaflet may have 
constituted a fear control process. This would be consistent with the findings of Study 
1, which "demonstrated that self-affirmed participants reported greater negative affect 
than those in the non-affirmed condition, suggesting non-affirmed participants may 
have engaged in fear reduction strategies. 
Though negative self-feelings did not predict intentions of non-affirmed 
participants, it did predict leaflet taking. Higher levels of negative self-feeling 
interfered with leaflet taking. This provides some evidence that high levels of negative 
} 
self-feeling in response to a health message can be associated with defensive, 
responding and reduction in health promoting behaviour as self-affirmation theory 
suggests. However, why negative self-feeling only interfered with the behavioural 
measure and not intentions is unclear. 
For self-affirmed participants none of the variables predicted leaflet taking. 
This finding may reflect the fact that 90% of the self-affirmed participants took a 
leaflet. Self-affirmation was effective at promoting leaflet taking regardless of threat or 
coping appraisals. 
There were no effects of self-affirmation on participants' token-taking 
behaviour. However, this measure might not provide an accurate measure of me~sage 
acceptance. For instanc~, some participants reported taking a token bec~use'they were 
hungry and, anecdotally, more participants took tokens closer to lunchtime than'later 
in the day (although no data were collected to confirm this). 
The findings' of the present study suggest that self-affirmation did not influence 
message acceptance either on general measures of acceptance. such as belief in the 
risks. o,r personal acceptance. such as risk perceptions and ease of imagination. Nor did 
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the message impact upon participants' threat appraisals. In contrast, Study 1 
demonstrated that self-affirmation could increase participants' perceptions of personal 
risk, as have Sherman et aI. (2000). One reason for the difference between the findings 
of the present study and Study 1 could be that the present study presented participants 
with a well-established health risk. As participants already knew that they should be 
eating 5 portions of fruit and vegetables a day to promote their health, those who were 
non-affirmed may have been limited in attempts to denigrate the message. Also, as 
participants provided evidence that they did not eat enough fruit and vegetables, and 
had verbally confirmed to the experimenter that they were not performing this 
behaviour regularly, they would have been limited in attempts to defend against the 
personal relevance of the message. Furthermore, 54% of participants reported being in 
the preparation stage, suggesting they had already accepted that this was a personally 
relevant message. As the work of Buunk and Dijkstra (2001) suggests, participants in 
the present study may have recognised that they needed to eat more fruit and 
vegetables to promote their health, but had rationalised this risk to allow them to 
accept the risk without changing their behaviour. The health message used in the 
present study did not specifically target possible rationalisations (e.g., "I will change 
my diet when I have more time I money I choice at meal times"), however, the 
\ - . 
message was still effective at increasing intentions to change in the self-affirmed 
condition. Perhaps self-affirmation acted to allow participants to reappraise the threat 
and reduced the use of rationalisations. 
Stage of change 
Analysis of participants' stage of change indicated that self-affirmation was 
able to increase intentions to change not only for those in the contemplation or 
preparation phases, but also for pre-contemplators. This provides promising findings 
that self-affirmation can not only impact upon message acceptance for those who 
already intended to change but also for those who had heard the message before but 
not previously intended to change~ 
Analysis of the leaflet taking measure suggested that self-affirmation' promoted 
leaflet taking in those who reported being at the earlier stages of change, but not those 
at the later stages of change. This finding may suggest that self-affirmation was most 
successful at promoting message acceptance for those reporting to be at the early 
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stages of change. Alternatively, those at later stages may have already sought out 
information about changing their diet, and thus took fewer leaflets. 
One limitation of the current methodology, however, was the stage of change 
items used. A pre-manipulation measure of stage of change was not included prior to 
reading the message; however, clearly doing so would have provided a more accurate 
measure of participants' stage before reading the health message. This is confirmed by 
examining discrepancies on the item measuring thoughts about changing and the stage 
of change measure. On the "thought about changing" measure 14 participants reported 
already making the change, though they had already confirmed to the experimenter 
that they did not regularly eat 5 portions of fruit and vegetables each day. In contrast, 
on the stage of change measure only 1 participant reported eating 5-a-day for more 
than 6 months and a further 3 participants for less than three months. This 
inconsistency in responding could reflect the fact that participants reported more what 
they intended to do rather than what they currently actually did. 
Self-esteem 
In the present study, as with the majority of results from previous studies, self-
affirmation was not found to be moderated by self-esteem. This was the case using 
both the Robins et al. single item measure of self-esteem and the more widely used 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale. The findings of studies in the current thesis, suggesting 
that self-affirmation was not moderated by self-esteem, were replicated using two 
different measure of self-esteem, and one measured at a different time point to the 
experiment. This finding suggests that, contrary to Steele et al. (1993), the effects of 
self-affirmation are not necessarily more effective for high self-esteem participants. In 
fact the results of the present study suggest that self-affirmation may be less effective 
for those who experience the greatest negative affect in response to a health message, 
but this does not appear to be associated with self-esteem. 
Mood 
. 
The present study found evidence that self-affirmation participants reported 
being in a slightly more positive mood after reading the health information than those 
who were non-affirmed. However, in line with self-affirmation theory, this increase in 
mood did not mediate the effects of self-affirmation. 
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Summary . 
The findings of the present study supports those of Studies 1 and 3, 
. . . , 
suggesting that self-affirmation can promote acceptance of health information. 
The fact that self-affirmation influenced the acceptance of a well-established 
health message, and did so regardless of coping appraisals, suggests that self-
affirmation may have potential as an applied technique. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The present studies tested the effects of self-affirmation on the processing of 
personally-relevant health information, examining more specifically whether self-
affirmation reduced biased processing of this information, and if so whether it was 
associated with systematic processing. The effects of self-affirmation on cognitive and 
affective mediators associated with message acceptance, for example threat and coping 
appraisals and negative affect, were also assessed. Steele's self-affirmation theory . 
(1988) predicts that ~hen information, for example health informa~ion, threatens self-
integrity, people are motivated to engage in processes to r~duce the threat to the self. 
This can result in biased proce~sing of health information (Chaiken et al., 1997; Ditto 
& Lopez, 1992). According to Steele, affirming unrelated valued aspects of the self 
can restore self-integrity after exposure to a negative and personally-relevant health ' 
. . . 
message, and thus reduce the motivation to engage in biased processing. Steele 
suggests that self-affirmation provides a resource to confront the consequences of 
" . , 
negative and personally-relevant information, and should reduce biased processing but 
not by reducing depth of processing. 
These predictions were tested using four experiments measuring the,impact of 
self-affirmation on measures of biased processing (e.g., general message acceptance, 
personal message acceptance, avoidance of attention, accessibility of defensive 
." ,.. " . 
cognitions and changes in health behaviours), and measures of depth of processing 
(e.g., self-reports, reading time, recall of information, sensitivity to message strength). 
Self-affirmation and biased processing 
The findings of Studies 1,3 and 5 suggestthat self-affirmation is able to reduce 
biased processing of personally-relevant health information. When participants were 
presented with a relevant and convincing health message (Study 1) self-affirmation 
promoted greater personal message acceptance on measures of risk perceptio~s, 
intentions to reduce an unhealthy behaviour, ease of imagining experiencing ill-health 
. . . 
as a result of the unhealthy behaviour, and negative affect. Self-affirmation appeared to 
reduce biased processing by reducing rejection of the personal implications of the 
health information. InStudy 3~ self-affirmation was also fo~nd to redu~e biased 
. . 
processing at the level of attentional avoidance, with s~if~affinD.ed participants 
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choosing more often to read a more threateningly titled health article than those who 
were non-affirmed. Also in Study 3, self-affirmation reduced endorsement of counter-
arguments and led to participants recalling less risk-disconfirming evidence after one-
week. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that self-affirmation reduces bias 
in recalL In comparison to non-affirmed participants, those who were self-affirmed 
also reported greater intentions to change an unhealthy behaviour (Study 1,5), a 
greater reduction of an unhealthy behaviour (Study 3), and engaging more in 
behaviours to promote a health behaviour (Study 5). Self-affirmation was seen to 
reduce biased processing and promote message acceptance for both novel and more 
established health threats. These findings support Steele's theory, suggesting that 
affirming valued self-concepts in domains unrelated to a health message can reduce 
biased processing. 
Reed and Aspinwall (1998) and Sherman et al. (2000) have previously shown 
self-affirmation may have the potential to reduce biased processing of health 
information. Reed and Aspinwall found evidence of reduction in biased processing on 
measures of general message acceptance. Sherman et a1. (2000) demonstrated that self-
affirmation promoted personal message acceptance (e.g., greater risk perception and 
intentions to change). The present research extended the findings of past studie~ by 
measuring the impact of self-affirmation using a range of ~easures of message 
, . 
acceptance and demonstrating that the effects of self-affirmation are durable, with 
changes in message acceptance persisting for up to one-month (Study 1), and changes 
in behaviour after 1 week (Study 3), Th~se findings suggest self-affirmation may have 
. the potential as an applied technique to encourage acceptance of personally-relevant 
health information. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, self-affirmation does not always lead to more 
objective processing of health information (Boney-McCoy et aI., 1999; Klein et aI., 
2001; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). The effects of self-affirmation on message acceptance 
. . . 
in the present studies were also not always consistent. Self-affirmation ~ppeared to . 
have very little effect on explicit measures of general or personal message acceptance 
in Study 3, though subsequently self-affirmed participants did report reducing their 
caffeine consumptio~ to a greater extent than those ~ho were non-affirmed. In Study 
4, self-affirmation was found to be associated with slightly less persuasion and lower 
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intentions to change for those at high risk. Replicating the findings of Klein et al. 
(2001), in comparison to non-affirmed participants, those who were self-affirmed were 
more likely to base their risk perceptions on their level of self-esteem as opposed to 
drinking behaviour. The factors that might moderate whether self-affirmation is 
successful at reducing biased processing or is associated with less objectivity are 
discussed below. 
Self-affirmation and depth of processing 
Past studies that have examined the effects of self-affirmation on the 
processing of health information have been inconclusive about whether self-
affirmation leads to message acceptance through systematic processing of ris~ 
information (e.g., Ruiter et aI., 2001). Rather than self-affirmed participants accepting 
a message after thoughtful consideration of the evidence, self-affirmation may promote 
agreeableness, with self-affirmed participants engaging in heuristic processing. If this 
. . 
were the case, self-affirmation may be associated with short-lived effects for 
persuasion (Petty & Wegner, 1999). 
The present studies extended past research by providing a variety of tests to 
examine the effects of self-affirmation on depth of processing. In Study 3, self-
affirmed and non-affirmed participants did not differ in the time they spent reading the 
, .~ . 
health information, the amount of information they recalled after one-week, or their 
self-reports of depth of processing. This suggests that self-affirmed and non-affirmed . 
participants did not differ in the effort they applied to processing the message, a 
finding inconsistent with self-affirmation promoting mindless acceptance. of health ; 
information. Furthermore, Study 1 provided ~vidence that self-affirmation produced 
durable changes in personal message acceptance, with self-affirmed participants 
maintaining the increase in risk perception and ease of imagining the negative health 
consequences of their behaviour. This enduring increase in persuasion is consistent 
with systematic rather than heuristic processing. These findings suggest t~at increased 
message acceptance after self-affirmation is not a result of mindless acceptance of the 
message and heuristic processing. 
In contrast, in Study 4, in which self-affirmation did not reduce biased 
processing, ~elf-affirmed participants appeared to be less sensitive to the strength of 
the arguments presented, a finding consistent with more heuristic processing. Thus, 
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though there is evidence to suggest that increases in message acceptance were not 
mediated by a reduction in depth of processing, in some circumstances self-affirmation 
may be associated with less effort in processing a health message, an issue that will be 
returned in more detail below. 
Limits to the effects of self-affirmation 
The present studies provided mixed evidence for the effects of self-affirmation 
on actual behaviour change. In Study I, although self-affirmed participants reported 
greater intentions to change this was not reflected in their drinking behaviour. In Study 
3, however, self-affirmed participants did report a reduction in their caffeine 
consumption a week after reading the health message. This change in behaviour was 
mediated by an increase in belief in the message. Whether or not self-affirmation 
influences behaviour does not appear to be a result of how effective self-affirmation is 
l" 
at reducing biased processing. For instance, in Study 1 self-affirmation appeared to 
have more consequential effects on the explicit measures of message acceptance than 
, . 
in Study 3, but less impact upon behaviour change. Thus the effects of self-affirmation 
on actual behaviour may depend on the health behaviour targeted. Self-affirmation 
may reduce biased processing of the message, but not influence other processes that 
may be important in the maintenance of an unhealthy behaviour, such as social norms 
, -
and habit. The findings of Study 1 suggest that, in some cases, where an unhealthy 
behaviour may be difficult to change, self-affirmation alone is not sufficient to 
influe~ce behaviour change. 
, There was no evidence from the present studies that self-affirmation reduced 
.,.' 
optimistic bias in participants' risk perceptions. In Studies 1,4, and 5, both self-
affirmed and non-affirmed participants reported the average other to be at greater risk 
of experiencing ill-health as a result of their behaviour, than they believed themselves 
to be. (This was not the case in Study 3, in which both self-affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants saw themselves as at the same risk as the aver~ge other fo~ experiencing 
FBD and breast cancer). Even when self-affirmation promoted increases in personal 
risk perceptions (Study 1) increases were also seen in risk estimates for the average 
other. The effects of optimistic bias on health behaviours ~e still unclear (Weinstein & 
Klein, 1996). For example, whereas optimistic bias has been argued to hinder people 
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from changing risky health behaviours (Weinstein, 1980, 1989), it has also been 
argued to have beneficial effects for coping and mental health (Taylor & Brown, 
1988). The causes of optimistic bias are also unclear, with both cognitive and 
motivational accounts aiming to explain this bias (Alicke et al., 1995; Weinst~in, 
1980). Steele's self-affirmation theory might suggest optimistic bias is a result of 
participants attempting to restore their self-integrity by making favourable comparative 
risk judgements. The fact that self-affirmation was unable to reduce this bias may 
suggest that the effects of self-affirmation' were not powerful enough to overcome a 
bias that has previously been shown to be highly resilient (Weinstein & Klein, 1995). 
Alternatively, self-affirmation's inability to reduce optimistic bias may reflect the role 
of cognitive factors in contributing to this bias. In a recent rc!view of optimistic bias, 
Chambers and Windschitl (2004) argue that while motivated factors may sometimes 
contribute to optimistic bias, to fully understand the bias, non-motivational factors 
must also be considered. , 
Self-esteem as a moderator of the effects of self-affinnation , 
According to Steele (1993) those with high self-esteem have more resources 
(more favourable self-concepts) with which to restore their self-integrity and thus find 
affirming the self easier than those with low self-esteem. In addition, those with low 
self-esteem may find self-affirmati0!1 tasks less credible and relevant (Stone & Cooper, 
2003), with self-affirmation techniques being less effective for those with low self-
esteem. An alternative prediction is that those with low self-esteem may have the most 
" , 
to gain from self-affirmation manipulations, as they do not tend not to engage naturally' 
in self-enhancing processes (Baumeister et aI., 1989; Beauregard & Dunning, 200 1; 
Sommer & Baumeister, 2002). To test these predictions, the present studies included 
measures of self-esteem to assess whether the effects of self-affirmation were 
moderated by self-esteem. 
In Study 2, higher levels of self-esteem were associated with greater reports of 
salience of positive and central aspects of the self-concept, both after a self-affirmation 
and a control task. After self-affirmation, however, increases in salience of positive 
and valued self-characteristics and feelings of positivity towards the self were seen 
regardless of level of self-esteem. Thus, regardless of self-esteem, self-affirmation was 
. 
. effective at making salient resources that could be used to restore self-integrity 
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following a self-threat. Although self-esteem did moderate the effects of self-
affirmation on a handful of measures of message acceptance (e.g., intentions in Study 
1 and risk perceptions in Study 3), on balance the findings from Studies 1,3, and 5 
suggest that the self-affirmation manipulations employed were just as successful at 
reducing biased processing in those with high and low self-esteem. Regardless of self-
esteem, self-affirmation promoted greater personal message acceptance in Studies 1 
and 5. In Study 3, self-affirmation was effective at increasing general message· 
acceptance (increasing the belief in message, and reducing the endorsement of counter-
arguments) and promoting greater attention to the more threateningly-titled health 
article regardless of self-esteem. 
Research published since beginning the present research (Schmeichel & 
Martens, 2005) also supports this finding, suggesting that self-esteem does not 
moderate the effectiveness of self-affirmation. Using a measure of state self-esteem, 
Schmeichel and Martens found that self-affirmed American participants, who had 
written about their most important value, were less likely to derogate an anti-American 
essay. This effect was not moderated by self-esteem. These findings suggest that, 
contrary to Steele (1993), self-affirmation may be as effective for those with low self-
esteem as those with high. 
Further research is needed to establish if self-esteem does moderate the 
effectiveness of some but not other self-affirmation techniques. For example, those 
with low self-esteem may find positive feedback a less credible source of self-
affirmation. The use of value affirmations, however, may be just as effective for those 
. , . . 
with low or high self-esteem, perhaps because they are self-descriptive and credible to 
both those with high and low self-esteem. 
What moderates the effectiveness of self-affirmation? 
In the present studies there is evidence that, while self-affirmation can reduce 
biased processing and promote message acceptance, it can also lead to less in-depth 
processing and less objectivity (Study 4). Similarly, within the literature examining the 
effectiveness of self-affirmation in relation to health threats there is evidence both for . 
(Reed and Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman et aI., 2000) and against (Boney-McCoy et al., 
1999; Klein et aI., 2001) self-affirmation as an effective technique to promote 
objectivity and acceptance of personal risk. What factors might moderate the 
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effectiveness of self-affirmation is still unclear. The current thesis provides some 
pointers to some of these factors. 
Based on the contradictory findings of Studies 1 and 4, one factor that may . 
have moderated the effects of self-affirmation was a difference between the two 
samples' perceptions of their coping resources. Models, such as Witte's (1992) EPPM, 
sugg~st that, even when threat appraisals are high, if coping appraisals are low, a 
message will be rejected. Perhaps self-affirmation promotes acceptance of personal 
risk, but unless people feel able to adopt a healthy behaviour (or reduce an unhealthy 
behaviour) the message will still be rejected. In Study 4, where an older, non-student 
sample was recruited, the higher risk women may have felt less able to change their 
drinking behaviour than the younger women in Study 1, and thus they were more 
likely to reject the message. Steele's theory suggests that self-affirmation should be 
effective even when coping appraisals are low. According to Steele, non-affirmed 
participants reject a health message when threat is high but coping appraisals are low 
because, by r~alising they do not have the resources to change, accepting the message 
does not provide an adequate route to restore self-integrity. In contrast, self-affirmed 
participants have a direct route to restore self-integrity allowing them to accept the 
health message regardless of coping appraisals. Study 5 provided a test of whether 
self-affirmation is effective when coping resources were low. Supporting self-
affirmation theory, for participants with high threat appraisals, regardless of coping 
appraisals, self-affirmation promoted intentions to engage in a healthy behaviour. 
Thus, self-affirming when coping appraisals are low appears to provide a route for 
message acceptance. . 
Fry and Prentice-Dunn (2005) have recently published a study also examining. 
whether coping appraisals might moderate the effectiveness of self-affirmation to 
reduce the use of maladaptive coping strategies, such as avoidance, hopelessness and 
religiosity, and increase the use of adaptive coping, such as behavioural intentions and 
rational problem solving. Parti~ipants were presented with info~ation describing 
breast cancer, including information about its treatment and risk factors. Half the 
participants were also provided with information aimed at increasing their perceptions 
of self- and response-efficacy. For women who had no previous experience of breast 
cancer, self-affirmation significantly reduced maladaptive coping in terms of 
211 
avoidance and hopelessness, but only when no coping infonnation was given. Thus, 
when women's perceptions of self- and response efficacy were boosted, self-
affinnation did not influence maladaptive responding. Presumably even non-affinned 
women who had recei\:,ed coping infonnation felt able to deal with the threat and the 
motivation to respond defensively was reduced. In contrast, when no coping 
infonnation was provided self-affinnation had its greatest effects. This finding 
supports those of Study 5 and suggests that self-affinnation does have the potential to 
reduce biased responding, even when coping appraisals are low. Therefore, the results 
of Study 4, in which self-affinnation did not reduce biased processing, would not 
appear to be a result of the participants having low coping appraisals. 
A second potential moderator of the effectiveness of self-affinnation is 
participants' perceptions of the long-tenn benefits of accepting the health infonnation . 
. As described in Chapter 5, Raghunathan and Trope (2002) have examined the role of 
positive mood as a resource to deal with negative, personally-relevant health 
infonnation. The~ argue that, when health infonnation is perceived to have long-tenn 
health benefits, positive mood can act as a resource to reduce biased processing. When, 
however, the long-tenn benefits of health infonnation are unclear, positive mood acts 
as infonnation about the environment, leading participants to engage in less in-depth 
processing and reducing acceptance of health infonnation. Raghunathan and Trope 
suggest that perceptions of long-tenn benefit may also act to moderate the effects of 
boosts to self-esteem for processing of health infonnation. For instance, when health 
infonnation has c}ear long-tenn benefits, self-affinnation should act as a resource and 
increase message acceptance, whereas if the long-tenn benefits are unclear, a boost to 
self-regard could act as infonnation about the environment, reassuring participants and 
leading to less in-depth processing and less persuasion. Looking back at the findings of 
Study 4, this explanation might not only account for the reduction in persuasion, but 
also the reduced sensitivity to message strength. Perhaps the women in Study 4, who 
fonned an older sample than those in Study 1, perceived there to be fewer long-tenn 
benefits of reducing their alcohol consumption than did those in Study 1. For example, 
compared to younger women, other factors increasing their risk of breast cancer may' 
have been more salient and alcohol as a risk factor may have seemed less important. 
Alternatively the older women could have perceived that the damage to the their health 
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from drinking alcohol may have already been done, or even that there were more long-
term benefits from drin}dng alcohol, for example for heart disease, associated with 
older age. 
Can the findings of Klein et al. (2001) and Boney-McCoy et al. (1999) also 
reflect ambiguity in the perceived long-term benefits of the health information? In both 
studies, rather than presenting participants with a health message outlining a health 
risk and the need to change behaviour, participants were asked to reflect on risky 
health behaviours they performed and their health consequences. Compared to the use 
of a health message, this task may have made it less clear what long-term benefits 
recognising their increased risk may have had. If the long-term benefits were less 
obvious, according to Raghunathan and Trope, the boost to perceptions of self-regard 
. . 
may have led to participants feeling less vulnerable and reduced the motivation to 
engage in inductive processing (i.e., "bottom-up"). The boost to self-regard may have 
acted not as a resource but as information. This may explain why participants in Klein 
et aI's study reported risk perceptions based on their self-esteem rather than their risk 
factor standing, while those in Boney-McCoy et al. (1999), who engaged in more self-
affirmation, felt less vulnerable. 
Further research to establish whether perceptions of the long-term benefits of 
health risk information do moderate the effectiveness of self-affirmation is clearly 
needed. Furthermore, it might also be the case that the long-term benefits of accel?ting 
threat infOImation in other domains may moderate the effects of self-affirmation. For 
example, does self-affirmation only reduce biased processing of feedback about 
personal traits, when these traits are perceived as malleable? ~esumably, if a 
participant believes there is no way of changing, for example, their general 
intelligence, accepting negative feedback on this trait may have no long-term benefit. 
, . 
In this case would self-affirmation reduce biased processing of test results? 
If the effects of self-affirmation are not moderated by the long-term benefits of 
the information, does this mean self-affirmation in some circumstances could be 
maladaptive? The motivated accounts of biased processing of health information 
suggest that defensive processing of personally-relevant health information can serve · . 
important functions. For instances in moderation, minimisation, rationalisation or . 
denial may provide an effective means of dealing with a health threat when a person 
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perceives there is little they can do to avoid that threat (Croyle, Sun & Hart, 1997; 
Sutton, 1982; Witte, 1992). Taylor and colleagues (1988, 2000) suggest that positive 
beliefs about one's health, even when they are unrealistic, may have a protective 
influence for mental as well as physical health. Does self-affirmation have negative 
consequences for well-being if it promotes message acceptance even when participants . 
perceive there is little they can do to avoid the threat? For instance in Study 5, 
participants who reported high threat appraisals, but low self- and response-efficacy, 
still accepted their need to change and intended to do so. For these participants does 
self-affirmation have a positive impact? For example, by allowing them to accept their 
need to change, does self-affirmation encourage them to begin to address their low 
coping appraisals, or alternatively are these participa.nts left feeling at risk but unable 
to change? 
Further research exarruning what factors might moderate the effectiveness of 
self-affirmation to reduce biased processing and exarruning the long-term impact of 
self-affirmation, especially under circumstances where accepting negative information 
may not be beneficial, would both increase our understanding of the effects of self-
affirmation for processing health messages and responses to threats to the self more 
broadly. 
Testing the assumptions of self-affirmation theory and the processing of health threats. 
Predictions about self-affirmation's ability to reduce biased processing of 
\ . 
negative and personally-relevant health information are based on two assumptions. 
t - , , 
Firstly, that health messages pose a threat to participants' self-integrity and, secondly, 
that people are motivated to engage in biased processing to restore self-integrity. The 
studies in the present thesis did not set out to specifically test these assumptions, but 
provide evidence relevant to them. 
Are health-threats threats to self-integrity? 
The present studies suggest that affirming one's strengths or values in a domain 
unrelated to health can provide a means of reducing biased processing. This finding is 
consistent with claims that health messages can act as self-threats (Croyle et al., 1997; 
Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1997), because if affirming some unrelated aspect of the self 
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reduces biased processing, it suggests that health messages also pose a threat to the 
self. 
If health threats do act as threats to self-integrity we might expect them to be 
associated with negative self-feeling, such as feeling disappointed with the self, guilty 
or self-critical. Pilot data from Study 5 supported this. In response to negative health 
information people did report, at least retrospectively, negative self-affect. This finding 
suggests health messages can have negative implications for the self. 
Though health messages may appear to have negative implications for the self, 
this does not necessarily mean all people will find health messages threatening. For 
. example, Crocker and Wolfe (2001) suggest that the types of events that pose a threat 
to people's self-esteem will differ. Whereas for one person a poor score on a maths test 
may threaten a deeply held belief about their mathematical ability, for another, who 
does not value doing well at mathematics, the poor score may have little impact on the 
self. It may well be that for some participants, health provides a more important value 
than for others, or in some cases, for example hypochondria, people may actually seek 
information to confirm that they are unhealthy rather than attempt to ward off this 
information. One limitation of the present studies is that measures ,of individual 
differences in how strongly participants valued health was not taken. Pilot data from 
Study 5 did suggest, however, that all participants reported being healthy to be 
'. 
important to them. Furthermore, from an evolutionary perspective, valuing one's" 
health has clear advantages. Assuming health will be equally valued by all participants 
is problematic (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Further research examining the effects of 
self-affirmation on the processing of health information might benefit from including 
measures of importance of health as a value, and testing whether, as the theory , 
suggests, self-affirmation has its strongest effects when health is highly valued. For 
example, if health is not highly valued, a health message should not threaten self-
integrity, and self-affirmation should have little effect on message acceptance .. 
The findings of the present studies also suggest that models aiming to 
understa~d the processing of fear appeals might benefit from considering 'the role of 
motivational factors other than fear. Das, de Wit and Strobe's (2003) Stage Model of 
processing fear appeals is one model that does suggest that defensive processing is 
motivated by threats to self-conceptions. If defensive processing is motivated by 
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threats to a positive experience of the self, one might predict that higher levels of 
negative self-feeling may predict message rejection. Models of processing of fear 
appeals, including Das et al.'s stage model, make no specific predictions about the 
roles of negative self-feeling or what impact self-resources may have upon message 
acceptance. Incorporating the self into models of processing of health messages may 
be beneficial. For example, models such as Witte's (1992) EPPM suggest that the 
impact of fear upon message acceptance is moderated by coping appraisals, while the 
evidence from Study 5 indicates that this is not the case when positive aspects of the 
self unrelated to the health behavioUr are made salient. This suggests that models of 
processing should consider the role of resources other than coping appraisals that may 
allow people to deal with negative self-relevant information, such as positive beliefs 
about the self in unrelated domains. 
Research examining the role of affective states, other than fear, in the 
processing of health messages is limited (Witte & Allen, 2000). The present research 
suggests that examining the role of negative self-feeling may provide a fruitful place to 
begin assessing the role of other affective responses. For example, the findings of 
Study 5 indicated that, like fear, negative self-affect could also interfere with engaging 
in a behaviour to promote health. ' 
Further tests are also needed to clarify the relationship between self-affirmation 
and negative self-affect. Steele suggests that self-affirmation provides a resource to 
restore self-integrity. Evidence, however, from Study 5 suggests that self-affirmation 
did not reduce negative self-feeling following the health message. Perhaps self-
affirmation does not reduce the negative implication for the self of a health message, 
but allows participants to face up to the negative self-consequences. The findings of 
Study 5 did suggest, however, that it was among those who reported the'most negative 
self-feeling that self-affirmation was least effective at increasing intentions to adopt a 
healthy behaviour. A better understanding of the relationship between ~elf-afiirmation 
and negative self-feeling may shed light on some of the limitations of the effects of 
self-affirmation. 
Is biased processing of health in/ormation motivated? 
Examining the effects of self-affirmation on the processing of health 
information is also relevant to the debate over whether biased processing is a result of 
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motivatio~al or non-motivational processes. Self-affirmation theory suggests that 
biased processing is motivated. As outlined in Chapter 1 there are, however, other 
plausible accounts for biased processing. For instance, according to Renner (2004) 
participants' expectation about information may account for biased processing. Renner 
suggests that unexpected information receives greater scrutiny and consequently tends 
to be evaluated more negatively and found to be less persuasive. Renner provides 
convincing evidence that expectations are important in predicting biased responding, 
demonstrating that when positive personally-relevant health information is unexpected 
it is also evaluated more harshly. Can the effects of self-affirmation be interpreted 
using a non-motivational account? For example, does self-affirmation change 
participants' expectations about health information they receive or lead t~ them feeling 
less surprised by negative information? Though non-motivational explanations are 
possible, they appear to be a less parsimonious account for the effects of self-
affirmation than that of motivated processing. That is not to say that cognitive factors 
do not contribute to biased processing, but that at least sometimes, biased processing 
of health information may be influenced by motivated processes. Further research, 
establishing what mediates the effects of self-affirmation and direct tests of the effects 
of self-affirmation on participants' expectations, could inform the debate concerning 
whether biased processing is motivated. Ultimately, however, teasing apart the 
influences of non-motivational and motivational processes in biased processes may not 
be possible (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). 
Are all self-affirmations alike? 
Steele's self-affirmation theory recognises .that some forms of self-affirmation 
are likely to be more successful in promoting self-objectivity than others. For example; 
. . 
self-affirming a central rather than peripheral aspect of the self is likely to be more 
effective (Steele, 1988). Recently published research has begun to distinguish other 
factors tha.t may differentiate self-affirmation techniques. Schimel, Arndt, Banko and 
Cook (2004) investigated the impact of intrinsic affirmations, which focus participants 
on self-definitional values without making salient social standards or expectations of 
performance (e.g., "Being a doctor reflects the way 1 think people should care for 
others") .and extrinsic affirmations, which focus participants on the contingent nature 
of the values (e.g., "I know 1 am a competent doctor because other people tell me 1 am 
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doing well"). Schimel et al. (2004) examined the use of self-handicapping after a . 
mental arithmetic test as a measure of defensive concerns. They found that intrinsic· 
affirmations. rather than extrinsic affirmations or a control task. reduced self-
handicapping. Schimel et al. suggest that affirming intrinsic aspects of self-worth may 
provide more positive responses than using extrinsic affirmations. Research further 
distinguishing whether self-affirmation manipulations are all alike may help to further 
elucidate what factors might moderate the success of self-affirmation. 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of self-affirmation techniques, and there it was 
noted that self-affirmation techniql,les may also differ in whether they affect self-
esteem. For example. while positive personality feedback as a self-affirmation 
manipulation has been found to increase state self-esteem (Fein & Spencer.1997; see 
also Arndt & Greenberg. 1999; Greenberg et al., 1992), value salience tasks typically· 
'. 
have not (Galinsky. Stone. & Cooper. 2000; Spencer & Steele, 1990; cited in Fein & 
Spencer, 1997). This may suggest that while some self-affirmation techniques may be 
mediated by changes in self-esteem, others are not. 
A recent paper by Schmeichel and Martens (2005) also suggests that some self-
affirmations work by boosting self-esteem, while value salience manipulations appear 
to work through a different mechanism. Based on the Terror Management Theory 
(TMT; Greenberg. Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986), Schmeichel and Martens suggest 
that value salience manipulations are able to reduce biased processing because they 
make participants' world-views salient. TMT suggests that people attempt to control 
anxiety and fear, evoked from knowledge of their vulnerability and inevitable death, 
using two psychological systems (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). Firstly, people's self-
esteem acts a buffer against anxiety,and secondly people's world-views or shared 
cultural beliefs and values. provide them with a sense of stability, meaning and 
importance. Schmeichel and Martens suggest that self-affirmations, in terms of 
positive feedback, can reduce defensive responses through increasing self-esteem. In 
,". ~ •• >. - ' 
contrast. value affirmations do not boost self-esteem directly, but remind participants 
of their world-view and by this route provide a resource to reduce the defensive 
response to threats. Schmeichel and Martens demonstrate that, after mortality salience,' 
, 
. self-affirmation has the potential to reduce negatively biased processing of information 
that threatened participants' world-views. Furthermore, this reduction in biased 
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processing was not mediated by changes in state self-esteem. Not only do~s the work 
of Schmeichel and Martens highlight one of the possible differences between,self-
affirmation techniques, but also demonstrates how the effects of self-affirmation can 
be reinterpreted using competing theories (a topic discussed in more depth below). 
From the perspective of self-affirmation theory, whether or not the effects of 
self-affirmation tasks are mediated by changes in self-esteem is not all that significant. 
, According to Steele, both forms of affirmation ultimately act to restore self-integrity 
and thus act through the same mechanism (e.g., restoring perceptions of the self as 
adaptive and adequate). In support of this, Sherman and Kim (2005) suggest that the 
self-threat used in a self-affirmation task will affect what mediates the effects of self-
affirmation. For example, if participants are presented with a threat to their collective 
self, the effects of self-affirmation might be mediated by changes on a measure of 
collective self-esteem. This logic could also be applied to differences between self-
affirmation manipulations, with the effects of self-affirmation only detectable on 
measures specific to the aspect of the self that is affirmed. For example, if you affirm a 
person's collective self then changes might be seen on a measure of collective self-
esteem. Therefore, differences between self-affirmation techniques can be incorporated 
into the theory. Further research examining possible differences between self-
affirmation techniques may, however, shed light on further factors that mediate the 
effect,S of self-affirmation and potentially moderate the effectiveness of self-
affirmation techniques. 
Self-integrity: The primary motive? 
Self-affirmation theory provides one version of the self-enhancement 
perspective, i.e., that people desire to maintain positive self-evaluations. Much 
research has examined self-evaluation processes separately, with self-affirmation 
theory being one of th~ few theories that has attempted to integrate these processes 
(Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Self· affirmation theory suggests that processes such as, self-
enhancing social COl?parison, self-serving attributions, dissonance, biased processing, 
degradation of out-groups and self-handicapping, among others, all serve to maintain a 
sense of self-integrity. Furthermore, Steele suggests that self-enhancing responses, 
following a threat, can be negated by an opportunity to affirm "central and valued 
aspects of the self' (Steele, 1988, p. 289). 
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Steele and Spencer (1992) claim that the desire to maintain self-integrity is the 
'primary motive. Other motives, such as the desire for self-cons~stency, control or 
predictability, all ultimately serve to maintain self-integrity (for a similar view see 
Sedikides & Strube, 1997). For instance, Steele suggests that the desire to maintain 
self-integrity involves both seeing the self as good and positive, but also the self as 
adaptive, in control and stable. Thus evidence, that in some circumstances people self-
verify or affirm negative self-conceptions (Swann, 1985), is also incorporated into 
) 
self-affirmation theory. 
The primacy of self-integrity as a self-motive is not, however, universally 
accepted. Examination of competing theories, such as dissonance theory, potentially 
provides an alternative account for the findings of the present thesis. Aronson (1992) 
argues that people strive for three things: (a) to preserve a sense of the self as 
consistent, stable and predictable, (b) a sense of the self as competent and (c) a sense 
of the self as morally good. The most important of these according to Aronson is self-
consistency. Aronson (1992) suggests that the effects of self-affirmation can be 
explained more readily by dissonance theory. For example, in the context of a health 
message, a self-affirmation task may remind people that they are a good person and 
subsequently make it harder for them to rationalise a behaviour inconsistent with this 
knowledge. Aronson is not alone in suggesting that the effects of self-affirmation can 
be interpreted in terms of dissonance theory. Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) 
have argued that self-affirmation acts as a trivialisation manipulation, reducing the 
importance of a perceived threat. Alternatively, Thibodeau and Aronson (1992) 
suggest that self-affirmation acts to remind participants of aspects of the self that are 
consistent with their self-concept. Thus self-affirmation is hypothesised to reduce 
rationalisation and attitude change by providing a boost to perceptions of consistency, 
stability and control. 
.. These alternative accounts provide plausible explanations for the effects of 
self-affirmation. Therefore, what evidence is there that self-affirmation is mediated by 
changes in self-integrity? As outlined above, according to Sherman and Kim (2005) 
the effects of'self-affirmation may be mediated by different processes, dependent on 
. the self-threat presented. Core to self-affirmation theory, however, is that affirmations 
in any domain will affirm a more global sense of self-integrity. Self-integrity is loosely 
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defined by Steele (1988), and though a reader is able to sense what Steele has in mind, 
the lack of clarity in the definition hinders operationalising and developing measures 
of this concept. Tesser et al. (2000) have questioned whether self-integrity simply 
means self-esteem. Steele, however, seems to suggest self-integrity is something more 
than just feelings of self-worth. Research to clarify definitions of self-integrity and 
develop measures of this concept would help develop a better understanding of self-
affirmational processes. 
Future directions 
Further research is needed to test self-affirmation theory and competing 
~xplanations for the effects of affirmation manipulations. For instance, Tesser and 
colleagues argue that self-affirmation is one of many self-esteem regulation 
mechanisms, mediated by changes in implicit affect. Research examining the effects of 
self-affirmation, including studies in the present thesis, have demonstrated that self-
affirmation does not appear to be mediated by explicit ratings of affect. The only 
experiment that has directly tested Tesser's claim that self-affirmation is mediated by 
changes in implicit affect is Koole et at. (1999) who found, contrary to self-affirmation 
theory, that the effects of affirming the self were mediated by changes in implicit 
affect. Clearly this finding needs to be replicated. If further evidence were provided 
that self-affirmation was mediated by'changes in affect, this might call into question 
Steele's assumptions about the mechanism underlying the effects of self-affirmation. 
Conclusions 
On balance the findings of the present thesis are consistent with predictions 
derived from Steele's (1998) self-affirmation th~ory. When participants were offered 
an opportunity to affirm important and central aspects of the self, albeit ones unrelated 
to health, they subsequently processed health information in a less biased manner. This 
increase in message acceptance did not appear to be associated with a reduction in 
depth of processing, suggesting that self-affirmation allowed participants to 
thoughtfully consider and accept the health-risk information. Also consistent with 
Steele, self-affirmation did not appear to be mediated by a reduction in negative affect 
or an increase in coping appraisals. Although the evidence from the current research 
suggests that self-affirmation can reduce biased processing, the mechanism by which it 
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does so is unclear. Further research is needed to examine what factors might mediate 
the effects of self-affirmation and to directly test Steele's claims about the role of self-
integrity. 
The present thesis has extended previous research by demonstrating that self-
"affirmation can have durable effects on message acceptance and can lead to 
behavioural change. These findings suggest that self-affirmation may have potential as 
an applied technique. Likewise, self-affirmation was found to increase message 
acceptance of both novel and well-established health messages and was effective for 
t~ose both high and low in self-esteem. However, in light of the findings of Study 4 
and other research (Boney-McCoy et aI., 1999; Klein et aI., 2001) that have 
demonstrated that self-affirmation can be associated with less inductive and more 
biased processing, further research is clearly needed to establish what factors moderate 
the effectiveness of self-affirmation before it can be developed as an applied 
intervention. 
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Appendix A: Example of Self-affirmation and Control Tasks from Study 1 and 5. 
STUDENT VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE 
In the present study we are interested in investigating students' values. By 
values we mean the moral principles and standards by which people try to live , ' 
their lives. For example, honesty might be a core value for some students. That 
is, they may try to be honest in all they do - whether in dealing with other 
people or when studying or working outside university. Following are some 
personal values that other students have described as important to them. 
, Conscientious 
Friendliness 
Spirituality I Religiousness 
Compassion 
Intelligence 
'Hedonism (the pUrsuit of pleasure /happiness) 
Generosity 
Trustworthiness 
Kindness 
Creativity 
Spontaneity 
" 
You are going to be asked to choose a value and write a short statement about it. 
Non-affirmation task: 
Please select the value that is least important to you, and write it in the space 
provided. (This value does not have to appear on list on the previous page.) 
Value: ....................................... ' .............. . 
On the sheet provided please write a short statement (around 2-3 paragraphs) about· 
why this principle or standard could be important to another student. Take a 
couple of minutes to think about how this value may influence their behaviours or 
attitudes. Please write about how they may use this value in their everyday life - at ' 
University, at home, amongst friends or in dealing with strangers. Only think about 
why this value might be important to another person, and not why it is unimportant 
to you. 
Self-affirmation task: 
Please select the value that is most important to you, and write it in the space 
provided. (This value does not have to appear on list on the previous page.) Ifmore 
thail one value is equally important to you then please select just one to write 
about. 
Value: ................................ ~ ....... · ....... .. . 
On the sheet provided please write a short statement (around 2-3 paragraphs) about 
why this principle or standard is important to you. Take a couple of minutes to 
_ think about this value and how this value has influenced your past behaviours or 
attitudes. Please write about how you use this value in your everyday life - at 
University, at home, amongst friends or in dealing with strangers. If you can, try to 
recall and write about specific occasions on which this value determined what you 
did. 
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Appendix B: Example of Leaflet from Study 2. 
Alcohol, Smoking 
and Breast Cancer 
Page 1 
Drinking a single alcoholic drink a day 
increases a woman's chance of developing 
breast cancer by around 6% according to 
a major global study of woman's smoking 
and drinking behaviour. The new research, 
from Cancer Research UK and published in 
the British Journal of Cancer, estimates that 
alcohol accounts for around 4 per cent of 
breast cancers in the developed world - and 
around 2,000 cases each year in the UK 
alone. Ifwomen's alcohol consumption 
continues to increase, this figure is likely to 
rise. In contrast smoking, which causes a 
third of all cancers, was not 
found to contribute to 
breast cancer. 
In the past it has been 
extremely difficult for 
researchers to separate the 
effects of tobacco from the 
effects of alcohol because 
the more women drink the 
more they tend to smoke and vice versa. 
This is a major reason why previous 
work has yielded conflicting results over 
their impact on cancer. The sheer size of 
the new study, including data from around 
150,000 women around the globe, allows 
the researchers to disentangle the two 
factors and make the most accurate 
estimates ever of the risks associated 
with smoking and drinking. 
Page 2 
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Sir Richard Doll, a co-author of the study, 
said: "There has been a great deal of 
research on whether smoking or alcohol 
contribute to breast cancer but until now 
results have been confused. For the first time 
we have undertaken a study large enough 
and detailed enough to look at the separate 
effects of tobacco and alcohol reliably. 
When we did this we found that drinking, 
but not smoking, increases the risk of breast 
cancer." 
Co-author Professor Valerie Beral, of 
Cancer Research UK's Cancer 
Epidemiology Unit at the Radcliffe 
Infirmary in Oxford, said: "This research 
tells us there is a definite link 
Every year 39,500 
women and 300 
men are 
diagnosed with 
breast cancer 
By the age of 80 
breast cancer will 
affect 8.8 out of 
every 100 women 
One drink a day 
raises the figure 
for women to 
9.4 cases per 100 
Six drinks a day 
raises the figure 
for women to 
13.3 cases per 100 
between alcohol 
and breast 
cancer and the 
evidence 
suggests that 
the more a 
woman drinks 
the greater her 
risk." 
The average 
alcohol intake 
for UK women 
has increased 
from about 7 
grams to 8 
grams per day 
in the last 
decade, but for 
young women 
the increase has 
been even greater. This increase in 
alcohol consumption could have a 
significant impact upon breast 
cancer incidence. 
Page 3 
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While women who drink are at a 
higher risk of a number of diseases, 
including cancers of the throat and 
liver, they are at a lower risk of heart 
disease and stroke than are non-
drinkers. Dr Gillian Reeves, who 
also co-authored the report, says: 
"The balance between the harmful 
effects of alcohol on breast cancer 
and its beneficial effects on heart 
disease depend on a woman's age". 
It is not until after the age of 65 or 
so that the benefits of moderate 
drinking become apparent as before 
then the risk of breast cancer is far 
higher than that of heart disease. 
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research 
UK's Chief Executive, said: "Large 
studies of this kind are very 
important for dissecting the complex 
causes of cancer. This research 
reinforces advice that excessive 
drinking can be hazardous. It seems 
that women's attitudes to alcohol are 
changing and this can only have a 
negative impact on their health. It's 
important that we get the message 
out to young women that drinking 
too much is dangerous." 
Page 4 
Recommendations 
There are many things that you can do 
to look after your heart, including 
taking plenty of exercise and eating a 
healthy diet. The small benefit that 
alcohol brings is not large enough to 
recommend that those who don't drink 
should start. Considering the potential 
harmful effects of drinking, including 
breast cancer, it is advised that tbose 
who do drink should not exceed the 
Government's recommendations for 
alcohol consumption. These are 
currently: 
I: • For women - 14 units per 
week. 
For example, that is 14 
glasses of wine or 7 pints of 
; beer 
• For men - 21 units per week 
For example, 10 and a half 
r pints of beer or 21 shots 
Ii 
(One unit of alcohol is equivalent to 
half a pint of beer or cider (of normal 
strength), 1 glass of wine, 1 measure 
of spirits or 1 smaIl sherry or port.) 
Page 5 
Contacts 
Breast Cancer Campaign 
Clifton Centre. 110 Clifton Street, London, 
EC2A4YT 
Tel: 02077493701 
Breast Cancer Care 
Kiln House, 210 New Kings Road. London. 
SW642NZ 
Tel: 0207384 2984 
Alcohol Concern 
Tel: 020 7922 8667 
Drinkline 
0800 9178282 
Alcoholics Anonymous 
GSO, Po Box I, Stonebow House, Stonebow, 
York, YOI 7NJ 
Tel: 01904644026 
From Cancer Re earch UK, 2002 
Page 6 
Images taken from: http://news. bbc.co.uk/ 1/hilhealth/2445273 .stm 
http://www.bajabeachclub.co.uk/ncle.htm 
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Appendix C: Table of Values from VIA Classification of Strengths Scale and 
Corresponding Item Selected for Self-affirmation Task. 
Value 
Wisdom and Knowledge 
Creati vity (originality, 
ingenuity) 
Curiosity (interest, novelty 
seeking) 
Open-mindedness 
Gudgement, critical 
thinking) 
Love of Learning 
Perspective (wisdom) 
Courage 
Bravery 
Persistence 
Integrity (authenticity, 
honesty) 
Vitality (zest, enthusiasm) 
Humanity 
Love 
Kindness (generosity, 
compassion, altruistic love) 
Social intelligence 
(emotional intelligence) 
Justice 
, Citizenship (team work, 
social responsibility) 
Fairness 
Leadership 
Temperance 
Forgiveness and Mercy 
Humility I Modesty 
Prudence 
Self-regulation (self-
control) 
. . 
Item 
"Being able to come up with new and different ideas and, 
ways of doing things is one of my strong points." 
"I am always curious about the world.". 
. "I value my ability to think critically." 
"I love to learn new things." 
"My friends value my good judgment." 
"I must stand up for what 1 believe in even in the face of 
strong opposition." 
"I always finish what 1 start." 
"I always admit when I am wrong." 
"I'm never bored." "I love what I do." 
"There are people in my life who care as much about my 
feelings and well-being as they do about their own." "I 
can express love to someone else." 
"I go out of my way to cheer up people who appear 
down." "I am never too busy to help a friend." 
"No matter what the situation, 1 am able to fit in." 
"I really enjoy being part of a group." "I work at my best 
when 1 am a member of a group." 
"I treat all people equally regardless of who' they ,might 
be." 
"One of my strengths is helping a group of people work 
well together even when they have their differences." "I 
am very good at planning group activities." 
"I never seek vengeance." 
"I do not act as though 1 am a special person." 
" 'Better safe than sorry' is one of my favourite mottoes." 
"I control my emotions." "I never get side tracked when 1 
work." 
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Transcendence 
Appreciation of beauty and 
excellence 
Gratitude 
Hope (optimism, future 
orientation) 
Humour (playfulness) 
. Spirituality (religiousness, 
faith) 
\ ' 
"I experience deep emotions when I see beautiful things." 
"At least once a day I stop and count my blessings." 
"Despite challenges, I always remain hopeful about the 
future." 
"I try to add some humour to whatever I do." 
"I am a spiritual person." 
Note. Adapted from Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification. 
Peterson, C, and Seligman, M. E. P., (2004). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Copyright 
2004 by Values in Action Institute. Reprinted with permission of the Values in Action 
Institute. 
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Appendix D: Example of Character Strength Self-Affirmation Task . 
. ,' 
Classification of Character Strengths 
The following questions are designed to measure your personal strengths. Please 
choose one option in response to each statement. If you are not sure choose the 
response that most closely reflects your thoughts. All of the questions reflect 
statements that many people would find desirable, but we want you to answer only in 
terms of whether the statement describes what you are like. Please be as honest and 
accurate as possible. ' 
1) Being able to come up with new and different ideas and ways of doing things is 
one of my strong points. ' 
Very much like 
, ' 
me 
o 
Like me Neutral 
o o 
2) I am always curious about the world. 
, , 
Very much like 
me 
o 
Like me Neutral 
3) I value my ability to think critically. 
Very much like 
me 
o 
Like me 
4) I love to learn new things. 
Very much like 
me 
o 
Like me 
Neutral 
Neutral 
5) My friends value my good judgment. 
" ~ >t I 
V ~ry much like Like me Neutral 
me 
o o o 
Unlike me 
o 
Unlike me 
Unlike me 
Unlike me 
Unlike me 
o 
, 
Very much 
unlike me 
o 
Very much 
unlike me 
o 
Very much 
unlike me 
,0 
Very much 
unlike me 
D. 
Very much 
unlike me 
o 
6) I must stand up for what I believe in even in the face of strong opposition. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
o " 0 0 0 0 
7) I always finish what I start. . 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0; 0 0 0 0 
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8) I always admit when I am wrong. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
9) I'm never bored. 
Very much like Like me - Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
10) I love what I do. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
; 
11) There are people in my life who care as much about my feelings and well-
being as they do about their own. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
_ .12) I go out of my way to cheer up people who appear down. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
_ 13) No matter what the situation, I am able to fit in. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
/ me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
14) I can express love to someone else. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much· 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
15) I am never too busy to help a friend. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
-me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
16) I really enjoy being part of a group. 
Very much like -Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
17) I treat all people equally regardless of who they might be. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
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18) One of my strengths is helping a group of people work well together even 
when they have their differences. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
19) I am very good at planning group activities. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
20) I work at my best when I am a member of a group • 
Very'much like Like me . Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
21) I never seek vengeance. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
22) I do not act as though I am a special person. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
23) ''Better safe than sorry" is one of my favourite mottoes. ' 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
. me 
0 0 0 0 
24) I control my emotions. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 0 0 0 
25) I never get side tracked when I work. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
0 a 0 0 
26) I experience deep emotions when I see beautiful things. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
Q 0 Q Q 
27) At least once a day I stop and count my blessings. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me 
me 
Q a Q Q 
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Very much 
unlike me 
a 
Very much 
unlike me 
o 
Very much 
unlike me 
a 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
Very much 
unlike me 
a 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
Very much 
unlike me 
Q 
28) Despite challenges, I always remain hopeful about the future. 
Very much like Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
29) I try to add some humour to whatever I do. 
Very much like' . Like me . Neutral Unlike me Very much . 
7 
unlike me me 
0 0 0 0 0 
! 
30) I am a spiritual person., ~ 
Very much like . Like me Neutral Unlike me Very much 
me unlike me 
0 0 0 0 0 
, ' .. 
; , 
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Appendix E: Health Information Presented in Study 3 . 
. WOMEN, CAFFEINE AND FIBROCYSTIC BREAST DISEASE (FBD) •. , 
, What is FBD? 
Fibrocystic Breast Disease (FBD) is a condition that can develop in women from 
their late teens or early twenties, and persists until menopause. The condition is 
characterised by benign (non-cancerous), fluid filled lumps in one or both breasts, 
causing soreness and discomfort. Symptoms include the breasts being painful to 
, touch, general sensitivity and swelling. The severity of FBD varies between 
patients, with some experiencing constant and severe symptoms, and others 
suffering intermittent bouts influenced by their hormonal cycle. 
I Who is affected? 
Over 2,000 women are diagnosed yearly with FBD. Research suggests it is higher 
in those whose lifestyle has certain features: There is some suggestion that FBD is 
more common in women who smoke. There is good evidence that FBD is more 
common in women who consume caffeine. 
, Is it serious? 
A very serious concern over FBD is that it may make women more susceptible to 
breast cancer. Several large scale studies have found a measurable increase in the ' 
incidence of breast cancer in women who have also experienced FBD. A further 
problem is that if cancer does develop, the lumpiness caused by FBD can make a 
cancerous growth harder to detect. Some of the symptoms of FBD may match 
those seen in breast cancer, leading to possible delayed diagnosis. 
I What is known? ,. 
Links have been found between FBD and caffeine, the stimulant drug found in 
coffee, tea, cola, and other beverages. In one recent study it was found that women 
who consumed two or more caffeinated drinks per day were significantly more 
likely to develop FBD than those who consumed less caffeine than this. In other 
research some evidence was also found that FBD was higher among women who 
smoked 'than among those who did not smoke. However, no other study has found 
a link with smoking. ' 
I How strong is the evidence for the link between caffeine and FBD? 
, The link between FBD and breast cancer is well-established. Most of the evidence' 
also supports the link between caffeine and FBD. However, a few smaller studies 
have failed to find any connection between caffeine and FBD and there remains 
some uncertainty over the mechanism involved, given that caffeine does not 
accumulate but is normally excreted within several hours of consumption. It is thus 
unclear how a substance which does not remain in the body could cause an illness 
such as FBD. Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence appears to implicate caffeine 
in the development ofFBD, and no other explanation has been able to account for' 
the linear relationship seen between consumption of caffeine and the increased risk, 
ofFBD observed. 
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I What should I do? 
Given the evidence of caffeine's association with FBD and the proven link between 
FBD and the development of breast cancer, the latest advice is that women should 
consume no more than 2 caffeinated drinks per day. 
Given the controversial nature of the evidence concerning smoking, there is no 
recommendation that women should give up smoking because of concerns over 
FBD. 
I Recommendation, I 
So overall, given the evidence, the latest scientific advice is that women should 
consume no more than 2 caffeinated drinks per day. 
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Appendix F: Examples of Participants' Thought Listings and How They were Used to 
Generate Statements for Study 3. 
Counter-arguments. Counter-argument statements were broken down into statements 
i '.
attacking the source, size of the study, questioning the reliability of evidence, or 
talking about the benefits of drinking alcohol. For example, participants made 
statements such as ''The sample isn't that big compared to world population, it might 
not be that reliable" and "What about evidence that suggests alcohol is good for you?". ' 
Article taken seriously. Participants made statements to suggest that they thought the 
issue was serious. For example, two participants included the following statements 
demonstrating they thought the topic was genuine and serious: ''This information 
should be more widely publicised" and ''This is important, 1 must tell my mum about 
this". 
I ." ' .. , '. 
Minimisation o/threat. Statements demonstrating participants minimised the impact of 
the information were divided into those (1) where participants argued that people can 
not worry about everything that might be bad for them, (2) suggesting that the 
, " 
participants believed they were healthy in general so did not need to be concerned, (3) 
" 
suggesting there are many different possible causes of cancer and there was no need to 
be particularly concerned about drinking. For example, two participants included the 
following thoughts: "I don't smoke and 1 exercise regul~ly, so I'~ healthy ove~all" 
and ''They say everything gives ,you cancer, you can't avoid everything". 
Denying personal relevance. Statements attempting to deny or down play the 
relevance of the message were broken down into statements suggesting: (1) the 
message was not relevant and participants did not drink too m~ch, (2) the ~essage was 
not relevant at participants' age, (3) other students drank more or the same as the 
participant, (3) the participants nearly drank the recommended amount, so did not need 
to be concerned, or (4) participants made no reference to themselves at all. 
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Appendix G: Example of Strong Version of Article from Study 4. Changes from 
weak version highlighted. 
Alcohol and Breast Cancer 
Drinking a single a1coholic drink a day 'ncreases a woman's chance of 
developing breast cancer by around 6%, according to a major global study of 
woman's drinking behaviour. he new research, from Cancer Research UK 
d published in the British lournal of Cancer, estimates that if women in 
I ritain sto ed drinkin 2,000 deaths from breast cancer would be avoided 
annuall . 
I rofessor Valerie Beral of Cancer Research UK's cancer epidemiology unit 
aid, "This research tells us that there is a definite link between alcohol and 
breast cancer and the evidence suggests that the more a woman drinks, the 
reater her risk. " 
Past research has been inconclusive about the role of alcohol in the 
develo ment of breast cancer. he sheer size of the new study, including data 
rom around 150,000 women around the globe, allows the researchers to make 
e most accurate estimates ever of the risks associated with drinking. Sir 
Richard Doll, a co-author of the study, said: "There has been a great deal of 
research on whether alcohol contributes to breast cancer but until now results 
have been confused. or the first time we have undertaken a study large 
enough and detailed enough to look at the effects of alcohol reliabl . When we 
(lid this we found that drinkin ,increases the risk of breast cancer.' 
While women who drink regularly are at a higher risk of a number of diseases, 
including cancers of the throat and liver, they are at a lower risk of heart 
disease and stroke than are non-drinkers. 011 Gillian Reeves, who also co-
authored the report, says: "The balance between the harmful effects of alcohol 
on breast cancer and its beneficial effects on heart disease depend on a 
woman's age". It is not until after the age of 65 or so that the benefits of 
moderate drinking become apparent and before then the risk of breast cancer is 
far higher than that of heart disease. 
This research does not suggest that every drink a woman has increases her risk 
of breast cancer by 6%. Instead the report suggests that a woman who regularly 
drinks one unit a day (7 units a week) has an increased risk of 6%. While 
drinking an average of 2.5 units a day (17.5 units a week) will increase her risk 
by 15%. urrent research would suggest that alcohol may increase the risk of 
. reast cancer by raising the levels of oestrogen in the body. Oestrogen has a 
M'ell-established link with breast cancer, with research suggesting oestrogen 
can playa role in both triggering its development and encouraging the growth 
of tumours (Prince Hen's Institute of Medical Research . 
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, ir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK's Chief Executive, said: "Large studies of 
his kind are ve 1m ortant for dissectin the com lex causes of cancer. This 
research reinforces advice that excessive drinking can be hazardous." The 
Government's current recommendations for alcohol consumption are: 
• For women - 14 units per week. For example, that is 14 small glasses of wine or 
about 9 bottles of mixers (e.g. Bacardi Breezers, Smirnoff ice). 
(One unit of alcohol is equivalent to half a pint of beer or cider (of normal 
strength), 1 glass of wine, 1 measure of spirits) 
This new research suggests that from the point of view of reducing the risk of 
breast cancer, women should reduce their alcohol intake as far as possible. 
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Appendix H: Example of Weak: Version of Article From Study 4. Changes from 
strong version highlighted. 
Alcohol and Breast Cancer 
Drinking one alcoholic drink a day ay increase a woman's chance of 
developing breast cancer by around 6%, according to a new study of 
woman's drinking. he new research, from the Clean Living research team, 
estimates that if women in Britain stopped drinking, 2000 deaths from 
reast cancer would be avoided each year. 
alerie Beral of the Clean Living team said, "Our research suggests that 
there may be a connection between alcohol and breast cancer, and that the 
ore a woman drinks, the greater her risk." 
Past research has been inconclusive about the role of alcohol in the 
development of breast cancer, with one recent large-scale international 
tudy, funded by the World Health Organisation (WHO), suggesting 
cohol consumption has no link to breast cancer. The Clean Living 
esearchers claim that their new study allows them to estimate the risks 
ssociated with drinkin more recisely. Richard Doll, a co-author of the 
study, said: "There has been a great deal of research on whether alcohol 
contributes to breast cancer, until now results have been confused. rrhe 
current study is able to look at the effects of alcohol in a new way, 
demonstratin that drinking may increase the risk of breast cancer." 
While women who drink regularly are at a higher risk of a number of 
diseases, including cancers of the throat and liver, they are at a lower risk of 
heart disease and stroke than are non-drinkers. Gillian Reeves, who al a 
was involved in the research, says: "The balance between the possible 
harmful effects of alcohol on breast cancer and its beneficial effect on 
heart disease depend on a woman's age". It is not until after the age of 65 or 
so that the benefits of moderate drinking become apparent and before then 
the risk of breast cancer is far higher than that of heart disease. 
This research does not suggest that every drink a woman has increases her 
risk of breast cancer by 6%. Instead the study suggests that a woman who 
regularly drinks one unit a day (7 units a week) has an increased ri k of 6~ . 
While drinking an average of 2.5 units a day (17.5 units a week) will 
increase her risk by 15%. The Clean Living team is unable to explain 
exactly why alcohol might increase the risk of breast cancer. 1I0wev r, a 
mall amount of evidence suggests that it raises the levels of oe trogen in 
the bod. 
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aul Nurse, head of the Clean Living team, said: "Studies of this kind are 
ery important for understandin the causes of cancer, as well as romoting 
our cam ai for health living. This research reinforces advice that 
excessive drinking can be hazardous." The Government's current 
recommendations for alcohol consumption are: 
• For women - 14 units per week. For example, that is 14 small glasses of wine or 
about 9 bottles of mixers (e.g. Bacardi Breezers, Smimoff ice). 
(One unit of alcohol is equivalent to half a pint of beer or cider (of normal 
strength), 1 glass of wine, 1 measure of spirits) 
he Clean Living research team suggests that from the point of view of 
I educing the possible risk of breast cancer, women should reduce their 
alcohol intake as far as possible. Other research teams are currently 
onducting further studies to establish whether alcohol does indeed playa 
I ole in the develo ment of breast cancer. 
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Appendix I: Example of Debrief Sheet for Weak Version of Article in Study 4. 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
** PLEASE READ ** 
; ,! 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your help is very much appreciated. 
The article you read was altered for the purpose of this study, and contained inaccurate 
information. The information was actually based on a press release and research from 
Cancer Research UK, examining the risks of drinking alcohol on breast cancer. The 
Cancer Research UK study, including data from over 150,000 women from around the 
globe suggests there is a definite link between alcohol and breast cancer. 
Other information misrepresented in the article, for example, in the following ways: 
• The Clean Living research team does not exist and the actual research was 
conducted by Cancer Research UK ' 
. • The arguments in general for the link between alcohol and breast cancer were 
presented to be weaker than the Cancer Research UK report would suggest. For 
example, Cancer Research UK argue that their study found that alcohol does increase 
the risk of breast cancer and there is a definite link. ' 
• There has been no WHO research indicating alcohol is not linked to breast 
cancer. 
• We are unaware of other research currently research the link between alcohol 
and breast cancer. . 
If you are interested in finding out more about the actual Cancer Research UK report 
on the effects of alcohol on breast cancer, the address of their website is below: 
http://www .cancerresearchuk.org/news/pressreleases/343 85 
Information about the study 
The present study is investigating the impact of completing character strength 
questionnaires on reactions to health information. Past research has demonstrated that 
completing tasks that make allow people to focus on personal values can increase . 
acceptance of a threatening health message. . 
The current study has been approved be the Department of Psychology, University of 
Sheffield Ethics Committee 
If you would be interested in finding out more the current research, please email: 
XXXXX@shef.ac.uk . 
Below please find contact details of organisations that provide information about 
issues relating to both breast cancer and alcohol. 
Thank you once again for your time and participation. 
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\ 
Contacts 
Breast Cancer Campaign 
Clifton Centre, 110 Clifton Street, London, EC2A 4YT 
Tel: 02077493701 
, Breast Cancer Care 
Kiln House, 210 New Kings Road, London, SW6 42NZ 
Tel: 02073842984 
Alcohol Concern 
Tel: 020 7922 8667 
Drinkline 
08009178282 
Alcoholics Anonymous 
. GSO, Po Box 1, Stonebow House, Stonebow, York, Y01 7NJ 
Tel: 01904 644026 
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Appendix J. Example of Health Information Presented in Study 5. 
Increasing your consumption of fruit and vegetables can significantly 
reduce the risk of many chronic diseases. It has been estimated that 
eating at least 5 portions of a variety of fruit and vegetables a day could 
reduce the risk of deaths from chronic diseases such as heart disease, 
stroke, and cancer by up to 20%. 
Poor diet contributes to 1/3 of all cancers, while diet and inactivity will 
soon over take smoking as the major cause of preventable deaths. 
Increasing your intake of fruit and vegetable consumption the most 
important cancer prevention strategy, after reducing smoking. In 1998, 
the Department of Health's Committee on Medical Aspects of Food 
Policy and Nutrition concluded that higher vegetable consumption 
would reduce the risk of colorectal cancer and gastric cancer. There 
was also some evidence that higher fruit and vegetable consumption 
would reduce the risk of breast cancer. 
Higher consumption of fruit and vegetables also reduces the risk of 
coronary heart disease and stroke. A recent study found that each 
increase of 1 portion of fruit and vegetables a day lowered the risk of 
coronary heart disease by 4% and the risk of stroke by 6%. Evidence 
also suggests an increase in fruit and vegetable intake can help lower 
blood pressure. 
Research suggests that there are other health benefits too, including 
delaying the development of cataracts, reducing the symptoms of 
asthma, improving bowel function, and helping to manage diabetes. 
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As well as the direct health benefits, eating fruit and vegetables can help to 
achieve other dietary goals including increasing fibre intake, reducing fat 
intake, help maintain a healthy weight, and substituting for foods with 
added sugars (as frequent consumption of foods with added sugars can 
contribute to tooth decay). . 
The message at the heart of the 5 A DAY programme - to eat at least 5 
portions (400g) of a variety of fruit and vegetables each day - is consistent 
with dietary recommendations around the world, including those from the . 
World Health Organization. 
The reason why fruit and vegetables are so beneficial is because as well 
as vitamins and minerals, fruit and vegetables also contain many complex 
plant components called phytochemicals. Some of the vitamins and 
phytochemicals are also antioxidants, destroying free radicals in the body. 
These free radicals are known to have a role in causing cancer as well as 
other harmful effects. 
It appears that the benefits of fruit and vegetables stem not only from the 
individual components, but also from the interactions between these 
components. Dietary supplements containing isolated vitamins or minerals 
do not appear to have the same beneficial effects as fruit and vegetables .. 
themselves. Indeed, in some studies, vitamin supplements caused more 
harm than good. 
http://www.5aday.nhs.uklHealthBenefits 
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